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Abstract
We investigate the e↵ects of di↵erent sets of shocks on di↵erent economies in this thesis.
First we study “contractionary” monetary shocks by imposing sign restrictions on the im-
pulse responses of macroeconomic variables for 6 di↵erent economies namely Japan, UK
and the US as well as Malaysia, Mexico and South Korea. We show that i) the e↵ect of
an adverse monetary policy shock on industrial production is ambiguous; ii) there is price
puzzle for Japan and UK which we conjecture as an outcome of excessive bank lending
and poor regulation but not of passive monetary policy; iii) there is delayed overshooting
puzzle for Japan and the exchange rate puzzle for the UK and the US. For the case of
developing countries, we find evidence of delayed overshooting of the exchange rate and
evidence of price puzzle for Mexico. This thesis also compares the dynamic e↵ect of fiscal
policy on macroeconomic variables implied by a substantial class of DSGE models with
the empirical results from imposing sign restriction for Italy and the UK. We observe that
private consumption and output increase after an “expansionary” spending shock. This
is in a sharp contrast with neoclassical theories such as real business cycle (RBC) model
that presumes consumers behave in Ricardian manner. A “contractionary” fiscal policy,
whether it is revenue or an expenditure shock, induce a recessionary impact on the econ-
omy. Therefore while we find support for the conventional Keynesian models, RBC and
some variants of this model are naive to explain the behavior of private consumption and
wages after a fiscal policy shock. Finally in this thesis we attempt to shed new light on the
dynamic impacts of government spending and technology shocks on the real exchange rate
for the Euro area. The main idea under this identification scheme is to let the data speak
about the behaviour of the interested variables. Moreover, this thesis investigates the
impacts of fiscal policy and technology shock jointly in contrast to most of the literature
which just focuses on one shock only. Our investigation suggest that the real exchange
rate appreciates (falls) following an expansionary fiscal shock. It appreciates in response
to a positive technology shock as well however after an on impact depreciation (increase)
which lasts for 8 quarters.
Key words: Exchange rate puzzles, Government spending shocks, Technology shocks,
DSGE model, Sign restrictions, Monetary shocks, Business cycles, Vector auto-regression,
Fiscal Shocks
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Introduction
Modern economies experience considerable short-run fluctuations in their main eco-
nomic indicators. Recognizing the sources of these extensive fluctuations is the main goal
of the macroeconomic research agenda. There is a large body of literature, indeed, ded-
icated to introducing a theory that is able to interpret these fluctuations. This thesis,
likewise, is devoted to shedding some light on the facts behind macroeconomic dynamics
by investigating the behavior of the economy following di↵erent shocks.
Moreover, economics is referred to as a “science” and is based on objective analysis.
Milton Friedman (1953) argues that (positive) economics in essence should be indepen-
dent of any ethical positions and normative judgments. To study any science, including
economics, there are two methods to employ: first, the researcher might choose to go
from theory to data (i.e. deductive approach), and second s/he can let the data speak
and afterwards determine theories that could reflect this data, (i.e. inductive approach).
This thesis scrutinizes the data to find the benchmark theory that is able to interpret
the macroeconomic movements more concretely. In the first two chapters, no specific the-
ory is applied per se to generate the sign-restrictions. In the third chapter, however, the
implications of the RBC model are utilized to obtain the sign-restrictions for technology
shock.
In monetary policy literature for instance, to understand the impacts of contractionary
monetary shock, researchers often examine all the past data, since it a↵ects the current
monetary policy choices (Leeper, Sims and Zha 1996). They also consider contemporane-
ous data since central banks might use that in making decisions about monetary policy.
If central banks therefore increase the interest rate unexpectedly, the data usually demon-
strates that inflation as well as reserves will decline respectively. Empirically speaking, if
one just chooses these reactions, as the only identifying restrictions, real GDP shows an
ambiguous reaction to a contractionary shock. However, most central banks believe that
a contractionary monetary policy will reduce real output. Yet, the controversy is, what is
the process by which central banks have achieved these further assumptions in identifying
a contractionary monetary shock? This fits a certain truth that economists want their
results to fit with their prior theorizing. Therefore, there is a danger that economists
get stuck in obtaining the same results as a result of imposing restrictive priors on their
models. The objective of this thesis, therefore, is to impose as few restrictions as possible
in identifying the shocks.
This thesis initially studies monetary policy in developed and developing countries,
since in the majority of the countries today, short-term stabilization is mainly done by
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monetary policy. The theories explaining monetary policy assume that the central bank
has the power to set the interest rate according to the Taylor rule. The only exception is
if the rule imposes a negative nominal interest rate, because the nominal rate cannot fall
below zero1. Central bankers were largely credible in the past and they were in charge of
financial and monetary stability. However, after the current financial crisis in 2008 with the
massive quantitative easing and expansionary monetary policies, central banks experience
a circumstance that no central bank has experienced before. According to Goodhart et
al. (2012), from a traditional point of view, the central banks today are indeed increasing
uncertainty by running quantitative easing packages. He therefore argues that it is very
important to review the implementation of the monetary policy and its role in the economy
over time.
The short-term nominal interest rate in some countries such as United States was
however, close to zero during the 1930s. Japan also experienced a virtually near zero
percent interest rate on short-term government bonds during the 1990s. Furthermore,
the Federal Reserve more recently lowered the short-term nominal interest rate not really
much higher than zero. The question here is that how monetary policy, if at all, can a↵ect
the economy when nominal interest rate is very close to zero. One possible solution is
to use fiscal policy instead of monetary policy when short-term interest rate is in its zero
lower bound. A second possibility is to conduct “open market operation”. Even though
it cannot lower the nominal rate when it is already zero, they may be able to decrease
the real interest rate. C.Romer (1992) argues that the rapid growth in money stock in
United States in the middle of the 1930s increased inflationary expectations, simulated
interest-sensitive sectors of the economy, and caused the economy to bounce back from
the great depression. The issue of whether or not expansionary monetary policy with a
zero nominal rate increases expected inflation is complicated. When nominal interest rate
is nearly zero percent, the economic agents are reluctant to use the liquidity services that
are provided by money. Therefore, when the central bank increases stock of money by
open market operation, economic agents can merely hold the additional money in place of
the bonds. It is not really obvious why inflationary expectations of the individuals have
to rise2.
The second chapter of this thesis studies the e↵ectiveness of the di↵erent kinds of
fiscal policy shocks. The third chapter focuses on the the e↵ects of the technology shock
1This implies that if high-powered money obtains a nominal return of zero, there would be no reason
for any economic agent to purchase an asset that o↵ers a negative real interest rate.
2Goodhart et al. (2012b) criticize the massive recent quantitative easing packages that has happened in
the UK, EU and the US. They argue that:“ reducing the o cial long-run risk-free interest rates on treasury
bonds by few further bases points is of second order importance since we are already at historically low
level”. They add that: “ what really matters is not the yield curve of the o cial risk-less rate but rather
the high credit risk premium in weaker banks, both in stronger and weaker countries”.
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as well as fiscal policy shocks simultaneously. Regarding to the impacts of fiscal policy on
economic activities, studies show that the US government has faced large budget deficits
since the very early 1980s. Moreover, as a result of aging issues in the US, it seems like
there are going to be more retiree than people who are willing to work in coming decades.
If there is not any change in the policy related to governing these issues, the resulting
boost in health care and security expenses are going to push the deficit even higher over
the coming years. This concern is being discussed recently in the US in the name of
“fiscal cli↵”. Many other industrialized countries, as well, run considerably large budget
deficit and face long-run budgetary problems. That is the reason why it is important to
study the impact of fiscal policies. It is always assumed that long and consistent budget
deficit reduce growth, and that they lead to some type of crisis in the economy. The other
important issue in studying of fiscal policy is to understand the impacts of government’s
choice between taxes and bonds. The Ricardian equivalence model that is the benchmark
model in this regard, assumes that the household budget constraints can be expressed
in terms of the present value of government purchases without any need to distinguish
if they are financed through taxes or bonds. Additionally, it is reasonable to presume
that taxes do not a↵ect households preferences directly. Furthermore, since the path of
taxes does a↵ect either households utilities nor preferences, it does not have any impact
on their consumption. Similarly, it is not taxes but government purchases that a↵ect the
accumulation of investment at each point of time. The key result here therefore is that
it is merely the value of government purchases and not the way they have been financed
that has an impact on the economy3. This irrelevance of the way government choose to
finance their expenditures is called “Ricardian equivalence between debt and taxes”.
The performance of Ricardian equivalence is closely related to the issue of whether the
permanent-income hypothesis is robust enough to explain the consumption behaviour of
individuals. In the permanent-income model, we assume that merely an economic agents
lifetime budget constraint has an impact on its behaviour. This means that the time path
of individuals after-tax income does not matter. For example, a bond which is issued today
and will be repaid by future taxes result in changes in the path of after-tax income without
having any impact on the lifetime budget constraint. In this condition, if the permanent-
income hypothesis is the good approximation of the consumption behaviour of economic
individuals, Ricardian equivalence hypothesis can also describe the economic soundly.
The assumptions that lead to Ricardian equivalence also imply that a tax cut increases
expectations of the present value of future tax expenditures by precisely the amount of
the cut. Therefore the households consumption remains una↵ected since their lifetime
resources does not change. In this situation, when there is an endogenous government
3Government purchases can be financed through either bonds or taxes.
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expenditure, a tax cut increases expectations of the future tax imbursements by less than
the value of the tax cut, and therefore consumption increases. The role of expectations
increases the likelihood that there are occasions in which, an increase in the rate of taxes
or a decrease in government expenditure increases the overall demand of good and services
in the economy4.
Regarding to the importance of the technology shock, RBC model basically provides
an example of an economy where real shocks drive output fluctuations. Assuming that the
economy is Walrasian, the responses to the shocks are optimal. Therefore, here fluctuations
in the economy are not the byproduct of market failure, and government interventions to
tackle them merely reduce welfare. This model also predicts that the fluctuations of
output are largely determined by the persistence of the technology shocks5. The Real-
business-cycle model, indeed, recognizes disturbances in technology as the main source
of macroeconomic fluctuations. By assumption, the impacts on the level of technology
eliminates gradually. The net outcome of the improvements in the level of technology
is that output rises in the period of the shock and then slowly goes back to normal.
Consumption responds less significantly and also more sluggishly than output; therefore
investment is more volatile than consumption after a technology shock.
As the remaining of this introduction, we discuss the questions and the findings of each
chapter about the sources of these fluctuations. The first chapter of this thesis considers
monetary policy in developed and developing countries, and the following chapters study
fiscal policy and technology shocks.
1.1 Monetary Policy and Macroeconomics
Monetary economists scrutinize the behaviour of prices, monetary aggregates, interest
rates and output while the fundamental theoretical and empirical issue centers on under-
standing whether money and monetary policy have any impact on real economic activity.
In their analysis, empirical monetary economists often resort to using a vector autore-
gressive (VAR) framework, developed by Sims (1980), as a toolkit both to describe and
understand the behavior of the data as well as to conduct policy experiments while they
scrutinize the impact of monetary policy on real economic activity. To that end empirical
researchers have been particularly interested in investigating the validity of the bench-
mark theories focusing on the impact of monetary policy shocks that lead to economic
4These possibilities has been confirmed by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) in their study of Denmark and
Ireland during 1980s.
5One of the shortcomings of this model is that the saving rate is assumed to be constant and not
time-varying. Therefore, investment and consumption are equally volatile and labour supply does not
change. In practice, however, investment in most cases changes more than consumption, and employment,
real wages and hours is significantly pro-cyclical. This means that the latter variables vary in the same
direction as aggregate output.
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fluctuations.
The fashionableness of VAR models is probability as a result of the possibility to use
these models to validate DSGE models imposing sign restrictions. Therefore, extract-
ing meaningful results from a reduced form VAR is a di cult task and requires cross-
equation restrictions which should be credible and uncontroversial. In this thesis, taking
into account the developments in the field, we investigate the impact of monetary shocks
for several (developed and developing) countries considering a Bayesian structural VAR
model as suggested by Uhlig (2005) and Mountford and Uhlig (2009). This methodology
identifies structural monetary shocks by imposing a small number of sign restrictions for
a few periods on the impulse responses to a monetary policy innovation to avoid some
of the identification problems that arise in the traditional structural VAR models. In
particular, we impose no restrictions on the responses of the key variables of interest, in-
dustrial production and exchange rate, to monetary policy shocks to let the data speak as
we concentrate on data for six countries; three of which are developed economies namely
UK, US, Japan and the other three are emerging countries including Mexico, Malaysia
and South Korea
It is worth stressing at this point that although most of the results in the VAR litera-
ture are consistent with the economic theory, Sims (1992) using a recursive identification
approach observed a positive relationship between prices and interest rate. Eichengreen
(1992) named this anomaly as a price puzzle. Sims (1992) argues that the price puzzle is
possibly an artifact of the omitted variables problem. In other words, because the central
bank has more information concerning expected inflation than a researcher can incor-
porate in a VAR model, the finding that the interest rate rises in response to expected
high inflation can only be explained due to the omission of a fundamental variable from
the model. Recently, Castelnuovo and Surico (2009) show that the price puzzle is the
by-product of a passive monetary policy with respect to inflation. More concretely, if a
central bank accommodates instead of fighting inflation, such a passive policy will generate
indeterminate multiple equilibria and expectations become self-fulfilling. Thus, high infla-
tionary expectation will be fulfilled by a passive monetary policy leading to expectation
for even higher inflation. This implies that the argument of Sims (1992) is correct only
when monetary policy is passive. However, the price puzzle could as well be an artifact of
poor identification problem of the VAR structure or structural breaks in the data.
Our empirical findings can be summarized as follows. Following a “contractionary”
monetary policy shock, the real industrial production increases slightly in the US and in
the UK. In contrast, in Japan, the response of real GDP to the shock is negative; however,
this response is small and negligible. When we turn to developing countries, we find that
the size of the response of real GDP to the shock is not di↵erent from that in developed
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countries and it is small. These findings are similar to that in Uhlig (2005) who find
that contractionary monetary policy shocks do not necessarily lead to a fall on real GDP.
Although the response of prices is tainted due to the sign restriction, it is interesting
to note that we do not observe the price puzzle for the set of countries we carry this
investigation. Exception to this observation is Mexico where there is evidence of a price
puzzle which we later show that this anomaly is an outcome of the 1994 crises.
1.2 Macroeconomy After Di↵erent Kinds of Fiscal Polies
One shortcoming of the literature is that compared to a large body of research which study
monetary policy shock, fiscal policy has not attracted enough attention in the literature.
On that ground, it is inconsistent with lengthy public debates on the impacts of fiscal
policy which strengthen the arguments about the importance of government spending and
taxation. All the discussion about the Balanced Budget Amendment in the US or having
independent organizations to implement fiscal policy in EU emphasize that fiscal policy
is an e↵ective way in smoothing out the business cycles variations. Furthermore, there is
not a single economic theory which is universally applied to explain the impacts of fiscal
policy on key economic variables. For that purpose, researchers have been particularly
eager to systematically observe the validity of the benchmark theories focusing on the
e↵ect of various sorts of fiscal policy shocks on the macroeconomy. We believe that this
is a very important deficiency in the literature. Therefore, one of the objectives of this
thesis is to examine which theory explains the economy.
We focus on the behavior of private consumption and wages in this thesis. The reason
is that di↵erent theories predict very dissimilar reaction of these two variables after a fiscal
policy shock. Put it di↵erently, even though most theories suggest that an expansionary
government expenditure increases output, the behaviors of wages and private consumption
are obscure. For instance, the classical IS-LM model predicts that after an increase in
government expenditure, private consumption grows as a result. Real business cycle (RBC)
model, on the other hand, shows consumption falls as a consequence of negative wealth
e↵ect after the similar shock. While it is mostly agreed that an expansionary government
expenditure increases output, di↵erent theories suggest a di↵erent response of wages and
consumer prices. The classic IS-LM model predicts that after an increase in government
expenditure, there will be an expansion in private consumption. RBC model, on the other
hand, shows that consumption will fall as a result of negative wealth e↵ect. As private
consumption is the main determinant of the aggregate demand, we put it as the center
of attention. The impact of fiscal policy on wages, as well, is a controversial issue in the
literature. The purpose in this thesispaper, therefore, is to investigate the comparability of
these two benchmark theories.
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We apply the new identification scheme for vector autoregressive (VAR) approach for
two chief European countries namely UK and Italy. Studying the e↵ects of fiscal policy on
European economies seems to become a hot topic recently since a large body of literature
about fiscal policy is focused on the US. Furthermore, after the recent financial crisis,
UK and Italy apply large cuts in di↵erent sectors of the economy which lead to di↵erent
demonstrations and protests from people who are going to be a↵ected by these tight fiscal
policies. Therefore, we find it worthwhile to see what will be the impact of these changes
for 6 coming years after such shocks happens.
To summarize our results, we find that an expansionary government spending shock
will cause a remarkable increase in private consumption and wages. Thus, our empirical
results seems to be in line with the conclusions of the models in which consumers behave
in a non-Ricardian manner and are hard to reconcile with those of the neoclassical theories
such as RBC model.
1.3 Fiscal Policy and Technology Shock
The reaction of the real exchange rate after government spending and technology shocks
across OECD countries show significant and systematic inconsistencies from standard the-
ories. On the other hand, it is important to have a comprehensive idea of the behaviour of
the exchange rate to understand the mechanism behind exchange rate fluctuations. In gen-
eral, it seems like current studies cannot support the predictions of both Mundell-Fleming
type and intertemporal business cycle models under standard assumptions. Theoretically
speaking, inflation increases after an expansionary government spending shock since these
shocks result in higher total demand for domestic goods. Technology shock, however,
decrease relative prices as a result of an increase in supply of domestic goods.
Recent literature delivers numerical evaluations of the impacts of an expansionary
government spending on exchange rate mostly for the Unites States. These findings help
to understand the proper size and timing of countercyclical fiscal policy measures and are
important for policy making. Having said that, the observed results on this fundamental
question tend to bring contradictory answers up to this time. Besides, most findings
concerning the e↵ect of fiscal policy in addition to technology shock on exchange rate are
done for the U.S. and Euro Area appears not to attract enough attention in this regard.
An expansionary fiscal policy in theory would deteriorate current account and as a
result appreciates the real exchange rate. After technology shocks the direction and the
size of the reactions of key economic indicators for example hours worked, employment
and exchange rate are controversial.
These disagreements appear to stem from the Real Business Cycle (RBC) model. The
focal assumptions of the DSGE models that are founded in RBC theory are that prices
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are flexible and firms are optimizing agents. In the textbook collaboration of the RBC
model, productivity gains shocks amends demand for labour and increase together per
capita hours worked and output. As a result, it decreases the relative price of domestic
goods. These predictions have little support empirically, however.
The aim of this chapter is to re-examine the dynamic reaction of exchange rate em-
ploying a new identification scheme putting forward by Enders et al.(2011) to identify
fiscal shocks and productivity gains at the same time within an estimated VAR model.
Essentially, they engage DSGE model in order to determine the sign and also the time
horizons of the identification restrictions. The credibility of these identification collabo-
rations chiefly depends on the theoretical framework that has been chosen. This model is
fully identified and endures robust predictions of the reaction of several key variables, it
leaves exchange rate behavior unrestricted following an expansionary government expen-
diture and productivity gain. Furthermore, we re-examine this issue for the Euro Area
since the impacts of these two shocks is less empirically investigated in the EU compared
to the U.S.
The VAR model we employ for this chapter uses data on quarterly frequencies for
the Euro Area relative to the US for post-Bretton-Woods period but before the current
financial crisis. The integrated variables in this model are namely consumption, output,
investment, government spending, government budget balance, inflation, the short term
interest rate and exchange rate. The findings here illustrate that exchange rate appreciates
(falls) following an expansionary fiscal policy in the EU. On the other hand, after a positive
technology shock, exchange rate appreciates for the whole period after an on impact
depreciation (increase). In general, although we employ an identification scheme that is
not often used in the study of fiscal policy, the empirical estimations are e↵ectively in line
with the existing literature concerning these issues. One therefore, can conclude that the
facts behind the exchange rate dynamics that are widely used across di↵erent identification
schemes are in particular appropriate to examine theories of the international transmission
mechanism.
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Theoretical Framework
Solution of DSGE Model
This section summarizes the theories of the business cycle, which are the theoretical
background of our empirical analysis. It also briefly explains how these models contradict
each other.
1.1 Real Business Cycle Model
RBC model delivers the benchmark framework for the analysis of the macroeconomic
fluctuations following the seminal works by Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Prescott
(1986). Its specifications are also broadly used in the dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium (DSGE) framework. Moreover, rational expectation hypothesis (REH) has been
developed within the RBC framework, based on the assumptions about rationality and
human behavior. The most important aspects of the RBC theory are grounded in three
basic factors: the e ciency of the business cycle, the significance of technology shocks as
the main foundation of economic fluctuations and the narrow role of monetary factors.
RBC theory is very popular among macroeconomists even though it is not as attrac-
tive for policy makers. Central bankers prefer to employ other macroeconomic models,
although their e↵ectiveness has been critically questioned by macroeconomists such as
Lucas (1976). Cooley and Hansen (1989) try to integrate the monetary sector in a con-
ventional RBC model with the assumptions of fully competitive and frictionless markets.
This model is called the “classical monetary model” and implies the neutrality of mone-
tary policy. These results are not desirable for most central bankers who think that their
policies have an impact on the real sectors of the economy, at least for a short period of
time. These models’ policy implication is that monetary authorities have to maintain the
short term nominal rates at a constant and equal to zero6. The monetary authorities in
the real world, however, change interest rates to soothe the deviations of the inflation and
other main indicators from their target value. This gap between theory and the practice
of monetary policy implies that there should be some missing aspects within the current
economic models. These shortcomings are indeed the main motivation behind some of the
post-Keynesian assumptions7.
The RBC model, similar to any macroeconomic theory, is concerned with the sources
and the nature of macroeconomic fluctuations. The assumptions in this model are com-
parable to most similar models8. The economy contains a large number of similar, price-
6This is known as the “Friedman Rule”.
7New Keynesian models keep the RBC as one of the underlying structures while adding some new
assumptions.
8The model is a discrete-time variation of the Ramsey growth model.
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taking firms as well as households. Households exists for an indefinite period. There are
three di↵erent kinds of input for production by firms: labor, capital and technology. The
components of output are consumption, investment and government spending. Govern-
ment spending is financed by lump-sum taxes9. The last assumption is about the two
driving forces in the model namely technology and government spending. The model,
furthermore, assumes that in the absence of other kinds of shocks, GDP growth rate di-
rectly depends on the rate of technological progress. Technology, after all, is determined
by random disturbances. Similar assumptions hold for government spending: the growth
rate of government spending follows the growth rate of technology shock. Two main con-
tributions to this model are the inclusion of leisure and the introduction of randomness
in technology and government spending. Furthermore, RBC solves the household’s opti-
mization problem by assuming that consumers are uncertain about rate of returns and
future wages. Uncertainty, furthermore, leads households not to follow a predictable pat-
tern in their consumption behavior. Instead, their behavior largely depends on the shocks
in technology and government spending that has occurred up to that date.
In order to solve the problem of the RBC model, the model was changed in two respects:
first, the role of government is excluded and second, 100 percent depreciation of capital
is assumed in each period. We justify the exclusion of government in order to isolate
the impacts of shocks in technology. The model shows that an increase in technological
progress increases the current wage relative to the expected future wage, and results in
increased supply of labor. However, increase in saving reduces the expected future interest
rates that will reduce labor supply in return. This model basically provides an example of
an economy where real shocks derive from output fluctuations. Assuming that the economy
is Walrasian, its response to the shocks is optimal. Therefore, fluctuations in the economy
are not the byproduct of market failure, and government interventions merely reduce
welfare. The real-business-cycle theory implies that the dynamics in aggregate output
show the time-varying Pareto optimum. This model also predicts that the fluctuations of
output are considerably determined by the persistence of technology shocks. Transitory
technology shock in the RBC framework, however, cannot count for significant long-lasting
output movements. One of the shortcomings of this model is that the saving rate is
assumed to be constant and not time-varying. Therefore, investment and consumption
are equally volatile and the labor supply does not change. In practice, however, investment
is most of the time, more volatile than consumption. Employment, real wage and hours
also are significantly pro-cyclical (See Kollmann et al, (2010)). This implies that the latter
variables fluctuate in the same direction as aggregate output.
9As in the Ramsey model, there is no di↵erence between the impact of debt or tax finance on the
outcome of the model.
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The Real-business-cycle model, therefore, recognizes disturbances in the technology
as the main source of macroeconomic fluctuations. It s assumed that improvements in
the level of technology eliminates gradually. Therefore, output rises in the period of
the shock and then slowly goes back to its baseline level. The RBC model implies that
the majority of the fluctuations in the industrialized countries are indeed the optimum
reaction of the economy to the exogenous fluctuations in the real forces (most significantly
changes in technology). It also assumes that we have perfect competition and a frictionless
market in the economy. Accordingly, cyclical variations do not necessarily mean the
ine cient allocation of resources and hence, stabilization policies may not be needed at
all. Therefore, fluctuations in total factor productivity are supposed to be the only driving
force behind the business cycle. This is, however, in contrast to the traditional theories of
technology shock. These models assume that technology shock is the source of the long-
run economic growth and is uncorrelated with the business cycle. More significantly, RBC
theory leaves out the monetary factors in its analysis of the economy. After a government
expenditure shock, this model assumes that consumption falls and labor input increases
as a result of its negative “wealth e↵ect”10.
However, there are several criticisms to the basic real-business-cycle model predictions.
The first critique concerns technology shocks. There is significant evidence that short-term
changes in the Solow residual echoes more than variations in the speed of technological
progress11. Hall (1988) demonstrates that the dynamics in the Solow residual are closely
related to external factors such as the political party of the president, variations in military
expenditures, and changes in oil prices. However, none of these variables appear to influ-
ence technology considerably in the short-term. These findings show that changes in the
Solow residual may not be a good measure of technology innovations. Di↵erent factors,
therefore, determine output growth and it seems that output growth is not necessarily
reproduced from a positive technology shock. The second critique of the model concerns
the exclusion of monetary disturbances. A key aspect of this model is that it associates
the fluctuations in output just with real shocks rather than monetary shocks. However,
there is a strong set of evidence that monetary shocks can a↵ect the economy considerably.
It is indeed argued that monetary policy can have real impacts on the economy as a result
of sluggish prices and wages.
1.2 Basic Keynesian Model
The second important theory of macroeconomic fluctuations is called Traditional-Keynesian
theory. This model is based on the assumption that there are some barriers to the on-
10Since these changes in government purchases are not permanent, agents react by reducing their capital
possessions.
11See for instance Bernanke and Parkinson (1991)
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impact adjustment of nominal prices and wages. These sluggish nominal adjustments
lead to aggregate demand fluctuation at the given price level. Thus, it causes monetary
disturbances, that merely a↵ect the demand side of the economy, to a↵ect employment
and output. Moreover, in most empirical studies, the exchange rate and international
trade have a significant role in short-run fluctuations12. An increase in the exchange rate
implies that foreign currency becomes more expensive and domestic currency depreciates.
The basic assumptions about capital flows are that there are no restrictions on “capital
mobility” and that investors are risk-neutral13. The assumption about the exchange rate
expectation is that investors do not expect the “real” exchange rate to change. If we
assume that the exchange rate is floating and then add robust restrictions on the behavior
of the price level and output, it turns out that there are variations in the exchange rate
that are fairly predictable. When expectations about the real exchange dynamics are not
static, perfect capital mobility no longer implies that domestic and foreign interest rates
are identical. Indeed, traditional Keynesian theories state that under perfect capital mo-
bility, interest rate disparities have to be o↵set by expectations of exchange rate dynamics.
This means that the domestic real interest rate can be higher than the foreign real interest
rate only if the domestic currency depreciates by this di↵erence in interest rates. This is
called “uncovered interest rate parity”.
This correlation between expected exchange rate dynamics and interest rate dispari-
ties leads to the “exchange rate over-shooting” that is put forward by Dornbusch (1976).
Overshooting basically means that on-impact reaction of a variable to a shock is larger
than its long-run response. The interest rate disparity assumption suggests that the nom-
inal exchange rate is prone to overshoot in response to a monetary shock. For instance,
suppose that initially domestic and foreign real interest rates are equal and therefore
nominal exchange rate is not expected to change. Then the central bank employs a more
expansionary monetary policy by targeting a lower interest rate for a given level of output
and inflation. We know that this means an increase in the supply of money. Keynesian
models in general argue that monetary interventions do not have any real impact in the
long-term. Therefore, the long-term outcome of an expansionary monetary policy is an
increase in both price level and the exchange rate.
In the short-run, an expansionary monetary policy is assumed to reduce the domestic
nominal interest rate. Investors, therefore, only hold more domestic assets if they expect
that domestic currency is going to appreciate. However, this implies that the domestic
currency is now cheaper than its long-term value and hence it has to appreciate so much
12The nominal exchange rate here is defined as the price of a unit of foreign currency in terms of domestic
currency.
13This is called “perfect capital mobility“.
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on impact that it overshoots its expected long-term value.
1.3 The New-Keynesian Model
During the late 1970s economists did not follow the Keynesian model anymore and classical
theories were dominant in the literature. Fischer (1977) and Phelps and Taylor (1977),
however, form a new strand of thinking within the Keynesian framework by taking into
account the microeconomic foundations of wage and price rigidities. This new theory is
called the “new-Keynesian” model. The new-Keynesian model’s goal is to explain why the
dynamics in price level are inconsistent with nominal output fluctuations. This is referred
to as “price stickiness” and suggests that real output cannot be chosen by individual
households and firms but rather is part of the residual. New-Keynesian economics concerns
the decisions of monopolistic competitive firms that determine their individual prices. The
firms are also constrained by their sales level. This is in contrast to the new-classical
models in which competitive price-taking firms determine the level of output. According
to the new-Keynesian model, however, price and wage rigidities are the consequence of the
microeconomic factors such as the level of technology, imperfect information, imperfect
capital market and etc. These factors take away any motivation for each individual firm
to concentrate on the nominal demand in setting their own prices. This therefore supports
the traditional Keynesian prediction that macroeconomic externalities lead to the failure
of the free-market economy. Di↵erent economists, however, disagree on the extent of the
price stickiness.
This model consists of households that supply labour, consume goods and hold money
and bonds. Firms, on the other hand, hire labour and produce and sell products in monop-
olist competitive markets. Households and firms behave optimally. Households maximize
the expected present value of utility, and firms maximize profits. There is also a central
bank that controls the interest rates. The main aspect of the new-Keynesian economics is
the lack of a market clearing mechanism. Therefore, a new-Keynesian model is a model in
which prices cannot adjust fast enough to clear markets within a short period of time. A
well-documented prediction of the new-Keynesian framework is that after a fall in nominal
demand, the aggregate price level decreases less than proportionately over a relatively long
period of time. During this period, the real price level exceeds the equilibrium price level.
This implies that the sub-equilibrium level of output is not chosen willingly by firms and
labours but imposed on them as a constraint. Every agent experiences a constraint that
is implicitly a product of its own failure to adequately decrease its price level. This leads
to the coordination failure that is a key feature in explaining price stickiness. The growth
of new-Keynesian economics in the previous decade is mainly associated with the search
for a realistic model to explain the wage and price rigidities using rational expectations.
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Most new-Keynesian models relate rational expectations to the maximizing behavior of
the economic agents.
Moreover, similar to the RBC model, the equilibrium is in the form of a stochastic
process for all the endogenous variables in the economy. Economic agents intertemporal
optimization decisions are also subject to their goals and constraints given the market’s
clearing mechanism (Gali, J. (2009)). Furthermore, in spite of the contrasts between
the RBC and the new-Keynesian model, they have some very strong similarities with each
other. The new-Keynesian model does indeed have roots in some of the implications of the
RBC model. It is based on the assumption of the infinitely-lived representative household
which maximizes its utility by consumption and leisure, subject to the intertemporal bud-
get constraint. The second assumption, that reflects this similarity, is the large number of
firms that have access to the same level of technology, subject to exogenous random shifts.
Even though capital accumulation, which is the key feature of the RBC model, has been
dismissed in the new-Keynesian model, it can be integrated simply and is indeed a com-
mon aspect of the medium-scale versions. The new-Keynesian model combines the DSGE
features of the RBC model with the assumptions that di↵erentiate it from the “classical
monetary models”. For instance, some of the main elements of the new-Keynesian model
are monopolistic competition, nominal rigidities and short-run non-neutrality of monetary
policy. Therefore, the new-Keynesian model assumes that the prices in the good market
are determined by private firms maximizing their profits and not by the Walrasion “auc-
tioneer” trying to clear all the markets simultaneously. This would lead to some friction
in the market since adjusting prices of goods is costly for firms. Nominal rigidities in the
market cause changes in nominal interest rate not matched one-by-one by the changes
in inflation expectations. This changes real interest rates and leads to fluctuation in pri-
vate consumption and investment. It also changes output and employment since firms
optimally adjust their level of production to the new level of demand. In the long run,
however, all the prices and wages return to their baseline level and the economy bounces
back to its natural equilibrium level.
The standard new-Keynesian model assumes that monetary policy a↵ects a household’s
intertemporal consumption through the interest rate. The literature, however, has not
found enough support for purely forward-looking consumers. Fuhrer (2000), Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), and Leith and Malley (2005) modify the new-Keynesian
models by introducing di↵erent habits that a↵ect the consumers’ behavior. This con-
sumption habit can be internal or external14. Amato and Laubach (2004) study optimal
monetary policy in a sticky-price new-Keynesian model using internal habits15. They ar-
14When households are not successful to internalize the externalities that their consumption creates for
other households, their habit is called External.
15Internal habit means households increase their consumption relative to their own past consumption
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gue that since habits are internal, the equilibrium price level near the original steady-state
price level is still e cient. This implies that there is no trade-o↵ between the output
gap and inflation. Hence the observed trade-o↵ in the data is the result of other kinds of
ine ciencies such as mark-up shocks. It might also be the byproduct of the “zero lower
bound nominal interest rates” that some countries face during recessionary periods.
The focus of the new-Keynesian model is to provide microfoundations to explain price
stickiness and also the non-neutrality of money. It also emphasizes the role of contracts on
the persistence of price stickiness and the resulting e↵ectiveness of monetary policy. New
generations of monetary models include these aspects in a fully specified DSGE model
and apply the formal modeling strategy that has been the feature of a RBC model. The
new-Keynesian model is developed as a tool to understand monetary policy and its e↵ects
on inflation, economic growth and welfare. It is also the backbone of new intermediate-
term models that are currently being developed in the IMF, The Federal Reserve Board
and some other central banks. It also delivers a theoretical justification of the inflation-
targeting policies being implemented by most of the central banks in the industrialized
world. It is, however, worth mentioning that the new-Keynesian model is based on the
basic Keynesian model that assumes monopolistic competition and price stickiness along
with the perfectly competitive labor market.
1.4 New Consensus Macroeconomics
The new Consensus Macroeconomics (NCM) has been extensively used recently to in-
terpret the impacts of monetary policy16. This model of macroeconomy is based on the
new-Keynesian framework and pushes it further by encompassing developments in this
area such as rational expectation hypothesis. The NCM model underlines the e↵ective-
ness of monetary policy while reducing the importance of fiscal policy. It also shows that
price stability is achievable through monetary policy since inflation is a “monetary phe-
nomenon” and can only be controlled through changes in interest rate (See Woodford
(2009)).
Arestis (2011b) studies the NCM model in an open economy through the following 6
equations:
Y gt = a0 + a1Y
g
t 1 + a2Et(Y
g
t+1) + a3[Rt   Et(Pt+1)] + at(rer)t + st (1.4.1)
Pt = b1Y
g
t + b2Pt 1 + b3Et(Pt+1) + b4[Et(Pwt+1)  Et (er)t] + s2 (1.4.2)
and do not take into account the level of other households’ consumption.
16This model is comprehensively discussed in Arestis, (2007a), (2007b), (2009), (2011); Arestis and
Sawyer, (2008b)
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Rt = (1  c3)[RR0 + Et(Pt+1) + c1Y gt 1 + c2(Pt 1   P T )] + c3Rt 1 + s3 (1.4.3)
(rert) = d0 + d1[[Rt   Et(Pt 1)]  [(Rwt)  E(Pwt+1)]] + d2(CA)t + d3E(rer)t+1 + s4(1.4.4)
(CA)t = eo + e1(rer)t + e2Y
g
t + e3Y
g
wt + s5 (1.4.5)
ert = rert + Pwt   Pt (1.4.6)
at is a constant that can reproduce fiscal policy. Yg is the output gap of the domestic
country while Y gw is the world output gap. R is nominal interest rate and Rw is the
world nominal interest rate. P represents the inflation rate while Pw shows the world
inflation rate and P T is the inflation target. RR0 is called the equilibrium real interest
rate. Equilibrium interest rate is a rate in which the output gap is zero. According to the
second equation above, this means that the rate of inflation is constant. rer represents real
exchange rate in these equations and er shows the nominal exchange rate. The nominal
exchange rate is defined in the last equation and is expressed as foreign currency units per
domestic currency unit. Pw and P are world and domestic price level correspondingly. CA
is the current account of the balance of payments. s characterizes stochastic innovations.
E represents the expectations at time t. The nominal exchange rate can be calculated
from the last equation:  (er)t =  (rer)t + Pwt   Pt.
The first equation represents aggregate demand where the current output gap is gen-
erated by past as well as expected future output gaps, real interest rates and the real
exchange rate. It is assumed here that monetary policy has an impact on the economy
through output gap, which is the di↵erence between actual output and trend output17.
This equation actually exhibits intertemporal optimization of expected lifetime preferences
of the representative agent. The controversial feature of the representative agent is that
it never defaults under the standard collaboration of the model. The intertemporal opti-
mization is rooted in the assumption that all debts are being paid fully at the end of the
period. This being the case, there is no credit risk or default risk in this model as a result
of the “transversality” condition. This implies that every economic agent that has rational
expectations is completely creditworthy. All the IOUs in the economy could be accepted
in exchange (See Arestis 2011). Consequently, there will be no need for any kind of mon-
etary asset, and hence any fixed-interest financial assets are similar to each other18. The
interest rate would vary over time as saving and borrowing propensity changes. Nonethe-
less, neither individuals nor firms are financially constrained, and consequently there is no
requirement for financial intermediaries or even money19.
17Trend output is the output that occurs when prices are completely flexible.
18Arestis (2011) argue that by grounding the NCM framework on the transversality assumption, the
advocates have revolved the model into an e↵ectively non-monetary framework.
19See Arestis (2011), Goodhart (2007), (2009) and Buiter (2008).
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The second equation is a Phillips curve, which originates from the intertemporally-
optimising representative firm, assuming that prices are sticky. Inflation is generated by
the current output gap, the inflation rates in previous periods, inflation rates in the future
and also the expected changes in nominal exchange rates. It is also based on the expected
world prices. This model assumes that prices are sticky and flexible in the short-term
and long-term respectively. The Philips curve in this model is also assumed to be vertical
given that b2+b3+b4 = 1. Et(p1+t) encapsulates the forward-looking property of inflation.
This equation also indicates that central bank’s success in defeating inflation depends on
its present policy stance, as well as market participants expectation about the future
stance of these policies20. This also suggests that economic individuals and agents have a
clear understanding of how central banks would respond to a macroeconomic innovation
that will have an impact on their current decisions. Hence, one could describe modern
central banking as the management of private expectations, and Et(Pt+1) can represent
the credibility of the monetary authorities. Monetary authorities’ ability to realize and
keep inflation low will therefore decrease inflation expectations.
The third equation depicts a monetary policy stance. It can be generated from op-
timization of central bank’s loss function, conditional on the economy’s structural con-
straints. This model determines the nominal interest rate that is produced by the rate of
expected inflation, the output gap, the inflation gap, as well as the equilibrium rate of the
real interest rate21. Monetary policy rule, in this model, is captured by the behavior of
the central bank and the short-run interbank interest rate. As discussed in Arestis (2011),
the lagged interest rate shows “interest rate smoothing” that is often disregarded in the
literature and is carried out by the central banks22. This equation suggests that policy
adjusts itself to the systematic innovations and changes in the economy in a predictable
way.
The fourth equation above, sets the exchange rate as determined by the di↵erences in
the real interest rates, the condition of the current account, as well as the expectations
about future exchange rate. Equation five shows that the current account is generated from
the real exchange rate, and the di↵erences between domestic and the world’s actual and
potential output. Finally, the last equation determines the nominal exchange rate using
the real exchange rate23. It is important to emphasize that, having a “representative
agent” in the NCM model, leads to the controversy that banks and credits are absent in
20The important assumption in this regard is rational expectation hypothesis. By rational expectation,
we mean that agents have a full understanding of how the economy performs and they comprehend the
consequences of their present decisions on the future.
21Inflation gap is defined as the deviation of inflation from its target value.
22See also Goodhart (2009).
23Angeriz and Arestis (2007), furthermore, criticize NCM model on the ground that exchange rate has
no role in the setting of interest rate by monetary authorities.
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this framework. This criticism has proved to be even more important after the existing
economical models failed to predict the onset of the current financial crisis, which is indeed
a credit crisis in nature.
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Justification of the Methodology
Structural vector auto-regression is used to examine the impacts of di↵erent shocks
on business cycles in this thesis. SVAR is a popular tool in macroeconomics to derive
information about the impacts of macroeconomic shocks. The VAR approach in macroe-
conomic research is applied to measure the response of state variables to the structural
policy shocks. SVAR is considered as a proxy of the underlying DSGE model. More for-
mally, Ireland (2004) shows that taking the first-order condition of the RBC model leads
to a system of non-linear, stochastic di↵erence equation. The log-linearization of the first
order condition around the steady state of each state variable, leads to a system of rational
expectations model. Solving rational expectations leads to a first order VAR.
1.1 Vector Auto-regression: Sign Restriction Approach
Vector auto-regression has been used broadly in macroeconomics partly because macroe-
conomists are unable to agree on a comprehensive structural model of the economy. In
other words, VAR can determine the important dynamics of the economy without impos-
ing restrictions from a particular structural model. The VAR method characterizes the
dynamic structure of the model, utilizing impulse responses and variance decomposition
simulations. Sims (1980), however, argues that the initial techniques to decompose VAR
residuals into meaningful economic shocks are not able to give structural interpretation
to the orthogonal shocks. This critique of the VAR has led to the construction of the
SVAR (structural VAR) by Blanchard (1989), Blanchard and Watson (1986), Bernanke
(1986) and Sims (1986) among others. In the SVAR framework, the researcher has the
opportunity to impose minimum restrictions while identifying the contemporaneous struc-
tural relationship in the economy. This method produces shocks that can be interpreted
economically. One of the strengths of the VAR model is that it can be directly employed
to the data. In addition, it is easy to estimate. VAR specification needs little reference
to economic theories. Therefore, it is considered to be flexible enough to accommodate a
wide range of issues relating to the nature and the sources of the business cycle dynamics.
This feature of the VAR, however, has been criticized. Some researchers argue that these
models may show instability across the periods when monetary and fiscal policy rules
change, given that VAR is loosely based on macroeconomic theories.
What’s more, following the work of Kydland and Prescott (1982), macroeconomists try
to understand the economic indicators’ dynamics by employing dynamic, stochastic, gen-
eral equilibrium (DSGE) models24. DSGE models are utilized to understand the sources
24The phrase DSGE model is stereotypically employed to suggest a broad class of dynamic macroe-
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of the business-cycle dynamics and the transmission of shocks into the macroeconomy.
It has been also used in interpreting the welfare impacts of economic decision making,
considering together parameters and model uncertainty. DSGE models are, in fact, firmly
rooted in economic theories25. Hence, the structural parameters in DSGE models remain
persistent in di↵erent policy regimes. DSGE models, nonetheless, are di cult to apply
directly to the data since they depend considerably on economic theories. They are also
considered to be too stylized to be suitable for this purpose26.
Ireland (2004) suggests combining the power of the DSGE framework with the flexibil-
ity of the VAR time-series models. He argues that this “hybrid” will bring the desirable
features of both approaches to the macroeconomic research. He emphasizes that these two
di↵erent methods of macroeconomic analysis can continue providing insights today if they
are combined with each other. This model uses, for the starting point, a fully-specified
DSGE model. However, he acknowledges that even though this model is a powerful tool to
investigate the economy, it is nevertheless too stylized to capture all the observed dynam-
ics of the data. To make estimation feasible, he developed the “hybrid” framework so that
DSGE model residuals are explained by a VAR method. Residuals in the DSGE model
are basically the dynamics in the data that theory is not able to explain. Similarly, in the
structural VAR models, following Bernanke (1986), Blanchard and Watson (1986), and
Sims (1986), researchers try to rely on the power of the economic theories while keeping
the flexibility of the more conventional VAR models. Macroeconomists’ objectives are,
therefore, to construct the macroeconomic models that are capable of explaining the data
while remaining rooted in the theoretical background. Structural VAR models normally
depend on the economic theories, only to the extent that it is mandatory for identification,
while the hybrid model is based on a fully-specified DSGE model. Which method one uses
depends on how confident the researcher is about the implications of the fundamental
theories. Significantly, the solution of the DSGE model can be shown to be a first order
VAR27: the new-Keynesian model below consists of households, firms and monetary policy
authorities. Households maximize utility subject to budget constraints. Firms maximize
conomic models that extends the benchmark neoclassical growth model discussed in King, Plosser, and
Rebelo (1988) in addition to the monetary model with numerous real and nominal frictions established by
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005).
25According to DSGE models, a firm’s decision-making depends on their preferences as well as the state
of technology. This property can be achieved from solving the firm’s intertemporal optimization problem.
Furthermore, DSGE models assume that agents possibly face uncertainty regarding the total factor pro-
ductivity, for example, or the nominal interest rate determined by a central bank. This uncertainty comes
from exogenous stochastic processes such as change in technology or unpredicted changes in central bank’s
interest-rate feedback rule.
26Depending on distributional postulations for the exogenous shocks, the DSGE model produce a joint
probability distribution for the endogenous system variables such as GDP, private consumption, investment,
and price level. In a Bayesian background, this likelihood function might be employed to convert a prior
distribution for the structural parameters of the DSGE system into a posterior distribution. This posterior
is the source for substantive information for decision making.
27This is indeed one of the significant advantages of using the VAR framework to study macroeconomics.
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their profit subject to the demand curve and to a production function. Finally, monetary
authorities choose an optimized policy value to minimize its loss function.
Households: The preferences of households defined over consumption goods, real
money balances (Mt/Pt), and leisure 1   Nt, where ti is the time devoted to market
employment. Households maximize the expected discounted present value of the utility:
E1ti=0[
C1  t+i
1    +
 
1  b(
Mt+i
Pt+i
)1 b    N
1+⌘
t
1 + ⌘
] (1.1.1)
subject to a budget constrain given by
Ct +
Mt
Pt
+
Bt
Pt
=
Wt
Pt
Nt +
(1 + it 1)Bt 1
Pt
+
Mt 1
Pt
+⇧t (1.1.2)
where Mt (Bt) is the household’s nominal holdings of money (one-period bonds). Bonds
pay a nominal interest rate it. ⇧t denotes real profits received from firms. This leads to
the followings first-order conditions:
C  t =  (1 + it)Et
✓
Pt
Pt+1
◆
C  t+1 (1.1.3)
 
⇣
Mt+i
Pt+i
⌘b
C  t
=
i
1 + i
(1.1.4)
 
N⌘t
C  t
=
Wt
Pt
(1.1.5)
These conditions represent an Euler condition for optimal allocation of consumption, the
intratemporal optimal condition setting the marginal rate of substitution between money
and consumption equal to the opportunity cost of holding money and the intratempo-
ral optimality condition of setting the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and
consumption equal to real wage.
Firms: Firms maximize profits by facing three constraints. The first is the production
function summarizing the available technology. Second, is the demand each firm faces.
The third constraint is that in each period only a fraction 1 ! of firms are able to adjust
prices. The firm’s pricing decision problem is the choice of price pjt to maximize expected
profits. After a long algebra the optimal level of price inflation is given by
⇡t =  Et⇡t+1 +  xt + ut (1.1.6)
This equation is known as a New-Keynensian Philips curve.
Log-linearization of the equation that represents the optimal allocation of consumption
leads to the new-Keynesian IS curve:
yt = Etyt+1  
✓
1
 
◆
(it   Et⇡t+1)
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expressing the resulting equation in terms of output gap xt = yt   y, where y is the
potential out, we obtain:
xt = Etxt+1  
✓
1
 
◆
(it   Et⇡t+1) + gt (1.1.7)
The last two equations above includes output, inflation and nominal interest rate. The
model can be closed by assuming that the central bank implements monetary policy by
controlling nominal interest rate. We assume that the central bank follows a policy rule
given by
it = ⇢it 1 + vt (1.1.8)
Combining the last three equations, the resulting system of equations can be written as24 1 0 00 1   1
0 0  
3524 itEtxt+1
Et⇡t+1
35 =
24 ⇢ 0 0  1 1   1
0   1
3524 it 1xt
⇡t
35+
24 vt gt
 ut
35
or in compact form:
A0EtXt+1 = A1Xt +B0ft (1.1.10)
Note that ft is regarded as exogenous structural shocks. If we note ⌘t = Xt   Et 1Xt as
the forecast error, then we can write the above equation as ⇣t 1 = A⇣t +B⇣t + ⇡⌘t where
⇣t = Et 1Xt. Solution of the last equation will lead to a first-order VAR as follows:
Xt+1 = AXt +Bft (1.1.11)
where A = A 10 A1 and B = A
 1
0 B0.
The plausibility of the uncorrelated shocks depends on whether the SVAR can ade-
quately capture the fluctuations in macroeconomy. This requires both a su cient number
of variables to be included in the VAR and su cient lag length in order to e↵ectively
illustrate the dynamics. In practice, we increase the number of lags to understand the
developments in state variables dynamics.
1.2 Di↵erent Identification Approaches for the SVAR
The aim of the SVAR is therefore to identify structural shocks. One approach is to
impose short-run restrictions (on the structural contemporaneous matrix). In this set-
up, you impose restrictions on the variance/covariance matrix (VCM) and compute the
empirical impulse response functions (IRF). If the empirical impulse response functions
are consistent with the expected theoretical impulse response functions, then the model
is identified. Providing information about the reduced form dynamics will not add any
information to our structural analysis. VAR is a reduced form model and therefore is
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unable to robustly interpret the impacts of di↵erent structural shocks on key economics
variables. The first step in obtaining meaningful results is to construct shocks that are
serially and contemporaneously uncorrelated. The second step is to identify the model
by imposing restrictions on it. This identification is required to estimate the structural
equation parameters (shocks)28.
There are three main ways to identify the VAR system: first, Sims (1980) proposed
to obtain identification by making the structural system “recursive”, and then put no
restrictions on the dynamics of the model. Recursivity fundamentally contains two dif-
ferent assumptions: first, it assumes that the shocks in the structural equations are not
correlated with each other, and next, endogenous variables should be ordered in a way
that each variable simultaneously builds on further variables down the structural system
while not depending on those above. In other words, the system is constructed to show
a triangular structure. The latter assumption is supported by “institutional knowledge”.
Whether the shocks are uncorrelated to each other primarily depends on how e↵ectively
the structural VAR reflects the macroeconomic system. Therefore, the first assumption
needs an adequate number of variables to be integrated in the model. It also requires a
lag length of high enough order to e↵ectively capture the dynamics.
The second way of identification features imposing long-run restrictions on variables.
Fry and Pagan (2011) argue that: “Recognizing that some macro-economic variables are
best thought of as being stochastically non-stationary brings in the fact that there may
be shocks with permanent e↵ects upon those variables. Long-run restrictions exploit this
fact”29. The jth horizon impulse responses of the variables to the structural shocks as
Cj and the long-run impacts of the shocks can be symbolized as C1. One can then
di↵erentiate the permanent from the transitory e↵ects of ith shock on the kth variable
by the existence of a non-zero factor in the kth row and ith column of C1. These can
be interpreted into linear restrictions on the structural coe cients of an SVAR30. These
kinds of restrictions decrease the number of parameters that can be estimated and release
instruments.
However, researchers stress that the identification of shocks based on either of the
above methods presents various shortcomings. Cooley and Leroy (1985) argue that iden-
tification based on the Cholesky decomposition is unsatisfactory because this approach is
not consistent with the DSGE models. Canova and Pina (1999) show that DSGE models
do not imply the recursive structure imposed by the Cholesky decomposition. Cooley and
28These restrictions decrease the number of “free” parameters in the structural equations to the number
that can be recovered from the information in the reduced form.
29See Fry, R., and Pagan, A. (2011). “Sign restrictions in structural vector autoregressions: a critical
review”. Journal of Economic Literature, 49(4), 938-960.
30For more details, see Shapiro and Watson (1988), Pagan and Robertson (1998).
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Dwyer (1998) show that the long-run restrictions used by Blanchard and Quah (1980) rely
on weak instruments and makes the di↵erentiation of the permanent shocks from transi-
tory shocks unreliable. Further researchers (see, for instance, Giordani (2004) and Benati
and Surico (2009)) point out that for a certain class of DSGE models, VARs are unable
to trace out both the true dynamics of the state variables and the true shocks even if the
appropriate identification restrictions were used. The is because the log-linearization of
the DSGE models around the steady state, leads to a VARMA data generating process
(DGP)31. If one of the roots of the MA component is large, then a finite order VAR would
not necessarily capture the true DGP.
Given the criticism regarding the use of zero-restrictions in identifying parameters of
a VAR structure and the fact that DSGE models do not exhibit zero-restrictions, re-
searchers began to use sign restriction to validate DSGE models. To that end, Canova
(2007) argues that a log-linearized DSGE model rarely delivers zero restrictions, but often
embodies sign restrictions which could be used to identify the model. This thesis utilizes
theoretically-based sign restrictions on the dynamic responses of the vector of variables to
scrutinize whether orthogonal disturbances have any stimulating economic interpretation.
Sign-restriction approach clearly isolates the statistical problem of orthogonalizing the co-
variance matrix of reduced form innovations from problems concerning identification of
structural disturbances (Canova and De Nicolo (2002)).
1.3 Summarizing the Data and Structural Demonstrations
Reduced-form VARs put in a nutshell the auto-covariance properties of the data. It also
provides a practical estimation tool although they cannot be interpreted economically.
To add economic content to the VAR system, researchers exploit the close relationship
between VARs and the modern dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. In the
setting of a DSGE model, a monetary policy rule might be well defined, however, the
concept of an aggregate demand or supply function is ambiguous. We will explain later
that these models are identified in terms of preferences of the economic agents and produc-
tion technologies. The optimal solution of the agents’ decision problems together with the
equilibrium condition causes an autoregressive law of motion for the endogenous variables.
Economic fluctuations are reproduced by unexpected changes in technology, preferences,
monetary policy and fiscal policy. Some economists, furthermore, argue that the captured
co-movements between the macroeconomic variables in the DSGE models can be gener-
31Benati and Surico (2009), using a new-Keynesian model, show that if there is a structural change in the
policy rule (i.e., from passive to active) then a VAR analysis will detect this as the variance of the shocks
has changed. However, their approach can be criticized on the grounds of the omitted variables problem
which induces biased coe cient and overestimated variance of shocks. To that end, Canova (2006) states
that an augmented VAR model including a proxy for the omitted variables (i.e. expected inflation), may
uncover the true DGP. Along the same lines also see Canova and Gambetti (2010).
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ated through well-specified economic transmission mechanisms rather than from correlated
exogenous shocks. Subsequently, these shocks are generally assumed to be orthogonal to
each other. These kinds of dynamic macroeconomic theories in essence imply that the
one-step-ahead forecast errors, ut, are the function of the orthogonal structural shocks in
technology, preferences and policies.
1.3.1 Reduced-Form VARs and Structural Shocks
Assume that the data is represented by a first order VAR:
zt = A1zt 1 + et (1.3.1)
where zt is an M ⇥ 1 vector of variables, Aj is an M ⇥M matrix of coe cients and et
is a i.i.d. N(0,⌃)32.
The VAR can be displayed in matrix form in various ways. Some of the studies convey
results using the multivariate Normal distribution and others by employing the matric-
variate Normal distribution33. Researchers use the multivariate Normal distribution if
they employ a MT ⇥ 1 vector Z which contains all T observations on the first dependent
variable, and then afterwards each of the T observations on the second dependent variable,
etc. The matric-variate Normal distribution is used if researchers describe Z to be a T⇥M
matrix that contains the T observations on every dependent variable in columns after one
another. Express xt =
 
1 z0t 1 ... z0t p
 
and
X =
2664
x1
x2
...
xT
3775 . (1.3.2)
Lastly, if A =
 
A1 A2 ... Ap
  0 we define # = vec(A) which is a M ⇥ 1 vector which
holds all the VAR coe cients into a vector. Therefore we can write the VAR either as:
Z = XA+ E (1.3.3)
or
z = (IM ⌦X)#+ e (1.3.4)
where e ⇠ N(0,⌃⌦ IT ) and Z is a T ⇥M matrix.
32Exogenous variables or more deterministic terms such as trends might simply be integrated to the
VAR system and incorporated in all the derivations. We do not do so, however, to make the notation as
simple as possible.
33See, e.g., Canova, (2007); Kadiyala and Karlsson, (1997).
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The likelihood function is obtained from the sampling density, p(z|#,⌃). If it is re-
garded as a function of the parameters, it may be displayed in two parts. The first part
is a distribution for # given ⌃. The second part is when ⌃0 has a Wishart distribution.
Define ✓ = (#,⌃) and note that P (✓) and P (✓|Z,X) denotes the prior and posterior
distribution of ✓. To estimate ✓, we use a normal-Wishart prior both for # and  . The
posterior distribution of ✓ is given by the following equations:
#|⌃, z ⇠ N(#ˆ,⌃⌦ (X 0X) 1) (1.3.5)
and
⌃ 1|z ⇠W (S 1, T  K  M   1) (1.3.6)
where W denotes the Wishart distribution, K is the number of coe cients in each
equation of the VAR and T is the number of observations. Aˆ = (X 0X) 1X 0Z is the OLS
estimation of A and
S = (Z  XAˆ)0(Z  XAˆ) (1.3.7)
Let "t be the vector of structural shocks with the variance-covariance matrix ⌃". The
problem of identification arises because S is the linear computation of ⌃" and the matrix
of contemporaneous interaction among the elements of Z.
1.3.2 Structural VAR
This section produces a brief description of the SVAR analysis. A description of the data
in the SVAR is described as follows:
B0zT = B1zt 1 + "t (1.3.8)
This implies that B0et = "t and literally means that the structural shocks we want to
quantify are linear combinations of the VAR errors "t. The latter is computed by the
VAR residuals eˆt. Estimating the structural (economic) innovations, "t, requires that one
create a fitting set of weights (Bˆ0) on eˆt.
To construct impulse response functions, we write the previous equation in MA form.
Zt = D(L)e (1.3.9)
or
zt = D0et +D1et 1 +D2et 2 + ... (1.3.10)
Dj is the jth period impulse response of zt+j to a unit modification in et (D0 = In).
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Therefore the MA form for the SVAR is:
zt = C0"t + C1"t 1.... (1.3.11)
where
Cj = DjB
 1
0 = DjC0. (1.3.12)
The VAR can be easily computed by OLS regardless of the nature of the structural VAR
(SVAR). Therefore, Dj can always be quantified after the lag length of VAR is specified
since Cˆj = DˆjCˆ0 and Dˆj is set by the data autonomously of any structural model. Every
restriction that is put on the Cj is essentially the only restrictions on combinations of the
columns of C0, with the weights employed in creating such combinations being the rows
of the Dj . To identify many issues concerning sign restriction, it is vital to understand
that researchers are most of the time restricting the factors of C0. These restrictions may
be put on C0 or on Cj for j   1. However, some argue that imposing sign restrictions
on impulse responses for longer time periods, Ci,j > 0, is not desirable since it can be
excessively constraining.
In combining theory-inspired models (such as DSGE models) with a summative model,
we often face the problem that there are variables in theories that cannot be observed in
the data. Hence, the model is fitted with a smaller number of variables. Suppose that the
observable variables in the dataset is represented as zt while the larger set in the theory is
depicted as z . Therefore, it is argued that a VAR in z  is equal to the VARMA in zt34.
Yet, the VAR cannot successfully represent the data if it is obtained from a theoretical
model with unobserved (latent) variables. Similarly, Kapetanios et al (2006) argue that
since the number of unobserved (latent) variables can be considerable for some structural
models, one needs to be careful when employing information from theory-consistent models
to identify innovations in the structural VARs. However, the literature attempts to solve
this issue by setting the orders of the observed variables relatively high. Nevertheless,
imposing restrictions on the signs of the impulse responses can solve this problem to some
degree, especially compared with the kind of approaches that impose restrictions on the
magnitude of shocks.
1.4 How Informative are SVAR Methodologies Using Sign Restrictions
in Generating Candidate Shocks?
1.4.1 Multiple Shocks
The chosen summative model, in all circumstances, will provide a set of n quantified
shocks, e˜t. Uncorrelated candidate structural shocks, "ˆt, can be generated by combining
34See for example Wallis (1977) and Zellner and Palm (1974).
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them in a proper way. There will in fact be many such combinations. Some of them
generate impulse responses that possess the correct signs whereas others will not. The
first thing to conform in empirical research is hence to choose an algorithm, that provides
a set of weights. The criteria for choosing a “successful” algorithm is literally to check
whether impulse responses functions, Cˆj , for the related structural innovations are in line
with the nominated sign restrictions. We then discard the impulse responses if they do
not satisfy the sign restrictions and “draw” additional set of weights.
The next step is to check whether the generated weights a rm the orthogonality con-
dition of the constructed structural innovations, "ˆt. Assuming that, we start by initially
calculating a recursive VAR. Afterwards, we would have eˆt = Bˆ
 1
0 "ˆt, where Bˆ0 is trian-
gular. Even though these structural shocks, "ˆt, are uncorrelated by construction, still we
ought to use the shocks that have unit variance. This can be obtained by dividing each
of the "ˆkt by its standard deviations. Therefore, we assume that Sˆ is the matrix that has
the computed standard deviation of the "ˆt on its diagonal and zeros elsewhere. Therefore
eˆt = Bˆ
 1
0 Sˆ
ˆS 1"ˆt = Tˆ ⌘ˆt, where ⌘ˆt = ˆS 1"ˆt become new structural innovations with unit
variances. ⌘ˆt are called base set. It is easier to compute ⌘ˆt by quantifying the covariance
matrix of the residuals eˆt, ⌦ˆ, and then applying a Cholesky decomposition ˆT 1⌦ˆTˆ 0 = In to
get Tˆ . Hence, ⌘ˆt = ˆT 1eˆt. This is a convenient approach since all that is required for cre-
ating impulse responses is the estimated covariance matrix of the errors in the summative
model equation.
We can now proceed to compute combinations of ⌘ˆt employing a matrix Q where
⌘ˆt00 = Q⌘ˆt. The ⌘ˆt00 are potential normal structural shocks and therefore need to be
orthogonal and Q must be restricted. The adequate restriction is that Q is a square
matrix and Q0Q = QQ0 = In. The means:
eˆt = TˆQ
0Q⌘ˆt = Tˆ 00⌘ˆt00 (1.4.1)
where Cov(⌘t00⌘t000) = QCov(⌘ˆt⌘ˆt0)Q0 = In. Accordingly, we have discovered a new set
of structural shocks, ⌘t000, that possess the same covariance matrix as ⌘ˆt and will give us
V ar(zt). However, it has di↵erent e↵ects (Tˆ 00) on et and will therefore produce di↵erent
impulse responses. Sign restriction approach is grounded in this ability to generate a
considerably large number of candidate shocks, draws, by changing impulse responses.
After we construct a Q so that QQ0 = Q0Q = In, it is convenient to compute all these
shocks by using programs that are able to compute matrix operations35. There are many
such Q0s and we call each a “draw”. There are di↵erent ways to calculate the Q, and two of
the most popular approaches are through “Givens” and “Householder transformations”36.
35In this thesis we have used MATLAB and RATS softwares for this purpose.
36The calculation of Givens and Householder transformation are explained in the appendix of this thesis.
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1.4.2 A Single Shock
So far we have identified n shocks. Sometimes, however, we are just interested to identify
one single structural shock. In doing so, we might still employ the M ⇥M Q- matrices
described above. Therefore, we need to compute M orthogonal structural shocks but just
focus on one of them. Scholl and Uhlig (2008), for instance, argue that the important issue
in identifying a single shock is the weights that we choose. These weights are required to
generate the structural shocks that are M ⇥ 1 vector q and has a unit length. If q is not
chosen from Q, then the subsequent shock does not have to be orthogonal with the rest of
the (unidentified)M 1 shocks. This property can also be problematic, if for instance, one
is interested to perform a variance decomposition. This is because most empirical papers
employing sign restrictions does not necessarily choose q in a way to ensure orthogonality.
Furthermore, let’s assume that there are two variables and we presume that one shock
has a strong positive e↵ect on the first variable but we cannot predict its impact on the
second variable. This implies the sign for C0 is

+ ?
? ?
 
in this example37. This information
is not adequate to achieve identification. A problem thus, occurs if we fail to integrate
su cient information in order to distinguish between shocks. It is called the multiple
shocks problem38.
1.5 Shock Identification
How do sign restrictions tackle the structural identification issue in the macroeconomics
model? To discuss this question, it is useful to find some primary orthogonal shocks by
presuming that the system is recursive. Recursivity implies that the moment conditions
to acquire the fundamental estimates of the structural parameters would be E(qt"St) = 0
as well as E("St"Dt) = 0. This recursive VAR system is assumed to have the following
form:
pt = ⌘1t (1.5.1)
qt    pt = ⌘2t (1.5.2)
where ⌘1t and ⌘2t are the base set of impulse responses39. We have essentially now
constructed new shocks ⌘00jt utilizing the base shocks pt = ⌘1t and qt    pt = ⌘2t keep-
ing the orthogonality assumption. The new orthogonal innovations, ⌘001t and ⌘002t are
created employing a Givens rotation as the weighting matrix. For example, if there is
one Givens matrix, Q,

cos⇥   sin⇥
sin⇥ cos⇥
 
, then the converted system

 ⌘1⌘1t00
 ⌘2⌘2t00
 
is equal to
37Here basically ? implies that no sign information is assumed.
38The important question is how to identify the model if in any draw, there are two shocks, with similar
impulse responses. The answer is to just accept one of them. We cannot, for instance, have two demand
shocks in the market model.
39Here pt, qt, St, Dt represent price, output, quantity supplied and quantity demanded respectively.
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
pt cos⇥  (qt   ⌧pt) sin⇥
pt sin⇥+ (qt   ⌧pt) cos⇥)
 
.
This being the case,  ⌘j is the standard deviation of ⌘jt. This depicts that ⌘jt00 was
made to have a unit variance. Assuming that ø1 = cos⇥ and ø2 = sin⇥, the two equations
can be written as:
(ø1 + ø2⌧)pt   ø2qt =  ⌘1⌘001t (1.5.3)
(ø2   ⌧ø1)pt + ø1qt =  ⌘2⌘2t00 (1.5.4)
while impulse responses of (pt, qt) to  ⌘j⌘jt00 is:
(

ø1 + ⌧ø2  ø2
ø2   ø1⌧ ø1
  1
) = (
1
ø21 + ø
2
2
)(

ø1 ø2
 ø2 + ⌧ø1 ø1 + ⌧ø2
 
) (1.5.5)
Therefore, the sign of the impulse responses on pt and qt will depend on sgn(ø1) and
sgn(ø2). These can be either positive or negative depending on the values driven by ⇥.
In this approach, we only keep the structural shocks that yield similar impulse responses
to the presumed signs. However, there will be many impulse responses that satisfy sign
restrictions. Each value of ⇥ yields a contemporary model with a new set of structural
equations and innovations. Fry and Pagan (2011) deal with this di culty by choosing
impulse responses that are as close as possible to the median. In the meanwhile, they
constrain the responses generated from the similar model. The model-based method of
constructing sign restrictions seems to be a practical technique. The reason that this
methodology is being used extensively among macroeconomists is twofold: First, it does
not bind the researcher to the DSGE model and second, it has the advantage of assuring
the informal approach of identification to produce robust results. However, it also mainly
depends on the purpose of the researcher in conducting the VAR analysis. Fry and Pagan
(2011) state that: “If one is trying to “discover” what the data says about relations then
imposing sign restrictions from (say) the NK model above would not appeal as much, since
one would never find (say) that interest rates had a positive impact on inflation in the
data. “Puzzles” like this are sometimes the source of productive theorizing and so one
should be careful about pre-determining outcomes.”40. To test this issue, one can check
the draws that produce impulse responses that are “not in line” with the sign restrictions.
If there are a large number of the rejected responses, then one can conclude that the data
does not support the model that is used to derive the sign restrictions.
Afterwards, di↵erent percentiles such as the 5%, 50% and 95% are also reported, along
with impulse responses. These series are considered as confidence intervals in Bayesian
estimations. Fry and Pagan (2005) argue that the percentile one reports is, indeed, an
indication of the potential range of impulse response as the model changes. One possible
40See Fry, R., and Pagan, A. (2011). “Sign restrictions in structural vector auto-regressions: a critical
review.” Journal of Economic Literature, 49(4), 938-960.
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interpretation of the median is that it is a good quantity to demonstrate as a summary of
the central tendency of impulse responses across models, and which merely utilizes sign
restriction information.
1.6 Sign Restrictions in Empirical Research: Monetary, Fiscal Policy
and Technology Shock
Various macroeconomic literatures exercises sign restrictions in order to study monetary
policy41. This thesis follows Uhlig (2005) and Uhlig and Mountford (2009) to identify
monetary policy shocks and fiscal policy shock respectively.
1.6.1 Monetary Policy
The focus of the first chapter of this thesis is on the impacts of a contractionary monetary
policy shock on the economy especially on output and exchange rate42. The VAR system
that is used here consists of the real industrial production, exchange rate, money market
rate, total reserves and consumer price index. This model is suggested by the large body
of the literature. By construction, we do not impose any restrictions on the growth rate
of real industrial production and that of the real exchange rate. However, we restrict the
impulse responses of monetary and price variables to identify monetary policy shocks. The
sign restrictions that have been employed suggest that a contractionary monetary policy
would decrease price level and total reserves, however expands the short-run interest rate
for five periods. In order to identify the model, “penalty function” has been applied to
maintain the impulse responses that obtain the robust signs. Upper and lower bounds
are depicted for each impulse response function across the models, to illustrate the results
in the form of impulse responses. To tackle the multiple shocks problem, all impulse
responses are kept and preserved as equal. Nevertheless, this estimation is based on the
median impulse responses43.
The following shows briefly the application of sign-restriction in the first chapter of this
thesis. Any impulse vector a ✓ Rn can be restored if there exists an n dimensional vector
q of unit length such that a = A˜q where ⌃✏ = AA0 = A˜A˜0, and A˜ is the lower triangular
Cholesky factor of the covariates matrix, ⌃✏. Rn is the matrix of impulse responses. Note
that eA = AQ where Q is an n⇥ n orthogonal matrix.
Uhlig (2005) shows that the estimation and inference can be implemented as follows:
41Examples are Faust (1998), Canova and De Nicolo (2002) and Uhlig (2005).
42Uhlig (2005) also identifies just a monetary shock saying that there is no motivation to uncover the
other primary structural shocks.
43Proceeding the method of Uhlig (2005), there are several papers that identify monetary policy using
sing restriction approach. Rafiq and Mallick (2008) test the impacts of monetary shock on the GDP of
Germany, France and Italy motivated by the notion that similar output reactions across the three countries
means appropriateness for a currency union. Mountford (2005) focuses on the impacts of monetary policy
on the UK whereas Vargas-Silva (2008) scrutinizes the e↵ects of a monetary policy shock on the U.S.
housing market.
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a prior of the Normal-Wishart for ( bB(L), b⌃✏) can be constructed and the posterior draws
are also obtained by the Normal-Wishart for ( bB(L), b⌃✏).44 After estimating B(L) and ⌃✏
from the posterior draws, we draw bqj from a uniform distribution, divided by its length.
Then, we construct a candidate impulse response vector b↵j = A˜bqj and compute its impulse
responses by:
rs = [I   cB(L)] 1baj (1.6.1)
where rs is the vector of the impulse responses at horizon s. We account for only those
draws of bqj where the sign restrictions are not violated. We repeat this procedure until
we obtain 1000 draws which satisfy the sign restrictions.
Mountford and Uhlig (2009) extend the method of Uhlig (2005) and identified at
most three structural shocks. To identify an impulse matrix [↵1,↵2,↵3], they used the
relevant sign restrictions ↵1 = eAq1,↵2 = eAq2, ↵3 = eAq3 and the orthogonality conditions
consistent with the assumption that structural shocks are independent (i.e., q0qi = 0 for
i = 1, 2). Mountford and Uhlig (2009) show that an impulse vector ↵ can be written as a
linear combination of Cholesky decomposition of b⌃✏ as follows. Define rji(s) the impulse
response of variable j at horizon s, to the i-th column of Am = [↵1,↵2, ..,↵m] where
Am= eAQm,with the m ⇥ n orthogonal matrix Qm = [q1, q2, .., qm]. The n-dimensional
impulse response r↵(s) at horizon s to the impulse vector ↵s is given by:
r↵(s) =
X
qiri(s) (1.6.2)
where qi is the i-th entry of q = qs.
In practice, this implies a joint draw from the posterior of the Normal-Wishart ( bB(L), b⌃✏)
and obtain candidate q vector. A draw is kept if all sign restrictions hold and disregarded
otherwise. Errors bands were constructed from the 1000 draws that were kept.
The advantage of using sign restrictions to identify policy shocks is that the results are
not a↵ected by the ordering of the variables. That is a di↵erent ordering of the variables
would not render di↵erence in observed impulse response functions. In addition, Bayesian
VAR (BVAR) is not subjected to the parameter uncertainty. This is so because a BVAR
estimates the reduced-form parameters and the impulse vector simultaneously. In our
investigation, we set the sign restrictions for 5 periods, s = 5.
1.6.2 Fiscal Policy and Technology Shock
Applications of VAR literature to investigate fiscal policy are not as common as those
of monetary policy. This is somewhat as a result of the di culty in identification of
the fiscal policy inside the VAR context. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) established a
44B(L) are coe cient matrices of size m⇥m. As a first step, however, it is already informative to simply
use the OLS estimate of the VAR, B = Bˆ and ⌃ = ⌃ˆ.
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technique of identification grounded on institutional detail and adjusted elasticities that
wish to isolate pure fiscal policy changes from those due to built-in stabilizers. Mountford
and Uhlig (2005, 2009) claim that, the robust fiscal policy shocks will be orthogonal with
the business cycle shock if a business cycle shock is accurately identified in the VAR and
therefore this solves the problem of identification of fiscal policy. It is also suitable to
utilize sign restrictions for this cases45.
In the second chapter, we investigate the impacts of the di↵erent kinds of fiscal policies
on a model including GDP, private consumption, total government expenditure, total
government revenue, real wages, the interest rate, total reserves, a producer price index
and the GDP deflator. Four shock have been classified: a business cycle shock, a monetary
policy shock, a government revenue shock and a government spending shock. Furthermore,
a minimal number of sign restrictions are exercised and they are not originated from any
particular model. A business cycle shock is anticipated to have a positive impact on
government revenue, GDP, consumption whereas a monetary policy shock has a positive
impact on interest rates and negative impact on reserves and prices. The fiscal shocks are
identified with government revenue and expenditure reacting positively to revenue and
expenditure shocks.
In the third chapter of this thesis, we also identify technology shock simultaneously
with fiscal policy shock. Turing to technology shock, a critical di↵erence should be made
concurring to whether technology shocks are expected to be long-lasting or not. If perma-
nent, a second question would be whether there is only a single one. If there is just one
permanent technology shock, the standard procedure suggests isolating this shock through
long-run restrictions. For instance, Gali (1999) studied two variables namely labour pro-
ductivity -which was expected to possess a unit root- and hours worked - which did not.
Technology shocks were merely taken to have a long-run impact on labour productivity.
He focused on the impacts of technology shocks on hours worked in the short-run.
Selected papers, such as Fisher (2007), develop in which there are two long-lasting
components. Therefore, it is desirable to propose a way of discriminating between the two
perpetual shocks. One method is to isolate the impacts of a pure technology shock by
employing sign restrictions for that purpose, (See Francis et al (2003)). The technology
shock is expected to obtain a non-zero impacts on labour productivity in the long-run as
the other shock is acquired to have a zero impact. This is relatively strange because such
a di↵erentiation is what typically characterizes a persistent from a short-lived shock. It
takes the implication that, for the non-technology shock, a positive impulse response at
horizon j should be compensated by a matching negative one at some other horizon, so as
45Canova and Pappa (2007) and Dungey and Fry (2009), therefore use sign restriction to study fiscal
policy.
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to construct the cumulated responses sum to be equal to zero in the long-run. Once they
accomplish this analysis Francis et al. (2007) attempt a di↵erent methodology that pursues
to identify the shocks founded on sign restrictions. Particularly technology shocks are
assumed to require both a positive long-run and short-run impact on labour productivity.
Accordingly, as distinguished previously in our argument of the “multiple shock problem”,
it appears implausible that the two sign restrictions employed could support a reasonable
identification.
Dedola and Neri (2007) say that the technology procedure does not obtain a unit root.
They therefore define which signs of the e↵ects of a technology shock are “robust” to a
range of DSGE models, adjusted with a variety of parameter values. They study these
signs for a sizable number of variables and impulse response horizons. Therefore, a positive
technology shock usually seems to have positive influence on labour productivity, the real
wage, GDP, consumption and investment for up to nineteen periods. Even though merely
one shock is isolated with these sign restrictions, it appears to be highly possible that their
practice of a very large number of restrictions could probably create the multiple shocks
problem.
We use sign-restrictions in order to obtain the identification for the shocks. We employ
Bayesian approach for the actual estimation of our model. Specifically, we apply a flat
Normal-Wishart prior. In this identification scheme, orthogonal structural shocks could
lead to tight identifying sign restrictions in the way that lots of draws from the Normal-
Wishart posterior for the VAR parameters ( ,⌃) are not accepted since they only allow
the impulse matrices that fits exactly the sign restrictions. As a result, many draws
receive zero prior weight, even if only few of the restrictions are mildly violated. This
issue becomes more problematic if the number of orthogonal shocks as well as the number
of variables included in the VAR model increases. To find a solution for this complication,
we let for small deviations " from the sign restrictions46.
46See for instance, Enders et al.(2011)
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Chapter 1
Investigating the e↵ects of Monetary Policy on Output and
Exchange rates using a A VAR Analysis Imposing Sign
restrictions: Developed vs. Emerging Countries
2.1 Introduction
The fundamental theoretical and empirical question in monetary economics centers on
understanding whether money and monetary policy have any impact on real economic
activity. To that end monetary economists have been particularly interested in investi-
gating the validity of the benchmark theories focusing on the impact of monetary policy
shocks that lead to economic fluctuations. In their analysis, they often resort to using a
vector autoregressive (VAR) framework, developed by Sims (1980), to describe and un-
derstand the behavior of prices, monetary aggregates, interest rates and output, as well
as to conduct policy experiments.
The popularity of VAR approach can be attributable to the fact that these models
validate dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models under certain sign re-
strictions.47 In fact, it is well known that linear or log linear approximations of Markovian
DSGE models around the steady state yields VAR(1) solutions which are complicated func-
tions of the underlying preference, technology and policy parameters.48 Hence, extracting
meaningful results from a reduced form VAR is a di cult task and requires cross-equation
restrictions which should be credible and uncontroversial. In general, to solve the identifi-
cation problem in the model, researchers impose constraints either on the short run or the
long run impact of monetary shocks on macroeconomic variables. There are two main ap-
proaches to solve the identification problem. The first approach, followed by Sims(1988),
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Bernanke and Mihov (1998) among others, requires a
recursive identification scheme known as the Cholesky decomposition where policy shock
a↵ect output with a lag. The second approach49 achieves identification by imposing zero
restrictions on the long-run impact of monetary disturbances.
However, the identification of structural economic shocks based on zero restrictions
has been repeatedly stressed in the VAR literature that this approach has various short-
comings. Cooley and Leroy (1985) argue that identification based on the Cholesky decom-
47More concretely, Ireland (1999) show how a real business cycle model can be written as a VAR(1).
The first order conditions of a DSGE model and log-linearisation around the steady state lead to a system
of rational expectation (RE) model. Also note that conventional solution of RE models using Blanchard
and Kahn (1980) method gives a VAR(1).
48See, for instance, Leeper, et al. (1996) Christiano et al. (1999) and Canova (2007) who summarize the
developments of VAR models and empirical findings.
49see Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Gali (1992) among others.
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position is unsatisfactory because this approach is not consistent with the DSGE models.
Canova and Pina (1999) show that DSGE models do not imply the recursive structure
imposed by the Cholesky decomposition. Cooley and Dwyer (1998) show that the long-
run restrictions used by Blanchard and Quah (1989) rely on weak instruments and lead to
unreliable conclusions concerning the di↵erentiation of permanent shocks from transitory
shocks. Further research50 points out that for a certain class of DSGE models VARs are
unable to trace out both the true dynamics of state variables and the true shocks even if the
appropriate identification restrictions were used. This is so because the log-linearization
of these models leads to a VARMA data generating process (DGP).51 If one of the roots
of the MA component is large then a finite order VAR would not necessarily capture the
true DGP. However, Canova (2006) and Canova and Gambetti (2010) show that when
VAR method is properly used then the true DGP can be properly recovered.
Given the criticism regarding the use of zero restrictions in identifying parameters
of a VAR structure and the fact that DSGE models do not exhibit zero restrictions,
researchers began to use sign restrictions to validate DGSE models. This reasoning is
due to the observation that a log-linearized DGSE model rarely delivers zero restrictions
to extract structural shocks, they contain many sign restrictions which could be used to
identify the model52.
In this thesis, taking into account the developments in the field, we investigate the im-
pact of monetary shocks for three developed countries as well as three emerging economies
considering a Bayesian structural VAR model as suggested by Uhlig (2005) and Mountford
and Uhlig (2009). This methodology identifies structural monetary shocks by imposing
sign restrictions on the impulse responses of (some) variables while allowing some other
variables to be completely determined by the data. This approach is useful because it
avoids some of the identification problems that arise in the traditional structural VAR
models. In our case, we impose no restrictions on the responses of industrial production
and exchange rate to monetary policy shocks as they are the key variables of interest in
this study and we want the data to determine their path. Our dataset covers the period
between January 1988 to December 2009 on a monthly bases and collected for the UK,
the US and Japan as well as South Korea, Malaysia and Mexico.
An investigation of monetary transmission mechanism on developing countries is im-
portant as they are fast growing emerging economies and they play an important role in
50see Chari et al (2005), Giordani (2004) and Benati and Surico (2009)
51Benati and Surico (2009) using a three-equation New-Keynesian model show that if there is a structural
change in the policy rule (i.e., from passive to active) then a VAR analysis will detect this as the variance
of the shocks has changed. However, Benati and Surico (2009) can be criticized on the grounds of omitted
variable problem which induces biased coe cients and overestimated variance of shocks. To that end,
Canova (2006) states that an augmented VAR including a proxy of the omitted variable (i.e. expected
inflation), may uncover the true DGP.
52see Canova (2007) page 138.
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the world economy as many western countries struggle due to the impact of the 2007/08
financial crises. In the past, these economies, too, experienced periods of financial crises
and bounced back with the aid of the IMF or the World Bank. As part of the finan-
cial aid package, these institutions were generally required the implementation of a set
of restrictive fiscal and or monetary policies. These austerity packages were quite tough
to implement as there was little prior information concerning their impact on the real
economic activity causing these countries to find their way in darkness. This is in fact
one of the contributions of this thesis to the literature; di↵erent from the earlier research,
we also focus on the e↵ects of monetary policy on Mexico, Malaysia and South Korea, as
there is little focus on developing economies.53 In this respect, our investigation aims to
carefully examine how the macroeconomic variables in an emerging economies responds
to adverse monetary shocks as we focus on data from Mexico, Malaysia and South Korea.
It is worth stressing at this point that although most of the results in the VAR litera-
ture are consistent with the economic theory, Sims (1992) using a recursive identification
approach observed a positive relationship between prices and interest rate.54 Sims argues
that the price puzzle is possibly an artifact of the omitted variables problem. In other
words, because the central bank has more information concerning expected inflation than a
researcher can incorporate in a VAR model, the finding that interest rate rises in response
to expected high inflation can only be explained due to the omission of a fundamental
variable from the model. Recently, Castelnuovo and Surico (2010) show that price puzzle
is the by-product of a passive monetary policy with respect to inflation. More concretely,
if a central bank accommodates instead of fighting inflation, that is if a central bank
follows a passive policy, then this would generate indeterminate multiple equilibria and
expectations become self-fulfilling. Thus, high inflationary expectation will be fulfilled by
a passive monetary policy leading to expectation for even higher inflation. This implies
that the Sims argument is correct only when monetary policy is passive.
Our empirical findings for developed economies can be summarized as follows. First,
similar to Uhlig (2005), we find that a “contractionary” monetary policy shock, does not
necessarily lead to a fall in real GDP. For instance, in the US, we find that the real indus-
trial output growth stays positive for the entire 5 year period following a contractionary
monetary shock. In Japan the real industrial production growth does not respond much
to the monetary shock for several months but then it slightly increases after the middle
of the second year following the shock; however, this response is small and negligible. In
53Leeper et al (1996), Canova (2007), Benati (2008), Canova and Gambetti. (2010) and Cover et al.
(2006) provide an extensive literature review on monetary transmission mechanism for developed economies
using structural VAR. In this literature Ho and Yeh (2010) is an exception as they focus on data from
Taiwan and India implementing a VAR approach.
54Eichengreen et. al. (1992) named this anomaly as a “price puzzle”.
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contrast, the real industrial production growth in the UK declines for the entire period
following the negative shock. Second, although the response of prices is tainted due to the
sign restriction, it is interesting to note that we do observe the price puzzle for the UK
and Japan when we consider the full sample. We conjecture that the price puzzle in these
two countries is not an outcome of passive monetary policy but it is related to excess bank
lending over the period prior to the financial crises. Third, when we inspect the behavior
of real exchange rates, we observe delayed overshooting in Japan and the exchange rate
puzzle in the UK and in the US.55,56
In explaining our findings for developing economies, we also address the impact of
currency or financial crises that these countries experienced throughout the investigation
period. Our investigation shows that the real economic activity, similar to developed
economies, does not respond significantly to a contractionary monetary policy shock. We
observe significant evidence for the price puzzle only for Mexico which we explain referring
to the factors that led to the currency crises in 1994. When we inspect the behavior of the
exchange rate, we observe an appreciation of the domestic currency for all countries up to
three years: in other words we observe the delayed overshooting puzzle in all countries.
However this behavior is also significant only in the case of Mexico.57 We argue that
financial liberalization, poor banking regulations, and the use of complex financial tools
which undermined transparency in financial markets have led to anomalous behavior in
consumer prices and exchange rates. We, therefore, claim that in macroeconomic policies
aiming to stabilize inflation and fiscal sustainability will be ine↵ective when the financial
markets are poorly regulated.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the method-
ology, section 3 provides information on the data and illustrates the results of the VAR
analysis in terms of impulse responses and variance decomposition. Finally, Section 4
o↵ers some concluding observations.
2.2 The Bayesian VAR Methodology
We empirically investigate the impact of a contractionary monetary policy shock on the
economy especially that on output and exchange rate. We construct a VAR system that
consist of real industrial production, exchange rate, money market rate, total reserves and
consumer price index and follow the identification approach suggested in Uhlig (2005) by
55For all the countries the real exchange rate is measured with respect to the US dollar whereas the real
exchange rate for the US is measured against the SDR. All real exchange rate variables are drawn from
the International Financial Statistics (IFS).
56Scholl and Uhlig (2008) report the presence of the exchange rate puzzle for US- Germany, US-UK,
US-Japan.
57A typical delayed overshooting result predicts that exchange rate overshoots its long-run value in re-
sponse to monetary shock but it reaches its peak after one to three years instead of happening immediately.
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imposing sign restrictions. By construction, the growth rate of real industrial production
and that of the real exchange rate are the focus of interest and we do not impose any sign
restrictions on these variables. However, we restrict the impulse responses of monetary
and price variables to identify monetary policy shocks.
We can show that there are several impulse responses which satisfy the sign restric-
tions for k=0, 1, 2,3,4,5 which k represents the months after the shock. To obtain these
impulse responses, we have produced 10 000 candidate draws. Uhlig (2005) shows that
sign restrictions will cut o↵ the distribution of the initial impulse responses of prices and
total reserves which have been generated by cholesky decomposition.
In all of our plots we show the median plus 16% and 84% quantiles for the sample of
the impulse responses. This represents 1 standard deviation band. However, it is quite
popular in the literature to use two standard deviation bands which means that using
2.3% and 97.3% quantiles. Consistent with Uhlig (2005) , since we did not identify our
model completely and also for computational reason, we just use 100 draws to base our
inference in pure sign restriction approach , we cannot report these quantiles as accurately
as literature wants and thus we use 1 standard deviation bands rather than using 2 stan-
dard deviation band. Additionally, one standard deviation bands are also fashionable in
this literature.
2.3 Data and Result
In this section, we present our results that we generate using the pure sign-restriction
approach. We carry out our analysis using monthly data which covers the period between
January 1988 and December 2009 for the US, the UK and Japan as well as Mexico,
Malaysia, South Korea. We compare and examine the results gathered from these countries
to understand how monetary policy shocks a↵ect output, exchange rate and prices. Our
empirical model is similar to that of Bernanke and Mihov (1998) and it is well studied in
the literature. Our investigation makes use of real industrial production, commodity price
index, total reserves, the real exchange rate and short-term interest rate. The data on the
interest rate are taken from line 60b of the International Financial Statistics. Data for total
reserves are taken from line 12 of the same source and it represents total reserves minus
gold. Data on the consumer price index (CPI) and the industrial production are extracted
from lines 64 and 66, respectively. Last but not least, the real e↵ective exchange rate is
taken from line 42. Note that the real e↵ective exchange rates of the UK, Japan, Malaysia,
Korea and Mexico are measured with respect to the US dollar. The real exchange rate
for the US is given with respect to the SDR. Given the definition of the real exchange
rate series, an increase indicates a real depreciation whereas a decline indicates a real
appreciation. We use the logarithmic first di↵erence of each variable in our VAR system
48
with the exception of the short-term interest rates which is used in levels.
We built our VAR model allowing for 12 lags in the logarithmic di↵erence form of the
series with the exception of the short-term interest rates which is used in levels. To achieve
identification of the VAR system, we impose that the response of inflation and growth of
total reserves would not increase and that of money market rate would not decrease for
the first six months following the monetary policy shock; i.e. s = 5.
2.3.1 General Observation
We have three sets of key results. The first set is about the e↵ect of monetary policy shocks
on real output. We find that a negative monetary policy shock does not necessarily lead
to a contractionary e↵ect on real industrial production. It is possible that the ambiguous
e↵ect of monetary policy on economic growth is related to the response of the financial
sector to changes in monetary policy. Given our observations, it appears that transparency
and a well behaving financial sector can restore the confidence in the economy so that the
uncertainty surrounding the future economic growth and inflation can be deflated to a
large extent. More specifically, our findings suggests that sunspots are not necessarily
generated due to the implementation of passive monetary policies but due to the actions
of a poorly regulated financial sector58. Hence, it might be more important to (re-)institute
a well functioning financial system prior to meddling with the monetary policy to achieve
full economic recovery.
Second, when we consider the full data, we do find evidence for the presence of the price
puzzle for the UK and Japan. Evidence of the price puzzle begs an answer to the question
on the underlying factors that generate this indeterminacy. Although, Castelnuovo and
Surico (2010) argues that the indeterminacy is due to violation of the Taylor principle59
their suggestion is not consistent with the adoption of inflation targeting by the BoE or
the inflation averse policies followed by the BoJ.60 We conjecture that the mechanism
that generated sunspots both in the UK and in Japan was related to the excess bank
lending that took place before the periods of crisis that both countries went through.
A sharp increase in bank-lending accompanied by poor bank regulation can easily lead
to speculation and mal-investment. Under such circumstances a crisis can easily spiral
into poor economic conditions as both countries experienced. We show that this anomaly
58This conjecture perhaps does not correspond to the US reaction to monetary policy shocks due to its
size and the way it is governed.
59The Taylor principle states that if the coe cient of inflation in the standard Taylor rule is smaller than
one, then the rational expectations model has multiple equilibria and the expectations become self-fulfilling.
60Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) argue that the association of indeterminacy with passive monetary
policy is model specific. Dupor (2001) shows that in a continuous time model with endogenous investment
passive monetary policy is consistent with determinacy. However, in the New-Keynesian widely used in
the literature to analyze the monetary transmission mechanism of interest rate shocks, passive monetary
policy is the generated mechanism of indeterminacy.
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disappears once the periods of crises are removed from the analysis. It seems that without
establishing a well functioning and a well regulated financial sector, it would be hard to
achieve economic recovery. Turning to the price puzzle in developing economies, we do
not find significant evidence to that end except for the case of Mexico. We argue that
significance of the price puzzle for Mexico is due to those factors which led to the financial
crises that took place in 1994. In particular, we show that once the e↵ects of financial
crisis are removed from the data, the price puzzle for Mexico disappears.
Our third set of results relates to the behavior of the real exchange rates of the countries
in our sample. We find that the reaction of exchange rates to monetary policy shocks is
not identical across all three developed countries. In particular, there is evidence of a
delayed overshooting puzzle for Japan.61 In contrast, for the UK and the US we find
evidence for the exchange rate puzzle; depreciation of the real exchange rate in response
to the contractionary monetary policy.
For all three developing countries in our dataset, we observe that the response of the
exchange rate to monetary policy shocks is delayed.62 However, this behavior is significant
only for Mexico.
It is worth noting that within the framework of a typical delayed over-shooting model,
as demonstrated in empirical studies including that of Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) and
Grilli and Roubini (1995, 1996), the value of exchange rate overshoots its long-run level
in response to a monetary shock and reaches its peak after one to three years rather
than instantaneously as the Dornbushs overshooting model suggests.63 Hence there is
a critical disagreement between the standard theory and the baseline evidence regard-
ing the e↵ects of monetary policy shocks on the behavior of exchange rates.64 Recently,
Faust and Rogers (2003) argue that the delayed overshooting is an artifact of the recur-
sive identification scheme. In particular, they show that there is no evidence of delayed
overshooting model once mild sign or shape restrictions are imposed to identify monetary
policy shocks. Yet, Scholl and Uhlig (2008) restore the delayed overshooting puzzle by
imposing sign restrictions on the impulse response functions.
61Essentially, this means a desecration of the uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition which is called
as the ‘forward discount puzzle’. It is important to note though that there could be a forward discount
puzzle even with no delayed overshooting.
62A typical delayed overshooting implies that exchange rate overshoots its long-run value in response
to monetary shock but it reaches its peak after one to three years instead of happening immediately as
expected by the Dornbushs overshooting model. Essentially, this means a desecration of the uncovered
interest parity (UIP) condition which is called as the forward discount puzzle. It is important to note
though that there could be a forward discount puzzle even with no delayed overshooting.
63The delayed overshooting puzzle is also named as the forward discount puzzle due to a violation of
uncovered interest rate parity. It is worth noting that a forward discount puzzle might exist even if there
is no delay overshooting. See also Leeper et. al. (1996), Clarida and Gali (1994) and Kim (2001).
64Dornbuschs (1976) famous overshooting model, which predicts that an increase in the domestic interest
rate relative to the foreign interest rate leads to an immediate appreciation followed by a depreciation of
the domestic currency to its long-run equilibrium level.
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2.3.2 Empirical Results
Figures in appendix 2 show the impulse responses for Japan, the UK and the US as well
as Korea, Malaysia and Mexico to a “contractionary” monetary policy shock for di↵erent
sample periods65. Figures 1, 3, 3, 6, 7 and 8 plot the impulse responses for the full sample
for each country, respectively. Figure 2 presents the impulse responses of Japan to a
contractionary monetary policy when we use shorter periods as we investigate the role of
crises. We follow a similar strategy regarding the e↵ects of crises periods for the UK on
the response of variables to monetary policy shocks. In particular Figure 4 depicts the
response of the UK economy as we exclude the periods of EMS currency crisis and the
recent financial crisis.
We also have the figure 9 that show the response of the Mexican economy for the post
1994 crises data. The subsequent discussion explains the response of each economy to
a contractionary monetary policy shock followed by a detailed account of the price and
exchange rate puzzles in Mexico.
2.4 Results from Developed Countries
2.4.1 The Case of Japan
When we inspect Figure 1, we observe that a contractionary monetary policy shocks
have unclear e↵ects on the real industrial production of Japan. Real industrial produc-
tion growth does not respond to the shock for the first two and a half years after which
it starts to increase. Overall, the reaction of industrial production growth in Japan is
around the baseline level suggesting that a contractionary monetary shock does not create
large fluctuations in industrial production. Evidence that adverse monetary shock is not
an important source of fluctuation in Japans economy is consistent with the fact that
Japanese monetary authorities faced nearly-zero interest rates for most of the period that
we explored in this study. Thus, when the economy experiences a recessionary shock,
monetary authorities cannot stimulate the demand by decreasing interest rate since the
nominal interest rate cannot go below zero. Put it di↵erently, zero bound interest rate
reduces the e↵ectiveness of monetary policy; should the economy face a shock on aggre-
gate supply or demand, monetary policy cannot be used to return the economy back to
its equilibrium66.
We next turn to examine the behavior of consumer prices. We put the restriction that
inflation should not increase in the first 6 months following the negative monetary policy
shock. But then inflation begins to exhibit an increasing trend; although inflation remains
65All the graphs for this chapter are located in the second appendix (Appendix 2) of this thesis.
66Baba et al. (2004) show that although the ratio of money base to GDP doubled after 1995, deflation
has persisted. They also argue that evidence of recession and deflation was due to the low and even
negative growth rate of bank loans.
51
below the baseline level for almost two years, it becomes positive and increases for the
rest of the period. On average there is mild evidence of the price puzzle which might
be an artifact of omitted variables problem as suggested by Sims (1992) and Castelnuovo
and Surico (2010). In particular, Castelnuovo and Surico (2010) argue that in a New-
Keynesian model the omitted variable problem is the by-product of a passive monetary
policy which leads to indeterminacy. Indeterminacy, as Lubik and Schorfheide (2004)
stress, is an outcome where policy shocks are not uniquely identified and sunspots become
important in generating business cycles and a↵ecting the equilibrium. Hence, structural
VAR models (SVAR) would be misspecified should one mistakenly omit forward-looking
variables such as expected inflation. Under such circumstances, monetary policy shocks
will not be identified properly.
We presume that the price puzzle is surfacing here due to the economic crises that
Japan went through over the late 1980s and early 1990s. In particular, recall that the
bank of Japan (BoJ) during this period followed an expansionary monetary policy to
mitigate the impact of Yens appreciation in order to comply with the 1985 Plaza Accord.
The expansionary monetary policy, along with the current account surplus, led to excess
liquidity in the financial system fueling financial assets and real estate prices. During this
period, the Japanese monetary policy authorities were also concerned about the possibility
that inflation would surge as a consequence of the developments in the economy. To
counteract a potential surge in inflation, BoJ doubled the bank rate. Yet, they were then
slow to reduce it. The increase in the bank rate exerted a negative impact on real estate
and stock prices resulting in an increase in the number of loan defaults. The negative
impact of loan defaults on the economy was further exacerbated as Japanese banks ended
up with the final bill in the form of bad loans. The damage was done: bad loans, continuous
increases in the number of defaults and reduction in real estate and stock prices paved
way to a deflationary environment making demand side policies ine↵ective.
Given the negative and protracted nature of the crises in Japan, we conjecture that the
presence of the price puzzle could be due to excess lending and poor banking regulation
that was in e↵ect prior to the financial crisis. To provide evidence to our conjecture, we
generate the impulse responses for the post-crises period so that we can circumvent the
indeterminacy possibly induced by the inclusion of this period in the analysis. Figure 2
depicts our observations for the 1992-2009 period. When we concentrate on the behavior
of prices, we see that although prices fall and remain below zero for the whole period
there is still a tendency in prices to increase following the third year. Once we exclude
the 2007-09 period from the analysis the price puzzle disappears fully. However, while the
reaction of the other variables do not change, it now appears that the adverse monetary
shock has a negative e↵ect on industrial production growth.
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When we turn to analyze the movements in the real exchange rate, we observe in
Figure 1 that the Japanese Yen appreciates following the monetary policy shock for a
year and then settles around its baseline as the value of the currency does not appear to
change much (although there is some evidence of depreciation following a year and a half
of the shock, this is very mild). Thus, there is evidence of delayed overshooting following
the contractionary monetary policy shock. However, the delayed overshooting in Japan
might be a mirror response to the price puzzle. More specifically, exchange rate initially
appreciates to mitigate the e↵ects of expected inflation and then depreciates. Once we
exclude the periods of financial crises the delayed overshooting disappears.
2.4.2 The Case of UK
We next inspect the results for the UK. Figure 3 plots the impulse responses of the variables
when we use the full data. In general, we observe that the industrial production growth
falls following a contractionary monetary policy shock. However, this drop is not too large.
As expected, inflation initially falls due to the restriction that we impose for the first 6
months. Afterwards inflation increases reaching a peak by the end of the first year while
it remains above the baseline for the rest of the period. Yet, the deviation of inflation
from the baseline is negligible after the four years following the shock.
Similar as in the case of Japan, the positive relation between inflation and interest
rate could be due to the fact that the UK economy went through a period of crises in
early 90s. In this period, in conjunction with the German unification and the subsequent
contractionary monetary policy that Germany implemented, the UK economic outlook de-
teriorated and unemployment increased substantially. However, to reduce unemployment,
the British government could not stimulate economic growth by devaluating the British
pound because the UK was a member of the ERM. The option for the UK, at that time,
were either to opt out of the ERM and achieve higher economic growth by devaluing the
domestic currency or to remain in the ERM and su↵er a severe recession. The market
bet in favor of the former option leading to a speculative attack on the British pound in
September 1992. Given this panorama of the UK economy, it appears that the devalua-
tion expectations and the subsequent inflation expectations could as well be the underlying
mechanism for the price puzzle that we observe in the data. To test for this possibility,
we repeat the analysis concentrating on the post 1992 EMS currency crises period to re-
move the immediate e↵ects of this period of uncertainty. As in the case of Japan, we
also estimate the impulse responses by excluding the recent financial crisis. Our empirical
results about the period between 1995-2009 and 1995-2007 provide evidence supporting
our explanation that the price puzzle disappears once periods of crises are removed from
the data.
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Our results are consistent with Benati (2008) who using a time-varying coe cient
structural VAR (TVC-SVAR) shows that there is a violation of the “Taylor principle”
during the entire decade of the 80s. The UK joined the ERM on October 1990 and opt
out of the ERM in September 1992. The long- run coe cient on inflation is estimated to
fluctuate between 0.7 and 0.8 before the UK joined the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM).
During the ERM, the interest rate di↵erential between the UK and Germany declined from
2.3 to 0.4 (see Gross and Thygesen 1998). In line with the empirical regularities, Benati
(2008) estimates a temporary decrease in the long-run coe cients on inflation and output
growth during the ERM period. However, after the introduction of inflation targeting in
October 1992, following the suspension of the EMS membership, the long-run coe cients
on inflation and output increased substantially, reaching 1.4 and 0.9, respectively. This
observation suggests that the “Taylor principle” is not violated over the period following
the introduction of inflation targeting to the current financial crisis. To put it in other
words, although there was a violation of the “Taylor principle” before the EMS crisis, this
was not the case for the period prior to the recent financial crisis.
The behavior of the British pound exhibits an interesting reaction to monetary policy
shocks. We observe that the real exchange rate depreciates after a contractionary monetary
policy shock in all three graphs providing evidence in favor of an exchange rate puzzle
which might be consistent with the presence of a price puzzle. More specifically, within the
Frankels (1979) overshooting model an increase in the interest rate will lead to depreciation
only if the expected inflation is higher than nominal interest rate67. This explanation
accords with the observations in Figure 5 where the depreciation of real exchange rate
becomes explosive after two years following the monetary policy shock.
2.4.3 The Case of USA
Finally, we concentrate on the behavior of the US economy to a contractionary monetary
policy shock. Figure 5 shows our observations. The reaction of the US economy to a
monetary policy shock has been studied by several researchers including Uhlig (2005),
Scholl and Uhlig (2008) and it is pleasing to see that our findings in general align with
theirs. We observe that the industrial production growth in the US increases at first and
then falls towards the baseline supporting Uhlig (2005) that a contractionary monetary
policy does not necessarily lead to a contraction in the economy. When we turn to observe
67Frankels overshooting model suggests that the deviation of exchange rate form its equilibrium value
depends on the real interest rate di↵erential:
st = s¯  1
⇥
[(it  ⇧)  (i⇤t  ⇧⇤)] (2.4.1)
where st is the current exchange rate, s¯ is the equilibrium exchange rate it, is domestic nominal interest
rate, i⇤t is foreign nominal interest rate, ⇧ is the long-run domestic inflation rate and ⇧
⇤ is the foreign
long-run inflation rate.
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the behavior of prices, we see that inflation falls for the first six months reflecting the
restrictions that we impose. Furthermore, inflation remains below the baseline for most of
the time and it does not appear to have a tendency to increase although it exhibits some
cyclicality.
Similar to the UK, the real US dollar, which is measured against the SDR, exhibits
the exchange puzzle: the US dollar depreciates following a contractionary monetary policy
shock. This might be due to a forward discount puzzle where violation of uncovered
interest rate parity (UIP) is driven by the existence of forward risk premium. Here, the
risk premium implies that the forward premium is higher than the expected devaluation.
This result along with the behavior of other variables in our VAR are in line with Scholl
and Uhlig (2008) and Fratzscher at al. (2010) who found strong evidence for a forward
discount premium in four developed countries.
2.5 Developed Countries: Evaluation of the Results
Our results have strong policy implication for all there countries but mainly for those which
experience the price puzzle: the UK and Japan. Throughout the period under investiga-
tion, although both Japan and UK attempted to defuse contraction in their economies by
implementing monetary and fiscal policy tools to boost demand, both countries failed to
achieve their goals. Following the financial crises of the late 80s, the BoJ reduced the rate
of interest to zero and kept it at that level as the government increased its expenditures to
stimulate the economy. There was a reluctance to use a quantitative easing, because even
when Japan experienced deflation, BoJ was averse to possible future inflation. Similarly,
the recent financial crisis forced the BoE to reduce the bank rate to unprecedented low
levels while, di↵erent from the BoJ, increasing the money supply to support the demand
side of the economy.
When we turn to observe the reaction of the Labour government which was in power
during the 2007-2009 financial crises, we see that the government implemented expansion-
ary fiscal policies and strive hard to convince governments in continental Europe and the
US to do the same. In contrast, the subsequent ToryLib-Dem coalition government that
took power in 2010 restructured the fiscal policy to achieve a medium to long-term reduc-
tion of fiscal deficit and national debt. Under the current situation it is debatable that the
two sets of (conflicting) policies implemented by the BoE and the government will push
the country to its long-run growth path rather than to a low equilibrium where growth
will be too slow for a protracted period into the future. More concretely, given that the
monetary policy had limited impact on the demand side as experienced in Japan, USA
and the UK68, the coalition government might have been too quick to attempt to reduce
68Quantitative easing did not lead to inflation in Japan in the past.
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government expenditures to keep the public expenses in check. This complete reversal of
the UK fiscal policy may have further undesirable consequences as inflation in 2011 is on
the rise as a result of increases in fuel and wholesale commodity prices inducing inflation
expectations of the public.
Furthermore, the presence of the price and exchange rate puzzles implies that sunspots
could have significant e↵ects on the business cycle. In particular, it may be the case
that pessimism about the future economic circumstances might have introduced further
negative feelings on the e↵ectiveness of monetary policy in Japan and in the UK. Although
the earlier research has shown that the price puzzle or sunspot is a by-product of passive
monetary policy, our observations for the UK and Japan are not consistent with this view.
The reason is that over the period of investigation and importantly during the financial
crisis, monetary policy makers in both countries played a very active role. Given the
evidence, we suggest that the underlying factor to sunspots is excessive bank lending and
poor bank regulations. In Japan banks kept funding its customers before the financial
crises as long as the borrower was able to provide a collateral in the form of real estate.
This strategy worked well while the real estate prices were stable or increased over time and
the economy was not overheated as the asset bubble formed which eventually happened in
Japan in the 1990s and in the USA in 2007. However, once the bubble burst this practice
imposed immense negative e↵ects both on financial and real economic sector. In the case
of the UK, Haldane et al. (2007) show that UK banks increased their unsecured exposures
along with UK households secure debt to figures around 32% of UK banks total lending.
Haldane at al. (2007) also explain that households were very sensitive to adverse shocks
and there were signals of stress with the number of personal insolvencies sharply increasing
before the 2007-2009 financial crises.
It is also worth stressing that in the UK the price puzzle might have been the mirror
response of the exchange rate puzzle and vice-versa. More specifically, expected depreci-
ation of pound fuels expected inflation and expected inflation further increases expected
depreciation. The fundamental question is why there was an expected depreciation or an
increase of expected inflation in the first place. Is it due to bad policy or due to bad
luck? In our view it is due to a combination of both for the UK and due to bad policy
in Japan. Although in both countries the driving force behind expected inflation was
excess lending prior to the crises, the new element in the 2007-2009 financial crisis is the
increases in commodity prices and oil prices that happened con- currently. Under such
circumstances policy makers have to identify which part of expected inflation is generated
by supply shocks (i.e. oil price, food prices etc.) and which part of inflation is generated
by sunspots. The latter in both countries was a result of poor bank regulation which after
the crisis led to an uncertain economic environment undermining the e↵ectiveness of mon-
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etary and fiscal policy concerning the future economic growth. Our results suggest that
any decision to increase the interest rate by the BoE should be associated with demand
factors that a↵ects expected inflation. However, expected inflation is due either to supply
shocks or to bad policy prior to the recent financial crisis. Thus, an increase in interest
rate will not only undermine future economic growth but it might also issue wrong signals
concerning the credibility of BoE monetary policy committee.
As a final step of our empirical study we perform a variance decomposition analysis.
Table 1 shows the variance decomposition of all variables for all three countries in response
to an interest rate shock. We can see that movements in monetary policy is responsible
for a small fraction of the state variables movements in any of these countries. More
concretely, monetary policy explains at about 20% of the variability of any of the variables
included in the VAR system. Last but not least within each group of countries the variance
decomposition is relatively the same.
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Table 1: Fraction of Variance Decompositions
Fraction OF Variance for IP 6 month 12 month 24 month
Japan 10 % 14 % 16 %
United States 10 % 14 % 16 %
United Kingdom 11 % 17 % 20 %
Fraction OF Variance for CPI
Japan 22 % 21 % 20 %
United States 15 % 20 % 18 %
United Kingdom 18 % 22 % 23 %
Fraction OF Variance for Exchange Rate
Japan 11 % 13 % 17 %
United States 16 % 20 % 22 %
United Kingdom 12 % 15 % 20 %
2.6 Results from Developing Countries
2.6.1 The Case of Malaysia
Figure 6 represents the results for the Malaysia. Our results show the impact of real
industrial production growth to monetary policy shocks in Malaysia. We see that the
growth of real industrial production decreases after the shock. However, this fall is not
significant. Inflation, measured by the log di↵erence of CPI, also decreases following the
shock. The fall in inflation becomes larger after the first year and keeps falling till the
end of period. When we inspect the change in the value of the Malaysian Ringgit, we see
that the currency appreciates in the first two years following the shock and depreciates
afterwards. Yet its response is not significant. The initial appreciation of the real currency
might be explained by the increase in bank lending which was fueled by the international
banks desire to enter the East-Asian markets before the 1997 financial crises.69 These
capital inflows, used to fund private investments rather than consumption and government
expenditures, led to an appreciation of domestic currency by putting an upward pressure
on the prices of non-tradable goods. Hence, the behavior of the Ringgit depicted in Figure
1 is not surprising and can be described as delayed overshooting.
2.6.2 The Case of South Korea
Figure 7 displays the impact of monetary policy shocks in South Korea. In particular,
we observe that the real industrial production in Korea increases slightly during the year
following the shock returning to the baseline level by the end of the period. We also see
that the consumer prices fall immediately after the shock as it stays around the baseline
level for the remainder of the period. When we inspect the behavior of the South Korean
69Bank claims to private sector increased by more than 50 per cent relative to GDP, from 1991 to 1997,
in Thailand, Korea and Malaysia (Source: Pilbeam, 2006, pp. 469).
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Won, similar to the Ringgit, we observe that the real exchange rate appreciates nearly
for three years and then depreciates till the end of period. But the movements in the
exchange rate are not significant.
2.6.3 The Case of Mexico
Finally figure 8 displays our observations for Mexico. We find that a contractionary mon-
etary shock in Mexico exerts a negative impact on the growth of real industrial production
in the first year. Towards the end of the second year, the growth of the real industrial pro-
duction goes back to the baseline level and then starts to increase slowly after year three.
When we look at the response of prices, we see that the inflation increases following the
shock and this increase lasts for about three years after which it declines. In this context,
Mexican economy displays price puzzle following a contractionary monetary shock. We
also observe that the value of the Peso appreciates significantly after the shock for about
two years and a half and then depreciate till the end of the period. Hence, Mexico presents
a case where we observe the delayed overshooting puzzle.
2.7 Understanding the Price Puzzle in Mexico
The evidence in favour of the price puzzle and of the appreciation of Mexican peso after
a contractionary monetary shock is consistent with the underlying mechanisms which
eventually led to the 1994 currency crisis. More concretely, after the 1982 crisis the
Mexican government implemented a series of reforms to join the NAFTA. In particular,
the Mexican government pegged Peso to US Dollar and begun to follow an anti-inflationary
policy. However, tight monetary policy accompanied by financial liberalization resulted
in increasing interest rates and capital inflows which were used to fund domestic demand.
Although the domestic inflation declined after these reforms were introduced, it was still
much higher than the rate of inflation in the US. As a consequence, the Peso began
to appreciate in real terms and the current account deficit increased in relation to the
GDP. Under such circumstances, devaluation expectations increased which later fed to
the domestic prices70.
Given the above discussion, positive reaction of prices to a contractionary policy shock
reflects devaluation expectations and the subsequent high inflation that followed the de-
valuation of the currency. This is consistent with Sims (1992) and Castalnuovo and Surico
(2010) who argue that a passive monetary policy will lead to multiple equilibria and self-
fulfilling expectations. In this set up, appreciation of the Mexican peso reflects a passive
70Combination of high inflation and current account deficit (CAD) made it di cult for the the Mexican
government to fund CAD by issuing peso-denominated bonds. They started to issue dollar-denominated
bonds (tesobonos). Tesobones bought by domestic banks which used them as a collateral to attract capital
from the US banks by means of tesobono swaps. However, in February 1994 when the Federal Reserve
raised its interest rate there was massive capital outflows, leading peso to be evaluated by 15 per cent.
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monetary policy accommodating higher inflation than that is required to restore balance
of payments equilibrium. Interestingly, following the 1994 currency crisis, once the new
real exchange rate equilibrium is established, the price puzzle disappears. In fact observ-
ing Figure 4, which replicates the analysis using the data for the post 1994 period, the
price puzzle is not an issue of concern while our observations for the remaining variables
still hold.
It is worth noting that while the Korean and Malaysian economies experience rela-
tively similar reactions to a monetary policy shock, Mexico di↵ers from the former two
emerging economies and possibly due to di↵erences in the evolution of the Mexican mon-
etary policy. For instance, Mexico, under the dual exchange rate regime (from 1982 to
1991) never experienced severe capital controls. Furthermore, the central bank of Mexico,
took measures to avoid the formation of black market in currency transactions by keeping
the gap between the o cial exchange rate and market exchange rate low. In March 1988,
the Mexican monetary policy changed dramatically with a comprehensive anti-inflationary
view. Some economists argue that this change in the monetary policy was the main source
of fluctuations in Mexico.
Contrary to this view, one can argue that the main source of exchange rate, output
and price fluctuations in Mexico is mostly due to foreign shocks. Del Negro and Obiols-
Homs (2001) point to the US business cycles as the primary source of disturbances to real
activity in Mexico. Thus, this could be an alternative explanation as to why we observe
the price puzzle in Mexico but not in Korea and Malaysia. It might also explain why the
size of the Peso appreciation is di↵erent from that of Won and Ringgit. In this context,
although it is out of the scope of the this thesis, it would be interesting to explore the
e↵ects of shocks emanating from foreign countries, especially the role of US monetary
policy shocks on Mexico and possibly other Latin American countries.
2.8 Understanding the Exchange Rate Puzzle in Mexico
Evidence we have so far displayed shows that monetary policy shocks leads to appreciation
of the real exchange rate for several quarters in Malaysia, Korea and Mexico before the
value of the currency declines. Looking at the figures, although one can see the tell-tale
patterns of delayed overshooting and forward discount puzzles those patterns are not sig-
nificant except in Mexico. The key element that di↵erentiates the delayed overshooting
in Malaysia and Korea from that in Mexico is related to various factors which generated
growth in the pre-crisis period. In the case of Mexico it was the euphoria due to the eco-
nomic recovery supported by the US after the crisis in 1982 and to the structural changes
such as the privatization of state-companies, trade liberalization, financial liberalization,
fiscal reforms and monetary policy based on exchange rate targeting. In fact the Mexi-
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can economic recovery was called the Mexican Miracle as the country become the second
largest importer of capital in the early 1990s (see Kuroda, Tomita and Kazuhiko (2000),
p.3). However, liberalization of domestic markets increased imports far beyond that of
exports and generated a current account deficit. In return, the resulting current account
deficit raised devaluation expectations as the initial euphoria in the capital markets trans-
formed into a panic which resulted in a speculative attack. Thus, the key factor towards
the finding of the price puzzle and the delayed overshooting puzzle was the boom and bust
of Mexican economy which was the by product of initial macroeconomic and structural
reforms accompanied by poor financial regulation. From this framework, it is not too sur-
prising to see the initial euphoria of high economic growth transforming into devaluation
expectations.
The same arguments about the nature of financial crises could apply for Malaysia
and Korea. However, the lack of significant evidence of delayed overshooting will raise
some questions about the importance of market expectations as the main factor behind
the 1997 financial crises. Here, too, although market expectations were important these
two countries fell into economic crisis due to supply side shocks. In particular, trade
liberalization a↵ected the economic growth negatively in Malaysia and Korea as Chinese
producers benefited greatly from such policy changes. The gloomy picture in the region
was also exacerbated by a diminishing demand from Japan. A number of events further
fueled the economic downturn. In 1996, Habo and Sammi steel industries and Kia motors
in Korea went bankrupt. Commercial banks which lend funds to these industries also came
under strong pressure. The collapse of Thai Baht as a result of a fall in property prices
had domino e↵ect, due to trade links between Malaysia, Indonesia and Philip- pines.
Hence, it appears that although in all three countries the genesis of crisis was resulted
from implementation of liberalization policies which was based on poor financial market
regulations, Mexico mainly su↵ered from soft fundamentals (market expectations) while
Korea and Malaysia were dragged into crises due to negative shocks impacting the real
economy.
2.9 Conclusion
In this chapter we investigate the impacts of monetary policy shocks on output, exchange
rate and prices using data from the UK, the US and Japan as well as Mexico, Malaysia
and South Korea. We carry out our investigation implementing an agnostic identification
method recently proposed by Uhlig (2005). In this framework, to achieve identification
we impose sign restrictions on domestic short-term interest rates, prices and total reserves
for the first six months following the contractionary shock. We apply no restrictions
on real exchange rate and output so that the impulse responses of these variables are
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completely determined by the data. Regarding the restrictions that we impose, we follow
the conventional wisdom and assume that a contractionary monetary policy shock does
not lead to a fall in domestic short-term interest rates, does not increase domestic prices
and does not increase total reserves. We have three sets of observations.
First, the response of real output to adverse monetary policy shocks is ambiguous in a
way that in most cases it does not have a significant impact on output as the response can
be positive as well as negative. Therefore, we cannot be as comfortable as before when
commenting on the impact of a contractionary monetary shock on the output.
Second, among developed economies, we observe price puzzle for Japan and UK when
we use the full sample period during which both countries experienced 2 two distinct
periods of crises including the recent 2007-2009 financial crises. We argue that the price
puzzle is an artifact of excess lending and poor banking regulations. Excess lending prior
to financial crises created inflationary expectations which in the case of UK have been
further enhanced by depreciation of the home currency. In other words, we conjecture
that the price puzzle in Japan and the UK is not a by-product of passive monetary policy,
as the central banks were active through out the sample period, but rather it is an outcome
of the poor regulation of the banking system which led to a lending boom and inflationary
expectations. Our results suggest that the appropriate tool to satisfy market expectations
and to restore public confidence is through increasing the transparency of banking system
and introducing a better financial regulatory system. For developing economies, we observe
the price puzzle only for the case of Mexico. We show that this observation disappears for
the post-crisis period. We argue that the price puzzle was the by-product of real exchange
rate appreciation generated by a passive monetary policy accommodating higher level of
inflation than that is required to achieve equilibrium in the balance of payments.
Third, we show that the exchange rate puzzle occurs in the UK and the US for devel-
oped economies while we observe the delayed overshooting for Japan. Empirical evidence
suggests that in Japan exchange rate responds to mitigate expected inflation while in the
UK and the US exchange rate response accommodates expected inflation.71 For develop-
ing economies, we provide evidence that the Mexican Peso exhibits significant evidence for
delayed overshooting. Overall, although these observations we present here would be of
use to researchers and policy makers, as data becomes available more research on emerging
economies is warranted.
Last but not least, the results in this thesis suggest that monetary policy shocks can
explain only a small part of the variation in output and prices. Quantitatively, monetary
71In an attempt to explain empirical findings of delayed overshooting theoretical research such as Gour-
inchas and Tornell (1996, 2002) argue that delayed overshooting is the by- product of learning the current
state and the intrinsic dynamic if interest rate reaction to monetary shocks.
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policy shocks seem to have a negligible e↵ect on exchange rate fluctuations as well as
output, in contrast to some of the literature.
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Chapter 2
What Are the Impacts of Fiscal Policy on Private
Consumption and Wages in UK and Italy Using Sign
Restriction Approach?
3.1 Introduction
What are the impacts of fiscal policy shocks on the economy? And which theory explains
the response of economy to fiscal policy shocks more e↵ectively? Fiscal policy and the
analysis of the policy alike have not attracted enough attention in the literature compared
to a large body of research focusing on monetary shock. It is surprising since there
is a lengthy public debate on the impacts of fiscal policy that bring about arguments
about the importance of government spending and taxation. The discussions about having
independent organizations to implement fiscal policy, for instance, are all emphasizing that
fiscal policy is believed to be e↵ective to soothe business cycles fluctuations.
In addition, there is not a widespread agreement about which theory is able to ex-
plain the impacts of fiscal policy. As a result, researchers have been particularly keen to
systematically observe the performance of benchmark theories concerning the impacts of
fiscal policy. This is an important deficiency in the literature. And therefore one of the
objectives of this thesis is to assess the validities of these textbook models.
Our focus is on the behavior of private consumption and wages after a fiscal shock
since di↵erent theories predict contrasting behavior of these two variables. It could be
said that, while it is mostly agreed that expansionary government expenditure increases
output, the behaviors of wages and private consumption are ambiguous. For instance,
the traditional IS-LM model assume that an expansionary government expenditure in-
crease private consumption. Real business cycle (RBC) model, on the other hand, shows
consumption falls as a consequence of negative wealth e↵ect after the similar shock. We
put private consumption as the center of attention since it is the main determinant of
the aggregate demand. One of the purposes in this thesis, thus, is to investigate the
comparability of these two benchmark theories.
Macroeconomists see the economy as a dynamic and stochastic system that responds
to past and present random fiscal shocks. For this reason, they employ vector autoregres-
sive (VAR) approach, initiated by Sims (1980), to understand the response of economic
variables after changes in government spending and revenue. In order to get meaning-
ful results, econometricians identify fiscal policy shock through di↵erent identification
schemes. Several papers, for instance, make the assumptions that key economic variables
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have sluggish reaction to these fiscal shocks72. Others employ additional information such
as institutional changes in tax systems and the role of political issues such as wars and
election73. Di↵erent from the mentioned literature, this thesis follows Uhlig and Mount-
ford (2009) and simply uses macroeconomic time series data to identify the model. For
instance, we do not make any assumptions about timing of the institutional changes in tax
systems and also do not put any restrictions on the behavior of the key economic variables
such as prices, consumption, output and wages: we want to let data speak about their
reactions after a fiscal shock.
There are some universal concerns in studying fiscal policy using VAR approach.
First, changes in tax rates and also amendment in government expenditure is always pre-
announced. Therefore this lag between the announcement and implementation of these
policies can lead to some movements in macroeconomic variables before any actual change
occurs in fiscal policy itself. We adjust our identification procedure to tackle this issue.
For example for the case of government spending shock, we put a restriction that this
shock should last at least for 4 quarters however after a lag of one year once the shock
happens. The latter restriction controls movements that are caused by this lag between
the announcement and implementation of fiscal policy shocks. Second, even though there
is a general agreement that a monetary policy shock is a surprise change in short term in-
terest rate, there is no such a thing as fiscal policy per se. To address this issue, we identify
two basic fiscal policy shocks namely “government revenue” and “government spending”
and require that other kinds of fiscal polices are just di↵erent linear combinations of these
two basic fiscal policies. To clarify, we identify di↵erent kinds of both contractionary and
expansionary fiscal policies. Finally, one should be careful in distinguishing the changes
in economic variables that are caused by fiscal policy shocks from ones that are generated
by monetary policy and business cycle shocks. To solve this issue, we identify monetary
policy and business cycle shocks besides identifying fiscal policies and require them to be
orthogonal to fiscal policy shocks.
We apply this methodology for two main European counties namely UK and Italy.
Given that most of the research about fiscal policy has been done for the US, we believe
that it is important to focus on European economies to enhance our understanding about
the role of fiscal policy. Furthermore, after the recent financial crisis, UK and Italy apply
large cuts in di↵erent sectors of the economy that leads to di↵erent demonstrations and
protests from people who are going to be a↵ected by these tight fiscal decisions. Therefore,
72For more details see Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Fatas and Mihov (2001a,b), Favero (2002), and
Gali, Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2004).
73For example Romer and Romer (1994a), Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher
(1999), Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2003) and Eichenbaum and Fisher
(2005).
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we find it worthwhile to see what will be the impact of these changes for 6 coming years
after this shocks happens.
To summarize our results, we find that an expansionary government spending shock
lead to a significant increase in private consumption and wages. Thus, our empirical
results seem to be in line with the conclusions of the models in which consumers behave
in a non-Ricardian manner and hard to reconcile with those of the neoclassical theories
such as RBC model.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our methodology as
well as our assumptions. Section 3 presents our empirical results. In section 4 we analyze
our findings and compare them with literature. Finally, section 5, concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
After the current financial crisis we observe that nominal interest rates are getting closer
to their zero lower bound. Furthermore, firms become financially constrained to obtain
credit and financial institutions’ performances deteriorate during credit crunch. These
cause further implementation of expansionary monetary policies to become less e↵ective
and therefore policymakers turned their attention to fiscal policy.
On this ground, a number of recent empirical papers shed some light on the impacts
of changes in government expenditure and revenue on key economic variables such as un-
employment and consumption. They also attempt to discriminate between the two main
benchmark theories on the grounds of responses of these variables. Fiscal policy in stan-
dard textbook models changes national saving, investment, wages as well as other major
economic indicators by directly a↵ecting the demand. Accordingly, an expansionary fiscal
policy boosts the demand of goods and services on impact while reducing other compo-
nents of demand such as investment. This happens since total output is fixed. Yet private
consumption remains una↵ected since this change in fiscal policy has no impact on income.
On the other hand, interest rate should increase as a result of the increase in government
expenditure that reduces private investment as the consequence. This phenomenon is
called “ crowding out e↵ect”. This happens since government spending increases with-
out change in taxes and therefore government has to finance its debts by borrowing from
private sector. As a result, private saving falls that leads to a decrease in loanable funds
available for investment. When fiscal policy is simply a decrease in taxes, we observe that
disposable income and consumption rise on impact. However, this increase in private con-
sumption accompanies a fall in private investment since factors of production and output
are fixed. Moreover, one cannot investigate the impacts of fiscal policy shocks compre-
hensively without taking some important macroeconomic factors into account. To begin
with, one needs to know what governments can and cannot do considering governments’
budget constraint. Governments’ budget constraint does not stop them from being always
in debt. Yet, it places a constraint that the limit of present value of its debt cannot be
positive. Nonetheless, there are di↵erent views about the impacts of government debt on
their fiscal policy decisions.
According to the traditional theory, tax cuts reduce national saving by increasing
consumption. This has a crowding out impact on investment since a fall in national
saving increases interest rate. In Solow growth model, this fall in the level of investment
move down steady-state capital stock and leads to a lower level of output. Therefore the
economy set out with lower level of capital than in the Golden Rule steady state in the
long run and private consumption declines as a consequence. To analyze the short-run
impact, however, using benchmark IS-LM model, the model implies a boost in private
consumption as a result of this cut in taxes. This increases demand. Since prices are
sticky in the short-run, this increase in demand leads to an increase in employment. In
the long run prices adjust and therefore prices and output return to their natural level.
In an open economy, investors start investing in this particular economy. This may in
turn reduce the impacts of fiscal policy on capital accumulation. It can also deteriorate
trade deficit as a result of an appreciation of domestic currency. According to Mundell-
Fleming model, nevertheless, this has an expansionary impact on output and employment
in the short run.
Our focus is simply on the impacts of fiscal policy on consumption and some other
major economic indicators namely wages and output. A natural starting point to assess
the literature is Keynesian theory. Put it simply, this model assuming that prices and
wages are rigid, features output to be a function of demand. Therefore, an expansionary
fiscal policy has a multiplier impact on output and consumption increase consequently.
Furthermore, if government spending expansion accompanied by an increase in taxes,
balanced budget multiplier is exactly equal to one.
Here we extend basic Keynesian theory and take into account the e↵ects that changes
in interest rate and exchange rate have on the e↵ectiveness of fiscal policy. Therefore,
in addition to the direct crowding out e↵ect that happens to the extent that government
expenditure substitutes investment with private consumption, these indirect channels also
amplify the fiscal policy impacts. According to IS-LM model, private consumption has a
negative relationship with interest rate. An expansionary fiscal policy if being financed
by borrowing from private sector, results in higher interest rate. As a consequence, this
lowers investment even further. If we also assume that the economy has international
trade, exchange rate then enlarges the “crowing out e↵ect”. This happens since higher
interest rate induce capital inflows that appreciate exchange rate.
By contrast, recent theories of consumer behavior argue that consumption does not
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depend on current income since consumers are forward looking individuals. These theories
root inModigliani’s life-cycle model and Milton Friedman’s permanent-income hypothesis.
Ricardian view of fiscal policy also uses forward-looking consumers hypothesis to analyze
the outputs of fiscal policy on the economy. Therefore theories that adopt this hypothesis
and assume that consumers behave in Ricardian manner, such as RBC model, generally
predict a fall in consumption after a rise in government expenditure. It is sensible to
emphasis again that these di↵erences in the way individuals behave after an expansion-
ary government spending roots in how consumers are featured to act in each theory. For
instance RBC model presumes that consumers are infinitely-lived Ricardian households
whose choice to consume depends on their intertemporal budget constraint. In this case,
expansionary government spending reduces the present value of after-tax consumers’ in-
come that in turn decreases consumption through negative wealth e↵ect. It also raises the
supply of labor at any given wage. Employment and output increase as a consequence.
This being the case, wages have to fall in order to keep the equilibrium. Real business
cycle basically implies that we do not understand fluctuations of the economy as much as
we would think we do.
Nonetheless, central questions about the economy remain open to further discussions.
Is the stickiness of prices as well as wages a crucial concept in understanding how the
economy performs? Does fiscal policy have any impact to suppress fluctuations? The
answers to these questions are largely dependent on the way an economist thinks about
the role of fiscal policy. Economists who believe that price and wage stickiness are a natural
byproduct of market imperfections are those who believe fiscal policy and monetary policy
are significantly e↵ective. In contrast, real business cycle theories argue that government
just has a limited power to influence the economy. What is more, they consider business
cycle as a natural reaction of the economy to amendments in technologies. In real business
cycle models which is called “new classical” model as well, the invisible hand of the market
leads the economy to allocate its resources e ciently.
Finally, the benchmark theories of economic fluctuations are sources of hot debates
among economists and politicians. As a matter of fact, these debates and uncertainties
make the science of macroeconomics interesting.
3.3 Identification of Fiscal Policy Shocks
One of the main issues in studying the impact of policies on the economy is how to identify
shocks properly. This is even more controversial in fiscal policy literature. While monetary
policy shock is discerned as a surprise increase in short-run interest rate, there is no such
a thing as fiscal policy per se. This comes from the fact that there are wide ranges of
fiscal policies induced from di↵erent sorts of taxes and government expenditure. What is
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more, both revenue and spending changes are often announced before being implemented.
Therefore even though in monetary policy literature an unanticipated change in monetary
indicator can be genuinely called as monetary policy shock, we cannot say the same thing
about fiscal policy. Besides, if these pre-announced adjustments in fiscal variables do
not happen systematically with changes in economic situations, there is going to be the
omitted information problem in the VAR system. This leads to a misspecification of the
model.
Concerning the first issue, we identify fiscal policy by a two dimensional space spanned
containing government revenue and government spending innovations. We follow Uhlig
and Mountford (2009) in studying fiscal policy shocks in the US. In this approach, dif-
ferent types of shocks are identified through distinctive linear combinations of these two
basic fiscal shocks. We also address the second problem in this thesis. Due to lengthy
debates that happen before the actual changes in fiscal policies, the changes in tax rates
and also government spending are mostly predictable before they are implemented. As
a consequence, forward-looking households and firms adjust their behavior before these
shocks really happen. Our identification procedure, therefore, has been adjusted to take
this shortcoming into account by simply assuming that fiscal variables change for a defined
period only after a year after the shock happens.
Moreover, there is a further thorny and well-understood di culty in identifying fis-
cal policy shocks. One should di↵erentiate the movements in fiscal variables that result
from other shocks such as monetary policy and business cycle shocks from those that are
generated by fiscal policy innovations. We address this issue by identifying a fiscal policy
shock along with monetary policy and business cycle shocks. We additionally require that
these two latter shocks to be orthogonal to fiscal shocks. This extra restriction is also one
of the improvements of this methodology comparing to most of the literature. Uhlig and
Mountford (2009) argue that identifying business cycle shock and the requirement that
fiscal policy should be orthogonal to this shock has a great impact on the robustness of
the results.
We use it as an additional restriction further than merely putting restrictions on the
signs of impulse responses of fiscal variables. This means that after calculating the vari-
ations in the fiscal variables, we initially check how much of these movements can be
explained by business cycle as well as monetary policy shocks. Later we can conclude that
whatever percentage is left unexplained is caused by fiscal policy shock.
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3.3.1 Identifying Restrictions
We use GDP, private consumption, government revenue74, government spending75, money
market rate, wages, total reserves, GDP deflator and producer price index. All variables
are in levels with no exception at a quarterly frequency from 1970 to 2010, has 6 lags,
no constant or a time trend. The data sources are the IMF and OECD datastream.
This vector of endogenous variables are the smallest group of macroeconomic variables to
study the dynamic e↵ect of fiscal policy shocks on the economy. This model is to a large
extent similar to that of Uhlig and Mountford (2009) except from our exclusion of private
investment and inclusion of wage instead which is popular in the literature. GDP, private
consumption and wage are focus of this thesis. Cochrane (1994) argues that the ratio of
private consumption over GDP can be use to predict GDP and recommend to use private
consumption in the model. As one notices here, we also have monetary variables in our
model. The reason is that we identify monetary policy shock along with fiscal policy and
business cycle shocks.
This thesis identifies several shocks just by putting sign restrictions on the impulse
responses of some specific variables after the shock happens. Business cycle shock, for
instance, is a shock where private consumption, output and government revenue move
in the same way for four quarters following the shock. The assumption implies that
whenever government revenue increases as a result of an increase in output, it is due to a
business cycle shock rather than simply a fiscal policy shock. A contractionary monetary
policy shock in this thesis is identified as a shock that reduce total reserves and prices
however increases short term interest rate. Finally, fiscal shocks are mainly determined by
using sign restriction. Additionally, we assume that fiscal policies are orthogonal to both
monetary policy and business cycle shocks.
We start by identifying two basic fiscal policy shocks namely “government revenue
shock” and “government spending shock” and then create di↵erent linear combination of
these two shocks as di↵erent kinds of fiscal policy. Basic expansionary (contractionary)
government revenue shock is a shock in which government revenue increases (decreases)
for a defined period following the shock. Also we do not restrict the behavior of gov-
ernment expenditure when we are identifying government revenue shock and vice versa.
It is possible, however, to restrict the behavior of the other fiscal variable when we are
identifying a fiscal policy shock. For instance, we can force the government revenue to
stay at its original level for a year after a government expenditure shock has happened.
74Total government revenues is total government tax revenues minus transfer.
75Total government expenditure is total government consumption.
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3.4 Empirical Results
In this thesis we try to investigate the impacts of changes in government revenue and
expenditure as an indicator of fiscal policy on economic activities such as private con-
sumption, GDP and wages in the UK and Italy. We have used GDP, government revenue,
government expenditure, wages, money market rate, total reserves, producer price Index,
GDP deflater and final private consumption at quarterly frequencies. Data for total re-
serves, GDP deflater and money market rate has been obtained from IFS (International
Financial Statistics) and for government revenue, government expenditure, wages, PPI
and final private consumption we use data from OECD data stream. Furthermore, the
definition of government revenue and government expenditure in our study is taxes mi-
nus transfer and government consumption expenditure. All the series are in level. The
impulse responses for the fiscal shocks as well as other identified shocks can be accessed
in appendix 3 of this thesis. In these figures, we have shown the impulse responses of all
our 9 variables to the shocks we have identified where the 16th, 50th and 84th quantiles
of these impulse responses are plotted at every horizon between 0 and 24 quarters after
the shocks happens. Furthermore, the relevant graphs are located in appendix 3 of this
thesis.
3.5 Expansionary Fiscal Policy
3.5.1 Responses to an Expansionary Basic Government Spending Shock
Figure 1 and 2 illustrate the impulse responses of the right hand-side variables to a one
standard deviation shock to government spending76. The impulse responses are presented
for a period of 24 quarters with one-standard deviation error bands. These standard devia-
tion bands are calculated using Monte Carlo integration. Fiscal policy shocks are identified
only via restricting the impulse responses of the fiscal variables in the model. Another
restriction, however, is the necessity that these impulse responses are orthogonal to both
business cycle and monetary policy shocks. Therefore, a basic government spending shock
requires the government spending to increase for a defined period following the shock.
More importantly, one should notice that there is no orthogonality restriction between the
two basic fiscal shocks; government spending and government revenue shock. Therefore,
there is no need to restrict the behavior of government revenue while we are identifying
government spending shock and vice versa.
We start our analysis by the impact of basic government spending shock on key eco-
nomic variables for the UK. For this country, we can see through the results that after
an increase in government spending which should at least last for a year, GDP increases
76All the figures in this chapter are located in appendix 3.
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slightly after 5 quarters following the shock. This increase lasts for four years after the
shock happens and then it goes back to its baseline level. Private consumption follows
the same path as GDP. It does not react to the shock for about one year and a half and
then starts to increase which lasts till the fourth year following the shock. Wages increase
significantly after the shock and lasts for nearly 25 quarters following the shock. It is im-
portant to notice that the reaction of wages after the shock is more significant comparison
to those of GDP and private consumption.
Turning to Italy after the basic government spending shock, we observe that both
GDP and private consumption increase after 2 quarters following the shock that last
for the whole period. These reactions are identical to the UK. Wages in Italy increases
significantly following the shock. To add up, basic government spending shock is defined
as an increase in government expenditure that lasts for a year after the shock happens.
Thus, one can see from the results that even though the reaction of GDP and private
consumption in the UK and Italy are compatible, these shocks seems to last longer in he
Italy comparing to the UK.
RBC model predicts that wages should fall and labor supply should increase after an
increase in government purchase and spending. The reason is that changes in fiscal policy
a↵ect labor supply and therefore create a negative relationship between the supply of labor
and productivity. This negative correlation, as a matter of fact, can o↵set the positive
relationship between productivity and supply of labor that comes from the technology
shock. Ee did not find any support for this prediction of RBC model for the behavior of
wages, at least for basic government spending shock, in this thesis.
3.5.2 Responses to an Expansionary Basic Revenue Shock
The impacts of this shock on the UK and Italy is shown in figure 7 and figure 6 respectively.
We try to investigate the changes that a decrease in government revenue is going to bring
about in the economy. Restricting the impact of government revenue to be negative for
a year identifies this shock. Additionally, it is required through the methodology that
government revenue shock should be orthogonal to both business cycle and monetary
policy shocks.
We can see that for the UK, this leads to an expansion in GDP, consumption and wages
that lasts for the whole period. Prices increase too, however it increases significantly only
after two and a half years following the shock.
For Italy, GDP as well as private consumption fall slightly on impact that lasts till
7th quarter and then starts to increase till the end of the period. Wages follow the same
pattern in this country but start to increase later than those two variables; it increase just
after 14th quarter following the expansionary fiscal policy. Interestingly, prices and wages
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show very similar reactions to this shock. They both increase simultaneously in Italy that
can be due to higher production and consumption.
3.5.3 Responses to an Expansionary Deficit Spending Fiscal Policy Shock
We now explore the impacts of deficit spending fiscal policy shock. A deficit spending
shock and basic spending shocks are di↵erent in a sense that in the latter one, we do not
restrict the behavior of tax rate. However, deficit spending shock is identified so that
government spending increases for 1 percent while we restrict tax rates to stay unchanged
for a year after this increase in government spending.
For the UK, we can see that the sign of the reaction of GDP, private consumption and
wages are the same as those reactions after basic spending shock. This can be caused by
the fact that tax rate, in general, does not fluctuate significantly after a basic spending
shock even when we do not put restriction on its impulse responses. This implies that
restricting the behavior of taxes after a spending shock does not have a significant impact
on the results. What’s more, even though deficit spending shock a↵ects GDP and private
consumption slightly, its impact on wages is significant.
For Italy, most variables react similar to those in the UK after a deficit spending
fiscal policy. GDP, Private consumption and wages increase after this shock happens.
The behavior of prices, however, is slightly di↵erent from the UK. Prices increases for all
periods following the shock in the UK however it initially falls for almost one year and a
half and then increases in Italy.
3.5.4 Responses to an Expansionary Deficit Financed Tax Cuts
The deficit-financed tax cut policy shock is the shocks where government spending stays
unchanged and government revenue is cut by 1 percent for a year. These results are
shown through figure 16 and figure 17. These impulses estimations are merely a linear
combination of a set of basic revenue and spending shocks. Similar to Uhlig and Mountford
(2009) that study the US economy, deficit financed tax cut responses for the UK are mirror
image of basic contractionary revenue shock. Thus, it stimulates output and private
consumption in the UK where its e↵ect reaches to its maximum level in the third year
after the shock. After that pick in the third year, its impacts on these two key economic
variables starts to decline gradually. The e↵ect of this shock on price levels is negative at
the beginning of the sample however subsequently starts to get positive just after GDP
starts to increase. It seems that output growth is the key determinants of the price level
in the UK.
For Italy, as well, responses to deficit financed tax cuts are mirror images of the basic
contractionary revenue shock in this economy. Output and consumption falls initially and
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then starts to increase constantly after about two years. Prices fall at the beginning and
start to increase with a lag of a year following an expansion in output and consumption.
Wages does not respond to this shock in the UK for about two years and then rises. In
Italy, wages fall for about four years following the shock and then start to increase.
3.5.5 Responses to an Expansionary Balanced Budget Spending Shock
This shock is defined where both government expenditure and government revenue in-
crease in the same amount at each time for 4 quarters following the shock. Following the
literature, we assume that for each 1 percent increase in government expenditure, govern-
ment revenue raises just slightly higher. We can see that GDP and consumption increases
marginally just after one year and a half following the shock.
However, results for Italy shows di↵erent behavior of GDP and private consumption
to this shock. Both of these variables increase for almost two years and a half after the
shock and then fall afterwards which lasts till the end of the period. Even though wages
increase in both countries, the scope of this increase in the UK is much larger compared
to Italy.
3.5.6 Responses to an Expansionary Delayed Government Spending Fiscal
Policy Shock
In this particular fiscal policy shock, government spending responses do not react to the
shock for 4 quarters. That is why we call this shock a delayed government spending shock.
After a year of delay, they are restricted to stay positive for at least 4 quarters. This
thesis shows that after this shock happens in the UK, GDP falls initially but it increases
slightly after the 7th quarter that lasts for the whole period. The overall reaction of private
consumption is a slight increase however with some fluctuations around the baseline level.
Wages, on the other hand, increases for the whole period. Italy shows a similar response
for all of key variables to the delayed government spending shock as the UK.
3.5.7 Contractionary Fiscal Policy Shocks
Now we turn to the impacts of an adverse fiscal policy shock by observing the economy
after a fall in government expenditure and a fall in government revenue. We also study
di↵erent combinations of these two shocks.
3.5.8 Response to a Contractionary Basic Government Spending Shock
Here, we are going to investigate what is the impact of a fall in government spending on
key economic variables. We identify a basic contractionary spending shock, as a decrease
in government spending which by construction should at least last for a year after the
shock occurs.
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For the UK we observe that after a basic contractionary spending shock, GDP, private
consumption and wages fall considerably for the whole period. It seems that for the UK,
a reduction of government expenditures has a significant contractionary impact on the
economy: the results show that the scope of these e↵ects following the negative shock are
considerably large. Prices as well, fall following this contractionary shock.
In Italy, similar to the UK, all these variables fall following a contractionary shock.
However the size of these falls in the UK are considerably larger than in Italy. Prices, as
well, decrease slightly after this shock in Italy.
3.5.9 Responses to a Contractionary Basic Government Revenue Shock
In order to identify a basic government revenue shock, we require this shock to be orthogo-
nal to both business cycle and monetary policy shocks. We also define a basic government
revenue shock as a shock in which government revenue changes should last for at least 4
quarters following the shock.
The results basically shows what happens to the economy when government revenue
increases for a defined period following the shock and are very intuitive: GDP, private
consumption and wages fall considerably after the increase in government revenue in the
UK. Interest rate and prices fall in response to this shock. The responses of GDP and
private consumption for the UK are compatible with the study of Uhlig and Mountford
(2009) about the US. However, the responses of interest rate and prices in the UK are in
the sharp contrast with the US. Furthermore, the responses of these variables in the UK
after the revenue shock is considerably larger compared to their reaction in the case of a
spending shock.
After an increase in government revenue in Italy, however, even though GDP and
private consumption mostly fall after the shock happens, they start to increase after a
year and then falls till the end of the period. Wages, on the other hand, has a di↵erent
behavior and increase for nearly four years following the shock and then falls.
3.5.10 Response to a Contractionary Balanced Budget Fiscal Policy Shock
We define balanced budget fiscal policy shock when both government revenue and govern-
ment expenditure falls at the same value for a defined period following the shock. This
shows the impacts of contractionary government expenditure while reducing the taxes at
the same time. For the UK, we can see that this leads to an expansion in GDP, consump-
tion and wages as well as Price levels.
For Italy, the initial behavior of wages and prices are consistent with the reaction of
these two variables in the UK. However, an increase in GDP and private consumption just
lasts for three years in Italy following the shock and then they fall until the end of the
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period.
3.5.11 Responses to a Contractionary Delayed Spending Shock
Delayed spending shock is defined as a shock in which spending falls for a year however
after a lag of one year following the shock. After this shock happens, GDP and private
consumption increases on impact that lasts for 6 quarters following the shock and then
starts to fall. Consumption, however, fluctuates more than GDP. We can see that after this
shock happens, there are some periods in which private consumption increases regardless of
this contractionary nature of the shock. Even though this increase in private consumption
sometimes lasts up to a year, private consumptions fall in overall following this shock.
Wages and prices fall considerably after this shock in the UK. For Italy, GDP and private
consumption as well as wages fall considerably following this shock in a very explosive
manner.
3.5.12 Responses to a Contractionary Delayed Government Revenue Fiscal
Policy Shock
In this shock we assume that that government revenue increases at least for 4 quarters
however with a one year delay by construction. That is why we call this shock a “delayed
revenue shock”.
We see that after the government revenue shock in the UK, GDP, consumption and
wages fall for all the period of study. These results, not surprisingly, are very similar to a
basic revenue shock in the UK.
In Italy the response of GDP and private consumption is similar to the UK; both these
variables fall following an expansion in government revenues. In contrast, however, wages
fall in the UK while it increases in Italy. This dissimilar reaction of wage in the UK and
Italy has been observed after a basic revenue shock as well.
3.6 What do We Have in Common with the Current Fiscal Policy Lit-
erature?
This thesis tries to provide empirical evidences regarding to the economy and its reaction
after fiscal policies. There is no general agreement on these issues even though they
are critical topics for policymakers. For example, even though most benchmark models
agree that an increase in government expenditure increase the output, they contradict
each other concerning the implied impacts of an expansionary government spending on
private consumption while private consumption is a key determinant of the output. The
RBC model predicts that consumption should decrease after an increase in government
spending. This is because RBC models predict infinitely living Ricardian household who
consume at any point of time by taking into account their lifetime income and base on their
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intertemporal budget constraint. Therefore, an increase in government spending decreases
consumption through the wealth e↵ect and by decreasing the present value of their after-
tax income. In contrast to RBC model, benchmark IS-LM models predict that private
consumption increases after an expansion in government spending and hence amplify its
impact on output. As a matter of fact, Keynesian model assumes non-Ricardian consumers
whose consumption merely depend on their current disposable income and not on their
lifetime resources.
Furthermore, these conflicts about the behavior of private consumption after a fiscal
policy shock in the literature also exists in empirical research. Put it di↵erently, there
is no formal agreement about the responses of these variables after the shock happens.
For example, Uhlig and Mountford(2009), in line with Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher
(2003), find that even though private consumption does not fall after an expansion in
government expenditure, it does not increase neither. Thus they find no support for
neither the Keynesian nor the RBC theories for the US. On the other hand, Blanchard
and Perotti (2002) and Gali, Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2004), find that not only private
consumption does not fall after this shock, it actually increases significantly after this
shocks supporting the predictions of the Keynesian models.
In this thesis we show that after an expansion in government spending, consistent
with the Keynesian model, both output and private consumption increases for both the
UK and Italy. Expansionary fiscal shocks are identified by an increase in government
spending and/or a fall in government revenue through lowering taxes. Contractionary
shock, on the other hand, defined as an increase in government revenue in the form of rise
in taxes and also a decrease in government purchases of good and services and di↵erent
linear combinations of these two.
The summaries of the results for these expansionary and contractionary shocks are as
follows:
3.6.1 Expansionary Shocks
1- For the case of an increase government spending, we can see that both the UK and
Italy have compatible results regarding to the behavior of GDP, private consumption and
wages. In both of these countries, all three variables increase significantly after the shock.
However the di↵erence between the UK and Italy lies on the reaction of price levels. Prices
increases for the whole period following the shock in the UK while it falls on impact in
Italy which lasts for 10 quarters and then starts to increase. For delayed spending, we
observe that even though private consumption, output and price level increase for most
periods after the shock happens, they fall initially which lasts for almost two years and
a half before start increasing constantly for both countries. This can imply that once we
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control for the lag e↵ect by restricting an increase in government spending to happen just
after one year following shock, the e↵ectiveness of expansionary spending in the UK and
Italy reduce considerably.
2- In the UK, GDP, private consumption as well as wages increase significantly after
a fall in the tax rates and consequently government revenue. Prices, nevertheless, remain
unchanged for almost two and a half years and then starts to increase. For Italy, once this
shock happens, private consumption and GDP fall on impact that last for nearly two years
and then start to increase significantly. Price level and wages both fall for almost three
years and a half. However, wages start increasing immediately while price level stays in
the baseline level for almost 6 months and just begin to increases at the end of the whole
period. Therefore, one can conclude that the reaction of these economic variables to these
two di↵erent sets of expansionary and contractionary fiscal shocks are very di↵erent in
these two countries.
For delayed revenue shock we can see that after we impose the restriction that govern-
ment revenue should fall just after a year following the shock, these key economic variables
react di↵erently compared to the basic revenue shock scenario in the UK. GDP and private
consumption does not response to this shock for 9 and 14 quarters respectively and then
increases moderately especially comparison to their scale of change in basic revenue shock
scenario. Prices and wages, on the other hand, increase on impact however they start
increasing more considerably after three years and a half in which private consumption,
as well, starts to increase. It shows that in the UK, there is a strong connection between
the behavior of the consumption, price levels and wages. In contrary, in Italy results are
very di↵erent from that of the UK. GDP and private consumption increase for the whole
period. Prices just increase minimally for nearly a year and a half and then starts to fall
slightly that lasts for the whole period. Wages fall for the whole period in Italy as well.
Results for the UK and Italy are very di↵erent from each other. This can be due to the
fact that government revenue in the UK falls just for a year before it starts going back to
the baseline level and then increase gradually. In Italy, however, once government revenue
starts falling, it lasts for the whole period.
3- We now turn to analyze deficit tax cuts which will enhance our understanding about
the impacts of taxes on economy independently of the e↵ects of government revenue. For
both countries, this sort of shock is a mirror image of the basic contractionary revenue
shock. For the UK, output increases immediately after the shock yet in the Italy, even
though it increases in general, it falls initially. Consumption closely follows the output
pattern.
4- Deficit financed spending shocks represents the responses where a rise in government
spending is financed via a deficit. Here we can see that wages and consumption increase in
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both countries after this shock occurs. Fatas and Mihov (2001a) run the same experiment
for the US however including di↵erent types of labor elasticity in their model namely
elastic labor market and inelastic labor market. They find out that in an inelastic labor
market, output response to the shock is zero on impact and then falls after a year as a
result of a fall in investment. In elastic labor market, however, output increases. Uhlig and
Mountford (2009) run the same experiment however without taking into account di↵erent
elasticity of the labor market for the US. Their finding is similar to findings in this thesis.
Fatas and Mihov (2001a), furthermore, argue that the impact of deficit financed spend-
ing is very di↵erent from those of tax-finance shocks for the US. For the UK in this thesis,
contrary to Fatas and Mihovs, deficit financed spending and tax cuts have same impacts
on the economy. For Italy, however, there are some di↵erences. For example, output and
consumption falls initially after a tax-financed shock however increases constantly after
10th quarter.
3.6.2 Contractionary Shocks
5- The first set of contractionary shock is a fall in government spending for at least 4
quarters. This is called a basic contractionary spending shock. Following this shock in the
UK, GDP, consumption and price level does not respond for a year and then starts to fall.
While price levels falls for the whole period, GDP and private consumption starts to go
back to the baseline level in the few last quarters. Wages falls considerably in the UK after
this contractionary shock. The same pattern occurs in Italy however price level’s reaction
just di↵ers: while it rises slightly for 9 months following the shock, it falls afterwards.
Delayed spending shock in the UK causes GDP and private consumption to increase on
impact. However it returns to the baseline level immediately that lasts until 9th quarter
before it starts falling. While wages fall for the whole period following this contractionary
shock, prices do not change for 9 quarters and then starts to fall. The reactions of all
these variables are similar to the basic contractionary shock. This implies that for a
contractionary spending, whether we restrict the reaction of government expenditure to
fall just after a year following the shock or not, does not a↵ect the results in a large scale.
For Italy, GDP and private consumption fall for the whole sample however wages and
prices does not respond to this shock significantly and stay at the baseline level for most
of the time.
6- The fourth set of shocks that we are going to explore is when government revenue
increases for at least four quarters following the shock. This is due to an increase in tax
rates and has a contractionary nature. For the UK, we can see that this contractionary
fiscal policy will reduce GDP, private consumption as well as wages considerably however
this drop occurs after the 4th quarter following the shock. Price series does not react to
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this contractionary shock for 11 quarters and then start to decrease. In Italy, GDP and
private consumption falls on impact however they increase after a year that lasts for a year
and decline just after 2 years following the shock. Wages and prices react similarly to this
shock; they both increase for three years following the shock and then fall considerably.
One can observe that wages and prices in most cases follow the same pattern while GDP
and private consumption react similar to each other following these fiscal policy shocks.
Furthermore, It seems that GDP and private consumption drive the behavior of wages and
prices since at most of the times, the two latter variables react following the movements
in GDP and consumption.
We now show what happens after a delayed revenue shock where revenue is restricted
to increase just after a year following the shock. In the UK, GDP, prices and wages fall
after the shock. Private consumption falls as well however just after three years following
the shock and before that, it stays in the baseline level. In Italy, all the variables of interest
fall after this shock.
In this thesis we find support for Keynesian model of predicting private consumption
behavior after an increase in government spending. Private consumption increases in both
countries after all sorts of expansionary fiscal policy shocks such as increase in government
purchase of good and services and also decrease in tax rates. Whats more, consumption
falls in all contractionary fiscal policy shock scenarios. As it is argued before, the di↵erence
in the prediction of RBC and Keynesian models for the behavior of consumption comes
from their di↵erent assumption about decisions of consumers to consume and how they
finance it.
The RBC model assumes that consumers behave in Ricardian fashion while the bench-
mark IS-LM model believes that consumers just spend according to their current income.
And therefore since the implied impact of an increase in government spending hugely rely
on how private consumption is financed, one can conclude that consumers behave more
in a Non-Ricardian style rather than Ricardian one in this thesis. This means that their
consumption depend on their current disposable income and not of their lifetime wealth
and intertemporal budget constraint.
Mihov and Fatas (2001b) also argue that after comparing their result with RBC model,
they find out that the major di↵erence between this model and their empirical evidences
is on the reaction of private consumption. Their finding is in line with results in this
thesis that showed a rise in GDP is always accompanied by an expansion in private con-
sumption. Private consumption in RBC model, however, always falls after an expansion
in government spending even though output increases, as in Baxter and King (1993), as
a result of negative wealth e↵ect.
Keynesian, New-Keynesian and real business cycle theories predict that after a rise in
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government spending, there is an expansion in economic activities that lead to an increase
in output and real interest rates. The empirical estimations in this thesis are to a large
extent in line with these large sets of economic theories. Output increases in both countries
after this shock, interest rate increases persistently in the UK and increases after two years
in the Italy. We also integrated wages in our model in order to capture the impacts of
fiscal policy shocks on labor market. Similar to in Mihov and Fatas (2001a), we find that
wages increases after an expansionary fiscal spending shock.
In this section we focus on the empirical results of section 3 in the light of di↵erent
key theories in fiscal policy literature. The di culty in comparing results from empirical
models with main theories is that we cannot produce a unique VARmodel impulse response
that is fully compatible with a single economic theory. However, the first things that
stand out from this empirical investigation are that, not surprisingly, an expansionary
government spending and contractionary government expenditure have expansionary and
contractionary impacts on output respectively. Yet, there are some aspects of our results
that are surprising if we want to compare them with the prediction of the RBC model and
some modified version of this model which has been put forward by Baxter and King (1993)
and Fatas and Mihov (2001a). According to their theoretical experiment, the increase in
output after an expansionary fiscal policy comes from a significant increase in investment
that compensates the fall in private consumption. However, in the estimated impulse
responses in this thesis and also in Fatas and Mihov (2001a) and Uhlig and Mountford
(2009) papers, the opposite scenario holds. The increase in output is always accompanied
by an increase in private consumption.
There are also some issues about the impacts of government expenditure on wages. The
mechanism underlying the predictions of RBC model is described in detail in Aiyagari,
Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1992), Baxter and King (1993), Christiano and Eichenbaum
(1992), and Fatas and Mihov (2001a) among others. They stress that an increase in
(non-productive) government spending has a negative wealth e↵ect that reduces private
consumption. In the meanwhile, it causes an increase in the supply of labor at any given
point of wages. This in return reduces real wages that leads to higher rate. In their model,
they predict that this lower wages lead to an expansion in employment and output. If this
e↵ect is persistent enough, it can cause investment to increase as well. Returning to our
empirical estimations, one can observe that contrary to this model’s predictions, wages
increases as a result of an expansion in government expenditure. This increase in wages
is also confirmed in the study of Fatas and Mihov (2001a). In their paper, they call this
behavior of wages as one of the failure of their model to predict real world. According to
the prediction of their modified RBC model, employment and consumption should always
react in opposite direction. However in their VAR estimations, they observe a persistent
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positive correlation between employment and consumption. They justify this puzzle by
arguing that it must be a large increase in real wages that assuming that consumption
and leisure are both normal goods, this big change in wages compensate the tendency of
consumption and leisure to move in the same direction in response to change in households’
wealth.
3.7 Conclusion
This thesis analyzes the reactions of key economic variables to shocks in di↵erent kinds of
fiscal policies, both expansionary and contractionary shocks, in two main EU economies
namely UK and Italy using quarterly data from 1970 to 2009. We show impulse responses
of some main economic variables to these fiscal policy shocks using a novel methodology
for distinguishing the impacts of fiscal policy innovations. We employ the methodology
suggested by Uhlig and Mountford (2009) to study fiscal shocks. This approach uses the
information in the macroeconomic time series data of the vector autoregression alone.
Furthermore, we use as little prior assumptions as possible to identify fiscal policy inno-
vations. Importantly, it does not restrict the impulse responses of the main variables of
the interest namely GDP, private consumption and wages to fiscal policy shocks.
We compare our empirical estimations to standard real business cycle model and Key-
nesian model to see which model is more powerful in explaining the facts following a fiscal
policy shock. We observe that a rise in government expenditure has an expansionary im-
pact on output that is mostly driven by an increase in private consumption. When we
compare our results to RBC and Keynesian models, we observe that the standard RBC
model fails to fit the data.
The main discrepancy between our estimations and RBC model is in the behavior
of private consumption following an expansionary fiscal policy. It seems like consumers
behave in non-Ricardian fashion rather than looking at their lifetime income to decide
whether to consume or not. Put it di↵erently, contrary to the predictions of the RBC
model, we find that private consumption always increases after the expansionary shock
happens and data do not support the RBC predictions. Another di↵erence between our
results and the RBC model is in the response of wage to fiscal shocks. We find that wages
increases after an expansionary fiscal policy rather than decreasing. The RBC models
predict that after an increase in government expenditure, since after-tax lifetime income
falls which lead to a decrease in consumption via negative wealth e↵ect, supply of labor
increase in any rate of wage that lead to a fall in real wages. The data that we employed
does not support this prediction of RBC model again. Indeed, we find that wages increase
after an expansionary government spending shock. Gambetti and Gali (2009) provide an
explanation for this phenomenon. They explain how the interaction between rule-of-thumb
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consumers (for whom their consumption is a function of their labor income) and also sticky
price (which is the assumption of New-Keynesian models) can be used to show how it is
possible that an increase in government spending lead to an increase in consumption which
is in line with most of the recent literature. Rule-of-thumb consumers prevent demand
from a fall that would occur otherwise as a result of negative wealth e↵ect. Real wages, in
the meanwhile, increase because of sticky nature of prices even though there will be a fall
in marginal product of labor after an expansionary government spending. This happens
since price markups may fall to fill the resulting gap.
The impact of higher real wage together with higher employment increases current
labor income and therefore boosts consumption of rule-of-thumb consumers. However, in
models such as the ones that have non-competitive labor market and have the characteristic
of countercyclical wage markups, consumption and hours of working increase without
requiring real wage to rise. Since their model predicts a positive co-movement of private
consumption and government expenditure under a totally plausible framework, they argue
that their results as providing a potential solution to the seeming disagreement between
empirical evidence and the predictions of existing DSGE models regarding the results of
government spending shocks.
Results obtained following a decrease in tax rates, however, provide di↵erent responses.
In particular even though wages increases after this fall in tax rates, it initially falls for
two years in Italy and then starts to increase.
To conclude our finding, we can say that in general, most of the expansionary shocks
have expansionary e↵ects on both output and private consumption while contractionary
shocks generate recessionary impacts on the economy for both UK and Italy.
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Chapter 3
What Are the Impacts of Fiscal and Technology Shocks on
Exchange Rate? New Evidences for the Euro Area
4.1 Introduction
What is the behaviour of the real exchange rate following fiscal policies and technology
shocks? It is crucial to have a clear-cut answer to the main question in this chapter to
understand the mechansim behind the exchange rate fluctuations. Real exchange rate77
across OECD countries show significant and systematic inconsistencies from standard theo-
ries. For instance, during 1980’s, in the late 1990s and also more recently in 2002 significant
deviation in the United States producer-price based real exchange rate occurred78.
Overall, the existing evidence appears to fail satisfying the predictions of both Mundell-
Fleming type and intertemporal business cycle models under standard calibrations. Ac-
cording to benchmark theories, relative prices of domestic goods goes up following an
expansionary government expenditure shocks. This happens since these shocks lead to
the higher total demand for domestic goods. On the other hand, productivity gains79
bring on lower relative prices as a result of higher supply of domestic goods.
Economists recently provide numerical estimates of the e↵ects of an expansionary
government expenditure on exchange rate and other main economic indicators mainly
for the Unites States. These estimates are pivotal for policy making since they throw
some light on determining the appropriate size and timing of countercyclical fiscal policy
measures. Nonetheless, the empirical investigations on this central issue seem to deliver
conflicting answers up to this time. Furthermore, most studies related to the impact of
fiscal policy as well as technology shock on exchange rate are done for the U.S. and Euro
Area seems to be neglected in this regard.
Agreeing with the textbook theories, an expansionary fiscal policy should worsen the
current account and consequently appreciates the real exchange rate. The main empirical
finding which shows this impact is on the United States during the first half of the 1980s
and in the 2000s while the U.S was experiencing twin deficits. In contrast, more recent
empirical studies such as those of Kim and Roubini (2008), Monacelli and Perotti (2006),
and Ravn et al.(2007), among others, show that government spending depreciates the real
exchange rate.80 Following the productivity gains, as well, the direction and the size of
77Both the real exchange rate or the terms of trade are the measure of the international relative prices.
78Andrew Atkeson and Ariel Burstein(2008), for instance, show that during 1980’s in the United States,
manufactured goods prices changed by approximately 40 percent compared to a weighted average of the
prices of manufactured goods made in the US chief trading partners.
79We consider productivity gains as “technology shock”.
80Studies about the e↵ects of fiscal shocks on the real exchange rate for Australia, Canada, the U.K.
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the responses of main economic indices such as hours worked, employment and exchange
rate are controversial.81
These controversies seem to root in the Real Business Cycle (RBC) model. As pre-
sented in the seminal paper by Kydland and Prescott (1982), the main assumptions of
the DSGE models which are based on RBC theory, is that prices are flexible and firms
are optimizing agents. In the standard RBC framework, theretofore, technology shocks
changes demand for labour and raise both per capita hours worked and output and con-
sequently lowers the relative price of domestic goods. When confronted with the data,
these predictions have found little support. For example, recent empirical investigation by
Corsetti et al. (2008b), Kim and Lee (2008), and Enders and Muller (2009) find that real
exchange rates appreciate following a technology shock, captured by the terms of trade or
the relative price of consumption across countries.
The objective of this thesis is to re-investigate the dynamic behaviour of exchange rate
using a new identification approach proposed by Enders et al. (2011)82 to identify fiscal
shocks and productivity gains simultaneously within an estimated VAR model. Crucially,
they employ quantitative general equilibrium model in order to determine the sign and also
the time horizons of the identification restrictions.83 The plausibility of these identification
assumptions is largely related to the theoretical framework that one has chosen. Having
said that, employing a fully specified DSGE model lead to choose both the sign restrictions
and the periods that we have to impose those restrictions. While the model is richly
identified and endures robust predictions of the reaction of several key variables, it leaves
exchange rate behavior unrestricted following an expansionary government expenditure
and productivity gain. Furthermore, we re-examine this controversy for the Euro Area
since the impacts of these two shocks is less empirically investigated in the EU compared
to the U.S.84
We estimate our VAR model on quarterly frequencies for the Euro Area relative to
the US for post-Bretton-Woods period but before the current financial crisis. The model
includes data for consumption, output, investment, government spending, government
budget balance, inflation, the short term interest rate and exchange rate. Our results
and the U.S. gives somewhat mixed results, see, for example, Corsetti and Muller (2006) or Monacelli and
Perotti (2008).
81Regarding technology shocks, proof for an appreciation is built in for U.S. data. Corsetti et al. (2008b)
find an appreciation in Japan likewise. However Kim and Lee (2008) show a depreciation for the Euro
area and Japan
82Sign restriction approach is put forward initially by Uhlig (2005) and developed later in many respects;
see e.g Uhlig and Mountford (2009) and Enders et all (2011).
83Enders et al (2011) argue that this methodology is complementary to Corsetti et al. (2009a) study in
which they use sign restrictions to identify demand and productivity gains in the manufacturing sector and
investigate their impact on the real exchange rate. In their study, instead of employing a fully specified
general equilibrium model, the authors exercise sector-specific data in order to achieve identification.
84This is indeed a clear-cut di↵erence of this thesis with the very similar studies by Corsetti et al. (2009a)
and Enders et al. (2011).
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suggest that exchange rate appreciates (falls) after an expansionary fiscal policy in the
EU. Following a positive technology shock, however, after an on impact depreciation (in-
crease), exchange rate appreciates for the whole period. In overall, even though we use
an identification approach which is not often used in the recent literature, our empirical
findings are relatively align with the existing studies concerning the impacts of technology
shocks and fiscal shocks on exchange rate. More importantly, it is in line with benchmark
theories regarding to the impact of these two sets of shocks on exchange rate. It seems
that the facts about the exchange rate dynamics that are widely used across di↵erent iden-
tification schemes are in particular appropriate to examine theories of the international
transmission mechanism.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 2 we review the
literature. In Section 3 we show our identification scheme and explain a quantitative
business cycle model from which we determine sign restrictions. In Section 4 we illustrate
our VAR specification and results. Section 5 concludes.
4.2 Literature review
Most controversies in international macroeconomics concern the real exchange rate dynam-
ics for its fluctuations are more significant and long-lasting relative to other real variables.
However, most models are unable to explain the behaviour of exchange rate. Furthermore,
international financial market assumed to be complete in most benchmark models even
though there is a well-documented lack of a consumption risk-sharing across countries. As
a means of clarifying this important aspect of the real exchange rate and the dynamics
of cross-country consumption, macro-economists turn to apply new generation of mod-
els recognized as new open Economy macroeconomics (NOEM). These models extended
the literature by taking into account nominal rigidities as a feature of asset market or
alternative features.85
The real exchange rate is characterized as the ratio of price levels between two coun-
tries. Assuming that all prices86 are sticky, economists can explain real exchange rate
fluctuations, as shown by Benigno (2004). In models which assume markets are perfect,
the real exchange rate is identical to the ratio of the marginal utility of consumption across
countries. These models are subject to perform poorly, even when they allow for other
nominal or real rigidities. One way to solve this issue is to presume that agents cannot
have access to complete markets in order to secure their assets against country-specific
shocks. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002) investigate the fluctuation and prolonged
behavior of the real exchange rate by constructing a model with sticky prices. Their find-
85Some examples include Benigno (2009), Lane (2001) and Obstfeld and Rogo↵ (2000).
86Including domestically produced as well as imported goods.
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ing suggest that monetary shocks and nominal anomalies account largely for real exchange
rate volatility.
This view, however, has been challenged by studies which emphasize the significant role
of fiscal shocks in explaining the fluctuations of exchange rates. Taking the empirical per-
spective, the impacts of fiscal shocks on real economic variables, have been characterized
in di↵erent models with forward-looking agents and finite horizons. In particular, Frenkel
and Razin (1986) focus on the impacts of tax cuts on the world interest rates, consump-
tion as well as the current account in a two country economy model. Daniel (1993a,b),
for instance, investigates the consequence of tax cut in a country in which the time of a
future tax increase to balance the budget is unknown. Kawai and Maccini (1995) study
the impacts of fiscal deficits on a small open economy when there is a floating exchange
rates regime. Governments sell bonds in order to finance its fiscal deficit and is predicted
to be financed in the future by either seignorage or tax increases or other combination of
these two.
Canzoneri et al. (2001b) argue that it is essential to have strict fiscal discipline in
common currency areas where national governments enjoy less autonomy in following
their goals. They di↵erentiate between Ricardian and non-Ricardian regimes. In the first
one, the nominal anchor is determined by monetary policy and moreover the exchange
rate is defined by the standard theories. In non-Ricardian regime, however, fiscal policy
is being used as the nominal anchor and appoints the exchange rate.
Looking further in the literature, one can see that even though closed-economy RBC
models87 have been successful to some extant in explaining the U.S. macroeconomic data,
open-economy versions of these models that have integrated international relationships88
have been less productive in replicating basic determinents of macroeconomic time series.
The closed-economy versions come from the fact that countries play a role in international
markets. However they dismiss the evidence that open economies have the privilege of
sharing nation-specific volatilities with other economies through the exchange of goods
and financial assets.
For instance, the extension of the Kydland-Prescott model to a two-country frame-
work by Backus et al.(1994) lead to a riskier investment than is shown in the indus-
trialized countries. Open-economy models, as well, lead to mixed results in replicating
main characteristics of international data. Countries which participate in international
trade can a↵ect their economies’ behavior by shattering the tie between its production
and its spending on consumption and investment. This allows an economy to experience
87See Kydland, F., E. and Prescott, E., C., (1982) and Prescott, (1986).
88See Enrique G. Mendoza, (1991); David K. Backus et al., (1992); Marianne Baxter and Mario J.
Crucini, (1993) for more details.
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smoother consumption during the time compared to a closed economy. They also have
larger response of investment to movements in expected rates of return. This is why mod-
els which are featured by shocks to technology show89 larger changes in relative prices in
open-economy models relative to the corresponding closed-economy versions. This also
clarifies why technology shocks induce significant movements in the balance of trade and
exchange rate in those models. Yet, previous models comes from the fact that nearly half
of a country’s output is made of non-traded goods. This evidence is possibly an important
missing factor of existing RBC since it helps reconstruct the link between a country’s
output and its spending. As a result of all these controversies in the literature, this thesis
aims to study the implications of fiscal policy in the determination of the real exchange
together the impacts of technology shock on this key economic variable.
4.2.1 Business cycle model
Here we go through the business cycle model from which we draw our sign restrictions.
The model we are using here is widely used in this literature and it features two-country
specific model in which some frictions exist.90 We employ Gali(1999) model in which there
is some degree of sticky prices that will alter the transmission of real shocks. Additionally,
one of the assumptions is that each country is specialized in producing a particular type
of good. Consumers, on the other hand, in both countries consume both goods however
in di↵erent extent. Moreover, the extension of their consumption in each country will
determine relative prices which consequently derives real exchange rate fluctuations. We
followed Engel (1999), Chari et al. (2002) and Enders et al. (2011) and did not take
non-traded goods into account for the US.
Before describing our sign restrictions we briefly explain the structure of the model.
The world consists of two di↵erent countries called “home” and “foreign” country.
Households
In each country the representative household allocate some of its resources to consume
some goods and also supply labour. There is also an endogenous discount factor in this
model which means that leisure and consumption is higher than its steady state if thee
discount factor is higher. Labour and capital are not mobile internationally. Household
in each country rent the capital they own to intermediate firm. It is also costly to adjust
the level of investment. The law of motion for capital is given by
kit+1 = (1   )kit + [1  (Iit/Iit 1)]Iit (4.2.1)
89Here the assumption is that technology shocks create changes in the expected return to investment.
90See, e.g., Chari et al. (2002) and Kollmann (2002).
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Where   denotes the depreciation rate. Across countries, trade is in the form of
bonds denominated in the currency of each country. Each representative household in
each country has a budget constraint. Also in each country consumers maximize their
preference function subject to law of motion of capital, their budget constraint as well as
a non-ponzi scheme condition.
Final good firms
We assume that investment and consumption are composite goods that households
buy from final good firms. These firms are in perfect competition market and purchase
their inputs from monopolistic competitive firms. One of the other important assumptions
here is that we assume that the law of one price holds for the firms and therefore we have:
PBIt (j) = StP
B
2t (j);P
A
1t(j) = StP
A
2t(j) (4.2.2)
let Ait(j) and Bit(j) denote the amount of good j which respectively is made in country
1 and 2 and used in country i to assemble the relevant final goods. These are produced
under a technology level which depends on the elasticity of substitution between foreign
and home goods and the elasticity of substitution between goods manufactured within the
same country. It also depends on the home bias in the composition of final goods.
The problem of this firm is to minimize expenditures in combining intermediate goods
subject to the technology that it is using. Furthermore, assuming that we are in the home
country, we define the real exchange rate as follows:
RXt = StP2t/P1t (4.2.3)
therefore an increase corresponds to a depreciation. 91
Fiscal Policy
For fiscal policy we assume that government spending consists of the basket of inter-
mediate goods. More importantly we assume that government goods are made with the
same technology that final good firms uses except that merely goods which are manu-
factured domestically enter the consumption bundle of the government. This evidence is
put forward by Corsetti and Muller (2006). They argue that the import goods as part of
government expenditure is in general less than half the import content in private spending.
Government consumption evolves as follows:
Git = (i  ⇢g)Gi + ⇢gG1it + 'y(Yit   Yi)  'd(Dit  Di) + "git (4.2.4)
91The terms of trade are defined as the price of imports relative to the price of exports: PBit /P
A
it
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letters without time subscript refer to steady-state values; ⇢g shows persistence and 'y
and 'd demonstrate the extent in which government expenditure reacts to the deviation of
output and debt from their steady-state values. "git, is an i.i.d. shock to current government
spending, which may have been robustly predicted n periods in advance because, say, of
institutional features of the legislative process. We also assume that tax rates adjust to
the level of debts. The government budget constrain in country i is as follows:
Dit + P
G
it Git = ⌧it(WitHit +R
it
kKit +⌥it) +Dit +R
 1
it (4.2.5)
PGit is the price index of government consumption.
4.3 New evidence on the behavior of Euro Area real exchange rates
4.3.1 Data and baseline specification
We estimate the VAR model (1) on time series data for the Euro Area relative to the U.S.
We include a constant and 4 lags of endogenous variables in the VAR model. The vector
of endogenous variables consists of, in logs and real terms, private consumption, GDP,
private investment, government spending as well as the primary budget balance scaled
by GDP, inflation (measured using the GDP deflator), the nominal short-term interest
rate and the log of the real exchange rate. Data for real output, private consumption,
government spending, the GDP deflator, and private fixed investment are taken from
the OECD Economic Outlook database. Government spending consists of government
spending on goods and services (government consumption), however it does not include
investment and transfers.92 The data ranges from 1975Q1 to 2007Q4. We dismiss the first
two troublesome years after the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system.93
For all the variables we used the data for Euro Area relative to the U.S. However
exchange rate is an exception.94
We use our baseline specification and identify a shock in government spending together
with productivity gains while the backbone of our identification procedure is the sign
restrictions summarized in Table 1.
92 Additionally, we use the same source of data to achieve the short-term interest rate, the government
balance (measured in percent of GDP), exports of goods and services (value, local currency), imports of
goods and services (value, local currency), and GDP (market prices) for the U.S. Net exports, as a fraction
of GDP, are computed on the basis of these series. For the Euro area we obtain several series from the
ECB’s AWM database. For more details of where to get relevant data, see Fagan et al.(2001) and Enders
et al.(2011). We take the CPI-based real e↵ective exchange rate for the U.S. from the Main Economic
Indicators of the OECD.
93Euro area growth rates consists of West-Germany for just before 1990Q4, and unified Germany from
1991Q1 afterwards.
94We apply the short-term interest rate (STN), the deflator of exports of goods and services (XTD),
the deflator of imports of goods and services (MTD), and the government primary surplus (GPN-YEN).
In case OECD data is used, similar adjustments have been applied in constructing the AWM database.
Weights are based on PPP adjusted values for the year 2000, as reported in the World Economic Outlook
database (2007) of the IMF.
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Table 2: Expansionary Innovations in Euro Area
Variables Government Spending Technology Shock
Consumption unrestricted +8
Output +2 +8
Investment -4 +4
Gov.Spending +4 unrestricted
Gov.Budget -4 +0
Interest Rate +4 -4
Inflation +0 -0
Exchange Rate Unrestricted unrestricted
4.3.2 Empirical results
Figs. 1 to 16 shows the impulse responses to the shocks in government spending and
technology given the estimated VAR model. We can see in all the figures the median and
also the 16% and 84% quantiles of the posterior distribution of impulse responses. Cru-
cially the results are considered as “significant” whenever both quantiles are either above
or below zero at a specific point in time. The horizontal axis shows periods (in quarters)
after each shock while the vertical axis, on the other hand, represents the percentage that
the responses depart from its baseline values. We show the periods in which we impose
sign restriction as shaded area in the figures.
Figures 1 to 8 shows the impulse responses of the variables in the model to an expan-
sionary shock in government expenditure. The impulse responses of all variables display
the response of relative variables to a domestic innovations95 however the only exception is
real exchange rate which shows the reaction of the domestic variable. Relative government
expenditure increases persistently for almost 12 quarters. However it is likely to decrease
in later periods. Enders et al. (2011) argue that this happens as a result of systematic cut
in response to higher public debt. GDP rises for nearly three quarters on impact however
it also falls afterwards. Succeeding the evidence reported by Perotti (2005) for a post-1980
data and also by Mountford and Uhlig (2009) and Enders et al.(2011) for the U.S, this
thesis shows a very temporary expansion in output as a result of government spending
shocks this time for Euro Area. Indeed, GDP increases just for the period that its respond
is restricted to be non-negative. In contrast to the case of US, however, GDP keeps falling
for all the periods following a fiscal shock. The government budget deteriorates for at least
14 quarters. Private consumption, in the same manner, decreases for the most period of
the study however after an initial rapid increase which lasts for 8 months. Gali et al.
(2007) suggest that private consumption rises after an increase in government expenditure
95This means that variables are the di↵erence between the reaction of a domestic variable (here European
Union) and its foreign partner (United States). We used relative variables in this thesis since we focus on
the behavior of the real exchange rate, which is defined by these relative variables.
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only if there is either a labor market friction or when the majority of individuals con-
sume disposable rather than permanent income. Our results document that government
spending crowds out private investment for the whole period and reduces inflation after
it increases initially for roughly 5 quarters. Therefore, investment decline, while inflation
rises slightly for 5 quarter and then declines. Interest rates, in turn, increase initially as
long as they are restricted to respond non-negatively, but falls constantly thereafter. The
reaction of real exchange rate after the shock is that it appreciates ( falls) continually.
The size of these exchange rate dynamics, however, is not considerable. Under standard
assumptions, exchange rate appreciates following an expansionary government spending
in business cycle models as well as textbook modifications of the Mundell-Fleming model.
As discussed in methodology section, we do not restrict exchange rate impulse responses
and as a result, we find interesting evidences: align with standard models of exchange rate
behavior, an expansionary government spending appreciates (decreases) the real exchange
rate. Furthermore, this finding is in contrast with the number of studies which investigate
the same issue using di↵erent identification schemes. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) iden-
tify their model assuming that government spending is predetermined. Kim and Roubini
(2008) as well as Monacelli and Perotti (2006) analyze U.S. data and Australia, the U.S.,
the U.K and Canada respectively. They find evidence that government spending shocks
depreciate the real exchange rate. Canada, however, was an exception.96
Figs 9-16 reveals how our variables reacts to a technology shock, i.e., productivity
gain. Government spending decreases initially for nearly 6 quarters however rises for 20
quarters afterwards. The budget does not decrease on impact and indeed increases for
the whole period. Enders et al. (2011) generate the same result for the US and argue
that it is likely to be the byproduct of the fact that tax revenues are procyclical. The
response of consumption is positive for the whole period. GDP increases for the intial 12
quarters howevers it falls sharply afterwards. Private investment responses increases for
16 quarters before its start to fall. Nominal interest rate, as the model imposes, falls for
6 quarters however it starts to increase afterwards for nearly 10 quarters before it starts
to fall sharply again. Inflation after a technology shock follows the pattern of nominal
interest rate.
Real exchange rate after a technology shock, similar to that of fiscal policy, appreci-
ates (falls) for most of the periods however after an initial depreciation which lasts for 9
quarters. One of the exceptions of the standard collaboration of the RBC model is called
96Beetsma et al. (2008) employed a methogology suggested by Ramey and Shapiro (1998) to identify
shocks in the Euro Area. Their results suggest that the real exchange rate appreciates after an expansionary
government expenditure in this area. This methodology according to the litrature is a well-documented
substitution to the Blanchard-Perotti method. Monacelli and Perotti (2006) used the same identification
approach and report that government spending decreases, while the real exchange rate depreciates. They
argue that this happens as a result of the Carter-Reagan military build-up.
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the Balassa-Samuelson e↵ect. The Balassa-Samuelson e↵ect argues that exchange rate
may appreciate following an improvement in the technology of the production of traded
goods. This happens through the impact of these technology shocks on the price of non-
traded goods. 0ur results, in line with Balassa-Samuelson e↵ect, document that exchange
rates appreciate (fall) considerably in most quarters after a productivity gain however
after an on impact depreciation which lasts for 10 quarters. These movements of exchange
rate, on the other hand, contrasts evidences obtained from the rest of the litrature which
use long-run restrictions to identify technology shocks. The exchange rate medium-term
movements in this thesis shows that exchange rate depreciates (increases) just for the
several initial quarters. Subsequently, the exchange rate falls beyond its steady-state level
before the shock happens. The same medium-term patterns for the exchange rate is also
confirmed in the study of Enders et al. (2011) for the US.
4.3.3 Our Results and further issues in the literature
This chapter investigates the dynamic response of a series of euro area macroeconomic
variables to fiscal policy and technology shocks employing structural VAR models. The
similar studies for the euro area, however, mostly concentrate on monetary policy rather
than fiscal policy. For instance, Peersman and Smets (2001) merely analyze monetary
policy shocks, and Peersman and Straub (2004) estimate both monetary and technol-
ogy shocks using model-based sign restrictions. In contrast to those papers, we identify
fiscal policy shocks as well as technology shock simultaneously by imposing theoretically-
consistent restrictions in line with Enders et al.(2011).
The identification of impulse responses that built on structural VAR models aims not
just at calculating the properties of the data. It also tends to determine the set of shocks
that should be integrated in dynamic general equilibrium models. A controversial debate in
the literature is to understand the impacts of positive technology shocks on main economic
indicators such as hours worked under di↵erent specifications.97
Sousa et al. (2012) investigate the impacts of a one-standard deviation positive technol-
ogy shock and argue that it induce a steady increase in the output. Furthermore, wages,
consumption and investment also react positively to a technology shock. These results
has been confirmed in most benchmark theories. The di↵erence between their study and
ours, however, is that they study the impact of monetary policy together with technology
shock while our focus is on the e↵ects of fiscal policy and technology shock. We also
find a continuing development in private consumption after a technology shock however
GDP and private investment merely increases for initial 12 and 16 quarters respectively
97Several studies have been done in this regard, namely Basu and Kimball (2004) and Gali (2004). Also
see Erceg, Guerrieri and Gust (2005) for a compehensive study of the reliability of identifying technology
shocks using long-run restrictions on a VARs.
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following the shock and then they start to fall till the very end of the period. Both studies
a rm each other on the reaction of inflation to a technology shock. Inflation’s reaction
is mainly contemporaneous and the largest response happens on impact. Besides, this
reaction is not statistically important and it is not di↵erent from zero98. They finally
conclude that positive technology shocks create a permanent drop in the number of labor
input employed in the economy. Sousa et al. (2012) finally suggest that hours worked are
procyclical which calls into question the reliability of the RBC paradigm. Indeed, if pro-
ductivity gains were the major drivers of business cycles in the economy then their VAR
results would show a negative relationship of hours worked and output growth and not the
positive one evidenced in their study, (Enders et al. (2011))99. Christiano et al.(2003), as
well, show that a technology shocks induce an increase in consumption, investment and
output. Hours per capital’s reaction, however, is in a sharp contrast with the evidences
reported in a large body of literature in which per capita hours worked decreases follow-
ing a positive technology shock. These papers utilize a reduced form time series models
employing minimal identifying assumptions to estimate a technology sock’s impact on the
economy. Their results are significant since they cast doubt upon the basic properties of
many structural business cycle models which imply that per capita hours worked increase
after a permanent shock to technology. Concurrently, they imply that permanent tech-
nology shocks does not have any significant role in explaining business cycle fluctuations.
After all, technology might produce quantitatively significant impacts if one accepts the
traditional growth models theories. Dedola and Neri (2007), furthermore, examine U.S
time series data for the postwar period and argue that a positive technology shock push
U.S. hours worked per capita after one year. Contrary to Christiano et al.(2003), their
results confirm the significant role of a technology shock in determining output dynamics
and are in line with the predictions of standard RBC models. One of the main di↵er-
ences between DeDola and Neri (2007) and Christiano et al.(2003) is that the former use
sign-restriction approach in identifying the technology shock.
In the fiscal policy literature, we investigate the impacts of the changes in government
expenditure on key economic indicators such as private consumption. This is a crucial
issue since fiscal policy is believed by policy makers to have an important impact on
individuals’ welfare given that private consumption is the largest portion of the aggregate
demand. Macroeconomic theories, in contrast, do not have a universal opinion about the
welfare implications of the fiscal shocks. According to the textbook Keynesian theories,
98In their model however, they also include per capita hours and show that it seems to fall permanently
which is similar to the one reported by Gali (2004) for the euro area.
99Their results from VARs model which are based on restrictions are in line with the conclusions reported
in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Vigfusson (2004), the response of hours to a technology shock would also
change substantially if hours worked were found to be stationary.
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private consumption increases following a positive shock in government spending. It is
however argued that the impact of a fiscal policy shock on aggregate output depends on
the changes in investment. Additionally, investment broadly relies on the monetary policy
determination of the interest rate. This model assumes that economic agents maximize
their utility function and finance their consumption out of their present income. Most
modern-day macroeconomic models, on the other hand, follow the neoclassical theories
and assume that consumers are infinitely lived consumption-smoothing agents. These
models predict a fall in consumption following an increase in government expenditure
through negative wealth e↵ect. This e↵ect comes from the fact that economic agents
predict an increase in tax rates in future by governments in order to finance their current
fiscal expansions. The empirical literature, however, provide conflicting answer to the
question of the impact of fiscal policy on consumption.
Gali et al. (2007) and Erceg et al. (2006) suggest that their results confirm the presence
of the “hand-to-mouth” consumers who their consumption behavior leads to the crowding
in of the private investment. A study by Rossi et al. (2004), however, could not find enough
support for the Gali et al. (2007) findings after replicating their results by assuming that
individuals are rule-of-thumb consumers if taxation is distortionary instead of being lump-
sum. Our results in this thesis, in contrast, shows that consumption falls following an on
impact increase of this variable which merely lasts for 8 quarters after an expansionary
government expenditure. Coenen et al. (2007a) also shows an increase in consumption
following an expansionary fiscal shock which is negligible. Horvath (2009), align with
this thesis, notice that an increase in private consumption after a rise in government
expenditure is not generally an character of the economy under optimal stabilization. This
holds even when one’s definition of the consumer behavior is di↵erent from conventional
macroeconomic theories. Indeed, he argues that a “crowding-in” e↵ect of consumption
following a government expansion merely happens in situations that might be hard to
reconcile with realities in advanced countries.
4.4 conclusion
In this chapter, we investigate international relative prices and its impact on the behavior
of a couple of important economic variables after an expansionary government expenditure
and technology shock in Euro Area. More specifically, the center of interest here is on the
e↵ects of productivity gains and fiscal shocks on exchange rate. The real exchange rate
is an important factor since it contains important information regarding the international
transmission mechanism, (Enders et al. (2011)). Furthermore, the role of fiscal shocks
and technology shocks altogether in particular had not previously been studied in the
case of the Euro Area. The results in his literature to a large extent depend on the
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estimated VAR models in which identification is obtained either by short-run or long-
run restrictions. These models are widely just based on a standard collaborations, which
exclusively provides evidences by construction. We employ sign restrictions derived from
the DSGEmodels in this chapter in order to identify structural shocks and more specifically
technology shock. More importantly, the existing evidence on the reaction of exchange
rate following a technology and government spending shocks is controversial and and seems
to call into question the predictions of international business cycle models.
We document evidences for 15 countries in the Euro Area using a di↵erent identifi-
cation method which involves Bayesian econometrics and sign restrictions. For obtaining
robust sign restrictions, following Enders et al. (2011) we achieve 100,000 simulations
of parameters based on a quantitative business cycle. To identify shock simultaneously,
several variables have been restricted by our identification scheme while we leave the re-
sponse of the exchange rates to be determined by the data. Standard models predict that
government spending and technology shocks appreciate and depreciate exchange rates
respectively. Our results confirm the predictions of the benchmark models about the ex-
change rate in particular about the impact of fiscal policy. We could not, however, find
enough support for the alternative calibrations of these models which assumed a low trade
price elasticity.
Assessing a VAR model on time series data for the Euro Area relative to the U.S.
economy, the results suggest that expansionary government spending shocks appreciates
(decreases) the real exchange rate. Furthermore, the real exchange rate depreciates (in-
creases) after a positive technology shock however just for a short period of time. With
regard to the basics, our empirical results to some extent can justify the predictions of
standard business cycle models. More importantly, it seems like di↵erent parametrization
of the model we used does not necessarily lead to di↵erent behavior of exchange rate re-
sponses to both shocks. Corsetti et al. (2008a) document that robust wealth e↵ects after a
technology shocks push the demand for domestic goods further than supply and therefore
appreciate the exchange rate.
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Conclusion
The recent position of central banks is one of the most misleading statuses to aid
the economy recover the output or employment. In the meanwhile, expansionary fiscal
policies are constrained. This restriction is as the result of fears about the level of public
sector debt, deficits and increasing in the population of old people. In this circumstance,
with the fiscal expansion being restrained, it is an exceeding pressure on central banks to
implement expansionary monetary stimulus by politicians. Furthermore, Goodhart et al.
(2012a) argue that the central banks independence has always been limited to “operational
independence” and not “goal independence”. Policy makers hence have always the final
power to set the goals of central banks. For instance, recently, after long debates about the
significant amendment in the goal of the Bank of Japan in delivering monetary policy, BOJ
merely has changed inflation target from one percent to two percent to be consistent with
the Bank of England (BOE) and European Central Bank (ECB). Even though the issue of
the independency of the central banks is not the focus of this thesis, it is recommended for
the further study. In this thesis, on the other hand, we are mostly interested to empirically
investigate the impacts of di↵erent shocks on the economy.
The impacts of monetary policy on main economic indicators such as output, price
levels and the exchange rate is a controversial issue in the literature. After the great
depression at the start of the 1980s, for example, economists take it as a fact that a
contractionary monetary shock can create severe recession. Basic econometrics approaches
also simply confirm these findings and show that an increase in the federal funds rate is
followed by falls in output. These results, however, can not be reproduced once using
multiple time series analysis. In the first chapter of this thesis, we study the e↵ects of the
monetary policy shocks on output, exchange rate and prices for the UK, the US and Japan
as well as three emerging countries namely Malaysia, Mexico and Korea. We accomplish
our study applying an identification method recently proposed by Uhlig (2005). In this
context, to achieve identification we levy sign restrictions on domestic short-term interest
rates, prices and total reserves for the first six months following the contractionary shock.
We put no restrictions on real exchange rate and output so that the impulse responses of
these variables are entirely ruled by the data. Concerning the restrictions that we enforce,
we succeed the benchmark theories and presume that a contractionary monetary policy
shock does not lead to a decrease in domestic short-term interest rates, does not raise
domestic prices and does not jump total reserves. We have three sets of remarks.
First, for all the countries in this study, the reaction of real output to adverse monetary
policy shocks is ambiguous. Therefore in most cases it does not have a substantial e↵ect
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on output as the response can be positive as well as negative. Thus, we cannot be as
comfortable as before when remarking on the impact of a tightening monetary shock
on the output. Second, we see price puzzle in developed economies, for Japan and UK
when we use the full sample period during which both countries involved in two di↵erent
periods of crises including the recent 2007-2009 financial crises. We explore that the price
puzzle is an artifact of excess lending and poor banking regulations. Excess lending prior
to financial crises produced inflationary expectations that in the case of UK have been
broadened by depreciation of the home currency. Put it di↵erently, we speculate that
the price puzzle in Japan and the UK is not a result of passive monetary policy, as the
central banks were active through out the sample period, but rather it is an e↵ect of the
poor regulation of the banking system that bring about a lending boom and inflationary
expectations. Our results imply that the right tool to fulfill market expectations and to
restore public confidence is through increasing the transparency of banking system and
introducing a better financial regulatory system. For emerging countries, we perceive the
price puzzle merely for the case of Mexico. We show that this observation disappears for
the post-crisis period. We suggest that the price puzzle was the result of real exchange
rate appreciation produced by a passive monetary policy accommodating higher level of
inflation than that is needed to achieve equilibrium in the balance of payments.
Third, in developed countries, we show that the exchange rate puzzle happens in the
UK and the US while we detect the delayed overshooting for Japan. Empirical support
indicates that in Japan exchange rate reacts to mitigate expected inflation while in the
UK and the US exchange rate response accommodates expected inflation100. For emerg-
ing countries, we o↵er evidence that the Mexican Peso displays momentous evidence for
delayed overshooting. Generally, while these observations we present here would be of
use to researchers and policy makers, as data becomes available more research on emerg-
ing economies is warranted. Finally, the results in this thesis recommend that monetary
policy shocks can explain only a small fraction of the variation in output and prices.
Quantitatively, monetary policy shocks appear to have a trivial impact on exchange rate
fluctuations as well as output, in contrast to some of the literature.
Relative to the large empirical works on the properties of monetary policy, fiscal policy
has attracted less attention in the literature until very recently. This is indeed in con-
trary with the public debates that provoke the macroeconomic importance of government
spending and taxation. The discussions around the Balanced Budget Amendment in the
US, the deficit limits of the Growth and Stability Pact under EMU, or the possibility of
100In an attempt to explain empirical findings of delayed overshooting theoretical research such as Gour-
inchas and Tornell (1996, 2002) argue that delayed overshooting is the by- product of learning the current
state and the intrinsic dynamic if interest rate reaction to monetary shocks.
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having independent institutions overseeing fiscal policy are all grounded in the assump-
tion that fiscal policy is an e cient instrument for stabilizing business cycles variations.
The necessity for empirical evidence to explicate the concerns in these debates prompted
a large body of new research, which can be roughly classified in three groups. First, a
group of economists dedicated to exclusive episodes, fiscal consolidations, to analyze the
macroeconomic influences of large cuts in the budget deficit. The second line of research
study the stabilizing competence of fiscal policy variables, i.e. to what degree the tax
and transfer system delivers protection against particular regional shocks and how well it
soothes macroeconomic fluctuations in the aggregate. Lastly, the dynamic outcomes of
discretionary fiscal policy on macroeconomic variables - a classical matter in the enormous
macroeconometric models of the 1960s and 1970s was just revived within the context of
vector autoregressions in the work of Blanchard and Perotti (1999).
In the second chapter of this thesis, we investigate the responses of important economic
variables to shocks in diverse types of fiscal policies; both expansionary and contractionary.
We investigate the impacts of fiscal policy innovations by employing a methodology put
forward by Uhlig (2005) for studying monetary policy. This methodology merely uses the
information in the macroeconomic time series data and employs as little prior assumptions
as possible to identify fiscal policy innovations. Crucially, it imposes no restrictions on the
impulse responses of the chief variables of the interest namely GDP, private consumption
and wages following a fiscal shock. We therefore study two main EU economies namely
UK and Italy using quarterly data from 1970 to 2009.
We associate our empirical estimations to standard real business cycle model and Key-
nesian model to comprehend which model is more influential in describing the evidences
following a fiscal policy shock. We note that an increase in government expenditure has an
expansionary e↵ect on output that is mostly as a result an upturn in private consumption.
Turning to RBC and Keynesian models, we notice that the standard RBC model fails
to fit the data. The leading di↵erence between our estimations and the RBC lies in the
performance of private consumption after an expansionary fiscal policy. It appears that
consumers behave in non-Ricardian fashion rather than looking at their lifetime income
to decide whether to consume or not. In other words, dissimilar to the RBC model that
predicts that private consumption drops following an expansionary government spending,
we find out that it indeed increases constantly after this expansionary shock happens. The
further di↵erence is in the response of wage to a fiscal shock where we find that wages
increases after an expansionary fiscal policy rather than decreasing.
Following the RBC models, one should expect that after an increase in government
purchase, labor input rise in any given rate of wage that consequently lead to a fall in real
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wages101. This prediction is not confirmed in this piece of work. In contrast, we find that
wages increase following an expansionary government spending shock. Gali et al. (2007)
o↵er a neat explanation for this phenomenon: they basically use the relationship between
rule-of-thumb consumers (for whom their consumption is a function of their labor income)
and sticky prices (which is the assumption of New-Keynesian models) to show how an
increase in government spending lead to an increase in consumption. Furthermore, this
is in line with most of the recent literature. Rule-of-thumb consumers reduce their con-
sumption as an impact of negative wealth e↵ect. Real wages, in the meanwhile, increases
because of sticky nature of prices even though there will be a fall in marginal product of
labor after an expansionary government spending. This happens since price markups may
fall to fill the resulting gap.
Both higher real wage and higher employment raises current income and therefore
boosts consumption of rule-of-thumb consumers. However, in models where the labor
market is not competitive and wage mark-ups are countercyclical, consumption and hours
of working increase without requiring real wage to increase. Since these models convention-
ally assume positive co-movements of private consumption and government expenditure,
they believe their results are providing a candidate explanation to the existing conflict
between empirical evidence and the predictions of existing DSGE models concerning the
impacts of government spending shocks. After a tax-cut, however, responses are totally
di↵erent. While wages increase for most of the period after a tax-cut in this thesis, it
initially falls for two years in Italy and then starts to increase.
Finally, it is worthwhile to stress that three types of fiscal policy shocks has been
studied in this chapter: a deficit financed spending shock, a balanced budget spending
shock (financed with higher taxes) and a deficit financed tax cut, in which revenues increase
but government spending stays unchanged. Furthermore, we study most of these shocks
both in contractionary and expansionary scenarios. To conclude our finding in a nutshell,
one can see that most of the expansionary shocks have an expansionary e↵ects on both
output and private consumption while contractionary shocks generate recessionary impacts
on the economy for both UK and Italy.
The last chapter of this thesis attempts to understand how the real exchange rate react
to government spending and technology shocks. This question is fundamental to shed
some light on the international transmission mechanism and has become the topic of a
substantial discussion. Inclusively, the current evidence seems to be di cult to merge with
the forecasts of both Mundell-Fleming type and intertemporal business cycle models under
standard settings. In this chapter, we attempt to form latest evidences on the performance
101It is justified by the assumption that after-tax lifetime income drops after an expansionary government
expenditure which result in a fall in consumption via negative wealth e↵ect.
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of couple of main economic variables after an expansionary government expenditure and
technology shock in Euro Area. Precisely, it spotlights the outcomes of productivity gains
and fiscal shocks on exchange rate. Exchange rate dynamics in fact contain important
information concerning the international transmission mechanism. Likewise, the role of
fiscal shocks and technology shocks altogether in particular had not formerly been studied
in the case of the Euro Area. This evidence is to a large degree depends on the estimated
VAR models in which identification is pursued either by imposing short-run or long-run
restrictions. Recent empirical models are simply roots in standard collaborations of the
theoretical frameworks. This basically implies that they might exclusively o↵er evidences
by construction. We engage sign restrictions originated from the DSGE models in order to
identify structural shocks. Besides, the existing literature about the response of exchange
rate following a technology and government spending shocks is controversial and contrasts
the predictions of real business cycle models.
We provide indications for the countries in the Euro Area using a di↵erent identification
technique that contains Bayesian econometrics and sign restrictions. For acquiring robust
sign restrictions, we succeed 100,000 simulations of parameters based on a quantitative
business cycle. To identify both government spending and technology shocks, we restrict
the responses of several variables while leave the response of exchange rates unrestricted.
Textbook models predict that government spending and technology shocks appreciate and
depreciate exchange rates correspondingly. As a consequence, one may deem our results
align with these benchmark models, chiefly in the case of fiscal policy, and in contract
with alternative calibration that assume a low trade price elasticity.
Assessing a VAR model on time series data for the Euro Area relative to the US econ-
omy, the results imply that expansionary government spending appreciates (decreases) the
real exchange rate. Moreover, the real exchange rate depreciates (increases) after a posi-
tive technology shock however just for a short period of time. With regard to the basics,
our empirical results to some level can rationalize the predictions of standard business
cycle models. More crucially, it appears like di↵erent parameterization of the model we
expended does not necessarily result in di↵erent behavior of exchange rate responses to
both shocks. Corsetti et al. (2008a) argue that robust wealth e↵ects after a technology
shocks push the demand for domestic goods more than supply and consequently appreci-
ate the exchange rate.
1.1 Limitations and Policy Implications
This final section addresses the issues regarding the failures of standard macroeconomics.
It therefore elaborates the reasons that macroeconomics has failed so significantly and
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then discusses some of the implications of the analysis. Structural vector auto-regressions
(SVAR) are employed as a reliable tool to study the impacts of di↵erent shocks empiri-
cally. The first step in using SVAR is to choose a theory. This theory will be employed to
derive restrictions and then impose these restrictions on the model to identify the shocks.
However, there is not a unique theory that is accepted by macroeconomists as a universal
model in explaining the economy. This has a significant adverse e↵ect on empirical re-
search since researchers cannot universally agree on a specific theory that can explain the
economy after these shocks. Identification of the shocks in the SVAR system, therefore,
becomes unreliable since they are identified based on controversial assumptions. This the-
sis is tackled this issue by going from data to theory and letting the data determine which
theory explains economic fluctuations more coherently. The sign-restrictions that have
been utilized here are not generated by a particular theory. Rather, merely the assump-
tions that are well-documented in the literature are employed in this study, regardless of
which theory they belong to. The results find little support for the predictions of the RBC
model after technology, monetary policy and fiscal policy shocks. The data, however, does
seem to confirm the interpretations of the new-Keynesian model to some extent. More
importantly, they suggest that the theories such as the NCM model is more successful in
explaining the impacts of shocks on the economy. One could therefore confidently employ
the predictions of the NCM model in achieving identification in the future.
In this thesis, one observes that the theories rooted in the frictionless market assump-
tions fail to satisfy the reality. Other theories which take into account di↵erent frictions
and imperfections in the market explain the data more successfully. This might imply
that the economy is not necessarily stable nor self-correcting. This conclusion has been
exemplified by the current financial crisis. Furthermore, in this study one observes that
the macroeconomic models that are simplistic in explaining the data largely focused on
exogenous shocks. On the contrary, it seems that a large proportion of the macroeconomic
fluctuations come from endogenous sources which are long-run structural and persistent
shocks. Therefore, the models that just concentrate on exogenous shocks tend to perform
poorly in explaining the data. These results show that the majority of the really big shocks
are generated within the economy. This might be the reason that most standard economic
theories failed to predict the occurrence of the financial crisis in 2008.
The other important interpretation is that markets by themselves do not lead to e -
cient and stable outcomes, (Stiglitz (2011a)). Therefore even though policies might help
economies to better accommodate more trivial shocks, in reality they weaken the econ-
omy’s ability absorb bigger shocks. This probably holds for most of the integrations within
the financial market that help the economy dealing with some of the smaller shocks, but
apparently make the economy more vulnerable to much bigger shocks. Furthermore, even
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though the literature is largely focused on “too big to fail” banks, it has not literally talked
about the issue of “ too correlated to fail”, (Haldane (2011)). It is therefore worth paying
more attention on the relationship between financial stability and financial integration in
future macroeconomic research.
There are some important lessons to learn from the current financial crisis and the
implications of this study. The current financial crisis, has indeed been the materialization
of the failure of macroeconomic modeling. It is very clear that the standard macroeconomic
models did not work very well. But, what did go wrong that we could not use models
properly? And is there anything that we can learn from it? The fact that economic
models did not work should be apparent to everyone; economics is regarded as a science
and therefore, the facts in economics should be tested. However, many economists and
economic models failed to predict the most important economic phenomenon of the last
decades. Conventional macroeconomic models, therefore, are believed to stand in the
way of conventional wisdom. For example, most models of conventional monetary policy
assume that price stability is necessary for the economic stability. The deficiency is that
these models are largely grounded on the assumption of price distortions. They, therefore,
widely associate monetary policy as a tool to tackle low and medium inflation rates and
ignore the fact that the loss function of the economy is the financial crisis. Financial crisis
in fact costs much more than high inflation, which is the centre of attention in all inflation
targeting models. The scope of disaster created by the financial crisis is not comparable
with the costs of high inflation. For example, many countries were experiencing very high
inflation before financial crisis in 2008, but then it was mostly the inflation of food and
energy. If one uses the inflation targeting models, one would have to destroy the entire
economy (Stiglitz (2013)). These models should not be accepted because they are not
based on robust assumptions. On the contrary, they are used globally by the central
banks and politicians.
DSGE models have been used in this thesis for empirical estimation. This approach,
however, has some significant limitations. Goodhart et al. (2012), among others, argue
that the recent financial crisis proves how unsatisfactory DSGE models perform by concen-
trating on the wrong variables. To understand this failure, one might study the state devel-
opment of the current macroeconomic models. During the 1950s and the 1960s, macroe-
conomists started creating computerized models of the economy based on the income-
expenditure Keynesian model. This is called “reduced-form” equations using a Keynesian
framework. Lucas (1998), nevertheless, claims that these equations tend to produce in-
coherent results. Additionally, it contains no genuine microeconomic foundations. This
is called the “Lucas critique”. Therefore, his followers began setting up macroeconomic
models based on the microeconomic foundations. Furthermore, economists from that pe-
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riod started noticing the detachment between microeconomics and macroeconomics. It
was also a natural desire to reconcile these two strands of economic thought. There were
therefore two approaches to connect macroeconomics with microeconomics. The first ap-
proach was to accept that microeconomics is rooted in wrong assumptions and try to make
it realistic. The other way was to assume that microeconomic assumptions such as per-
fect competition and perfect information are robust and therefore use these assumptions
as the foundation to study macroeconomics (Stiglitz and Greenwald (1988)). The latter
approach was taken by mainstream economists. This is, however, a controversial task.
One of the important issues is that these models are not able to capture the probability
of “default” among financial participants. This happens since economists presume a “rep-
resentative agent” to make DSGE models easy to estimate. This assumption simply rules
out the possibility of default since then either the whole financial system does not exist,
or nobody at all defaults. Eliminating default implies that all agents are willing to borrow
or lend at a risk-less rate. Furthermore, there are no risk premiums in this economy since
all participants are totally credit-worthy. In other words, everyone is as credit-worthy as
the government in these models and hence there is no need for financial intermediaries.
There is therefore no banking sector or money in this model. Consequently, everything
that central banks ought to be interested in, such as default, financial frictions and banks
are excluded from the DSGE models.
The other important point is that high level macroeconomic systems might have con-
trasting properties from the low level microeconomics system which they are based on.
The DSGE models, in fact, have broken down in di↵erent aspects and future macroeco-
nomics research should study the unrealistic assumptions that have caused this failure
to occur. For example, economists should re-investigate assumptions concerning risk and
uncertainty, representative agent assumption, rational expectations etc. Stiglitz (2011a,b)
proposes to try di↵erent models and drop some of the critical assumptions to test them
empirically. This being the case, the focus of the future macroeconomic modeling would be
to examine the assumptions that are the most crucial reasons in generating the unrealistic
outcomes and find a solution for them. Even though the literature is not well-grounded
yet in this matter, it has been confirmed in some studies that the current version of the
“rational expectations hypothesis” and “wage rigidity assumption”, for instance, have
led to many false conclusions. Stiglitz (2013) argues that wage rigidity is indeed a very
wrong assumption because if wage rigidity is the problem, then the solution is to make
labor wages more flexible. More importantly, these kind of economic results have some
very significant political impacts in the real world. For example, the People’s Bank of
China has recently talked about lowering wages as the solution to reviving the economy.
Nonetheless, even in the Keynesian economics context, lowering wages leads to less aggre-
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gate demand and worsens the situation by creating debt deflation. Stiglitz and Greenwald
(2010) furthermore claim that debt inflation in fact has more explanatory power for eco-
nomic fluctuation than wage rigidity. It also plays a significant role in the models that
inform central bankers and made them aware of the current mess.
However, Sims (2012a,b) argues that sometimes criticizing DSGE models is an easy
way to satisfy the readers. The first thing to consider is that there is as yet no alternative
for what DSGE models are o↵ering to central banks. Central banks have just a few
months to decide their next action. Many of the central banks therefore extensively use
the models that play an important role in understanding the state of the economy and the
likely impacts of their various policy actions. It is true to argue that before DSGE models
were introduced, the old models were doing the same task for central banks. However, it is
absolutely important for policy decision-making to utilize the large amount of data coming
in. This can indeed, in some coherent way, contribute to the discussion of the state of
the economy and options for policy making. The important aspect of DSGE model is its
competence in organizing the data. Put di↵erently, the advtange of DSGE models is that
they employ rational expectations hypothesis in their analysis. Therefore, they capture
expectations and intertemporal budget constraint in an internally consistent way. Sims
(2012a) claims that even though DSGE models still do not perform in a way they should,
the theories that were used before behave much worse in these respects. In many cases,
their match to the data as models of the joint times-series behavior of large collection of
the variables are much more reliable than the previous models. In this respect, at least,
no model can be considered as the DSGE model competitor to up to this time.
Sims (2012a,b), nonetheless, agrees with the critiques of the DSGE model that unfor-
tunately some of these models that include central banks, have literally left out financial
sectors. However, there is a new-Keynesian DSGE model which contains a straightforward
financial friction inside the model that includes investment financed by collateralized debt.
This implies that it does not have a representative agent of the kind that Stiglitz et al.
(2012), for instance, criticized. It simply has investors on one side and firms on the other
side and the institutional frictions occur in transferring funds from one side to the other.
These models show that the shocks to collateral requirements have considerable e↵ects
on the business cycle. Furthermore, the existence of the collateralized-debt finance in the
economy has significant implications on financial stability and policy e↵ects. Additionally,
one important issue to investigate further is to test whether inflation targeting, which is
usually used in conjunction with the DSGE models, is indeed a deficient policy in the face
of the exogenous shocks in price levels. The discussion regarding this question is beyond
the scope of this thesis; however it could be a potential topic to investigate in the future.
Last but not least, the main tools of monetary policy is the interest rate on overnight
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loans between banks. This holds in normal times when overnight interest rates are con-
siderably sensitive to the level of excess reserves. Nevertheless, since the current financial
crisis began in 2008, the Federal Reserve’s target for the fed funds rate has been virtually
zero. Hamilton and Wu (2012) argue that: “The level of reserves, which had typically
been around 10 billion dollars prior to the financial crisis, has been maintained in the
neighborhood of a trillion dollars”102. Therefore, neither lowering the short-term interest
rate nor raising the quantity of reserves any further can expand aggregate demand and
output. Since the central bank’s traditional instruments are no longer able to further
boost the economy, it is of considerable interest to ask, in further research, what other
options central banks have to implement monetary policy.
102Hamilton, J. D., Wu, J. C., 2012. The e↵ectiveness of alternative monetary policy tools in a zero lower
bound environment. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 44(s1), 3-46.
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2 Appendix 1
2.1 A: Priors
Most empirical research on Bayesian estimations of DSGE models apply rather informa-
tive prior distributions. The purpose of using the prior is to implement other kinds of
information that are not directly introduced in the likelihood function. A number of pri-
ors might be used with the VAR system. Priors change regarding to three subjects: First,
VARs are not parsimonious models as they have a great many coe cients. For instance,
the number of observations can exceed a few hundred on every variable in quarterly data.
Choosing not to use prior information makes it really di cult to achieve reliable estimates
of so many coe cients. Features such as impulse responses and forecasts could also be
estimated inaccurately103. Second, the priors employed with VARs vary depending on
whether priors are used to generate results for the posterior and predictive densities, or
whether Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) approaches are indeed required to do this
Bayesian inference104. Third, the priors di↵er in how robustly they are able to deal with
deviations from the unrestricted VAR105.
2.1.1 The Independent Normal-Wishart Prior
The prior that has been used in this thesis is Normal-Wishart prior. Bayesian inference in
VAR models demand posterior simulation algorithms for example the Gibbs sampler. The
103i.e., posterior or predictive standard deviations can be large.
104Koop and Korobilis (2009) argue that:“with the VAR, natural conjugate priors lead to analytical
results, which can greatly reduce the computational burden. Particularly if one is carrying out a recursive
forecasting exercise which requires repeated calculation of posterior and predictive distributions, non-
conjugate priors which require MCMC methods can be very computationally demanding.”
105This literally means permitting di↵erent equations to have di↵erent explanatory variables, letting VAR
coe cients di↵er over time, allowing for heteroskedastic structures for the errors of various sorts, etc.
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natural conjugate prior has #|⌃ being Normal and ⌃ 1 being Wishart106. The fact that
the prior for # relies on the value of   means that # and   are not independent from each
other. Therefore, we use a prior that possess VAR coe cients and the error covariance
being orthogonal to each other and therefore is being called “independent NormalWishart
prior”.
We then re-write each equation of the VAR as107:
ymt = z
0
mt m+ "mt (2.1.1)
where t = 1, ..., T observations for m = 1, ...,M variables vector. ymt is the tth
observation on the mth variable. zmt is a Km-vector holding the tth observation of the
vector of explanatory variables related to the mth variable.  m is the supplementary
Km-vector of regression coe cients.
By allowing zmt to fluctuate across equations, it essentially permits some of the co-
e cients on the lagged dependent variables to be restricted to zero. This is called the
“restricted VAR”.
We can pile every equation into vectors and matrices as follows:
yt =
 
y1t y2t ... yMt
 0
(2.1.2)
"t =
 
"1t "2t ... "Mt
 0
(2.1.3)
  =
0@  1...
 M
1A (2.1.4)
Zt =
0BB@
z01t 0 ... 0
0 z2t0 ... 0
... ... ... 0
0 ... 0 zMt0
1CCA (2.1.5)
where   is a k ⇥ 1 vector. Zt is X ⇥K and k =
PM
j=1 kj . We might write the (possibly
restricted) VAR by the new notations as:
yt = Zt  + "t (2.1.6)
piling as:
106Conjugate prior is widely used in the literature.
107Please note that we have amended marginally some of the indexation of the VAR equations in this
section for describing the prior.
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y =
0@y1...
yT
1A (2.1.7)
" =
0@"1...
"T
1A (2.1.8)
Z =
0@Z1...
ZT
1A (2.1.9)
we can write:
y = Z  + " (2.1.10)
where " is N ⇠ (0, I ⌦ ⌃).
It can be shown that the restricted VAR can be composed as a Normal linear regression
model with an error covariance matrix of a particular form. A very typical prior for this
model is the independent Normal-Wishart prior as follows:
p( ,⌃0) = p( )p(⌃0) (2.1.11)
  ⇠ N( ¯, V¯ ) (2.1.12)
⌃ 1 ⇠W (S¯ 1, ⌫¯) (2.1.13)
It is important to note that this prior permits the prior covariance matrix, V¯  , to be
exactly what the researcher wants.
Employing this prior, the collaborative posterior p( ,⌃ 1|y) does not show a feasible
form that could lead to easy Bayesian analysis. For instance, posterior means and vari-
ances do not have analytical forms. Nevertheless, the conditional posterior distributions
p( |y,⌃ 1) and p(⌃ 1|y, ) do represent computable forms:
 |y,⌃ 1 ⇠ N(~ , ~V ) (2.1.14)
~V  = (V¯
 1
  +
TX
t=1
Z 0t⌃
 1Zt) 1 (2.1.15)
~  = ~V (V¯
 1
   ¯ +
TX
i=1
Z 0t⌃
0yt) (2.1.16)
In addition:
⌃ 1|y,  ⇠W (~S 1,~⌫) (2.1.17)
~⌫ = T + ⌫¯ (2.1.18)
~S = S¯ +
TX
t=1
(yt   Zt )(yt   Zt )0 (2.1.19)
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Consequently, a Gibbs sampler that successively draws from the Normal p( |y,⌃) and the
Wishart p(⌃0|y, ) can be computed in a straightforward way. Like any Gibbs sampler, the
subsequent posterior simulator outcome might be utilized to quantify posterior properties
of any function of the parameters, marginal likelihoods (for model comparison) and/or to
make predictions.
Remember that, for the VAR system, Zt will hold lags of variables and, therefore, have
information dated ⌧  1 or prior. The one-step ahead predictive density108, conditional on
the parameters of the model would be:
y⌧ |Zt, ,⌃ ⇠ N(Zt ,⌃) (2.1.20)
This outcome, besides a Gibbs sampler yields draws  (r) and ⌃(r) for r = 1, . . . ,
R that leads to predictive inference. For example, the predictive mean (a popular point
forecast) will be computed as:
E(y⌧ |Z⌧ ) =
PR
r=1 Zt 
(r)
R
(2.1.21)
and further predictive moments might be quantified in a similar approach. Otherwise,
predictive simulation could be achieved at each Gibbs sampler draw; however this can be
computationally di cult. For prediction horizons larger than one, the direct approach
might be employed.
2.2 B: Posteriors and Marginal Likelihood in Bayesian method
Suppose that we have M models symbolized by M1 till MM . Every model possess a
parameter vector ✓i a fitting prior distribution p(✓(i),Mi) for the model parameters, and
prior probability ⇡i,0. The posterior model probabilities are given by:
⇡i,T =
⇡i,op(Y1:T |Mi)PM
j=1 ⇡j,op(Y1:T |Mj)
(2.2.1)
p(Y1:T |Mi) =
Z
p(Y1:T |✓(1),Mi)p(✓i|Mi)d✓(i) (2.2.2)
p(Y1:t|Mi) is the marginal likelihood or data density related to model Mi. Providing the
likelihood functions p(Y1:T |✓(i),Mi) and prior densities p(✓(i)|Mi) are correctly normalized
for each model, the posterior model probabilities are satisfactory defined. As for any model
Mi
lnp(Y1:T |Mi) =
TX
t=1
ln
Z
p(yt|✓(i), Y1,t 1,Mi)p(✓(i)|Y1,t 1,Mi)d✓(i) (2.2.3)
log marginal likelihoods may be translated as the sum of one-step-ahead predictive scores.
The expressions on the right-hand side of the above equation deliver a decomposition of
108i.e., the one for predicting at time ⌧ given information through ⌧   1.
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the one-step-ahead predictive densities p(yt|Y1:t 1,Mi). This decomposition emphasizes
the point that interpretation about the parameter ✓i is based on time t-1 information,
when making the prediction for yt. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to deliver a
universal discussion of the procedure of posterior model probabilities or odds ratios for
model comparison109.
It is important to notice that in practice priors are repeatedly based on presample
information. As in time-series models data have a natural ordering, we might consider
observations Y1:T¨ as presample and p(✓|Y1,T¨ ) as a prior for ✓ that integrates these presample
facts. Conditional on Y1:T¨ , the marginal likelihood function for succeeding information
YT¨+1:T is provided by
p(YT¨+1:T |Y1:T¨ ) =
p(Y1:T )
p(Y1:T¨ )
=
Z
p(YT¨+1:T |Y1:T¨ , ✓)p(✓|Y1:T¨ )d✓. (2.2.4)
The density p(YT¨+1:T |Y1:T¨ ) is usually referred to as predictive marginal likelihood and
might substitute the marginal likelihood we obtained before in the building of posterior
model probabilities, if the prior model probabilities are likewise amended to replicate the
presample information Y1:T¨ . As previously, it is significant that p(✓|Y1:T¨ ) is a suitable
density. In the framework of a VAR, a correct prior might be attained by substituting the
dummy observations Y¨ and X¨ with presample observations.
Posterior model probabilities happen to be usually employed to choose a model spec-
ification upon which any subsequent implication is conditioned. Although it is normally
desirable to average across every model specifications with nonzero posterior probability,
a model selection method could deliver a fitting estimation if the posterior probability of
one model is extremely close to one, the probabilities accompanying with all other specifi-
cations are su ciently trivial, and the loss of providing suggestion or resolutions grounded
in the highest posterior probability model is not too large if one of the low probability
models is indeed accurate.
2.2.1 Empirical estimation of the Marginal Likelihood for SVARs
Bayes factor has normally been used for model comparison in forecasting exercise. In
our context, we can compute Bayes factor on reduced form VAR. However, computing
Bayes factor for SVAR, which implies that we need to compute marginal likelihood after
we put restrictions on impulse response functions, is computationally demanding. The
main problem is that selecting a model based on the Bayes factor does not necessarily
imply that its impulse response functions are consistent with the underlying theoretical
model. More concretely, the best performing model in terms of Bayes factor might perform
poorly in terms of theoretical model. This might be the main reason why the MATLAB
109A survey is provided by Kass and Raftery (1995).
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and the RATS softwares that we used in this thesis in our empirical work do not provide
the marginal likelihood.
Koop and Korobilis (2009), similarly, argue that the focus of the macroeconomics liter-
ature is on estimation and prediction rather than model comparison or hypothesis testing.
Macroeconomists are mostly interested in letting the data speak and then finding a fitting
model. Therefore, estimating several parsimonious models and computing statistical ap-
proaches to pick a single one is not desirable in macroeconomics research. Furthermore,
marginal likelihoods in multi-dimensional models such as SVARs could be too sensitive
to the prior that the researcher picks. Therefore, many software packages that are used
to compute SVAR do not report marginal likelihoods for high dimensional models since
estimating the marginal likelihood is computational demanding.
2.3 C: Givens Matrices
Assuming that we have 3 VAR variables in our macro model, a 3⇥ 3 Givens matrix, Q12
is the following:24cos⇥   sin⇥ 0sin⇥ cos⇥ 0
0 0 1
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Q12 is referred to as Givens rotation. This matrix is an identity matrix and the block
consisting of the first and second columns and rows has been swapped by cosine and sine
factors. ⇥ lies between 0 and ⇡ \ 2. Therefore, Q023Q23 = I3 given this mathematical rule
that cos2⇥ + sin2⇥ = 1. There are therefore three di↵erent Givens rotations for a three
variable VAR model; Q12, Q13 and Q23. Each of them depends on a separate parameter
⇥k. In empirical studies, most researchers accepted the multiple of the basic set of Givens
matrices as Q. For instance, in the three variable example we would adopt:
QG(⇥) = Q12(⇥1)⇥Q13(⇥2)⇥Q23(⇥3) (2.3.1)
QG is orthogonal and therefore shocks generated as ⌘t00 = QG⌘t are going to be uncor-
related and their impulse response on Zt will be Tˆ 00 = TˆQ0G.
The matrix QG described above depends on three di↵erent ⇥K . Canova and de Nicolo
(2002) argue that we can make a grid of M values for each ⇥K between 0 and ⇡. After-
wards, one needs to calculate all the possible QG. All these models recognized by various
numerical values for ⇥K are observationally similar. Their similarity lies in the fact that
they all generate an exact fit to the variance of the data on zt110. Simply, only those QG
yielding shocks that are in line with the provided sign restrictions are kept.
110It is presumed in the study that the zt has been mean corrected prior to the VAR being fitted.
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2.4 D: Householder Transformation
Another way of constructing an orthogonal matrix Q is to compute some random variables
W from an N(0, I3) density (for a three variable VAR for instance). Afterwards, one
needs to decompose W = QRR where QR is an orthogonal matrix and R is a triangular
matrix. Householder transformation of a matrix is employed to decompose matrix W. The
algorithm that generates QR is referred to as a QR decomposition. QR = I relates to the
matrix employed in recursive orderings. Runio-Ramirez et al. (2005) who put forward
this idea show that as the size of the VAR system grows, this approach is more capable of
computing impulse responses relative to the Givens approach. Fry and Pagan (2007) argue
that both approaches can be considered as equally e↵ective and the criteria for choosing
between these two would be computational speed.
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Appendix 2⇤
⇤I want to thank Dr.Karoglou from Aston University for his contributions to our joint
paper by producing the sensitivity analysis for the UK and the US.
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Figure 1: Japan Full Sample
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Figure 2: Japan 1992-2007
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Figure 3: UK Full Sample
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Figure 4: UK 1995-2007
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Figure 5: USA Full Sample
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Figure 6: Impulse Responses Malaysia
Impulse Responses with Pure-Sign Approach
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Figure 7: Impulse Responses Korea
Impulse Responses with Pure-Sign Approach
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Figure 8: Impulse Responses Mexico
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Figure 9: Impulse response Mexico (1995m1-2009m11)
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Figure 10: Sensitivity analysis for the UK impulse response
8
Figure 11: Sensitivity analysis for the US impulse response
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Appendix 3
1
Figure 1: Expansionary Spending Fiscal Policy Shock in UK
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Figure 2: Expansionary Spending Fiscal Policy Shock in Italy
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Figure 3: Expansionary Delayed Spending Fiscal Policy Shock in UK
Responses to Spending (delayed)
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Figure 4: Expansionary Delayed Spending Fiscal Policy Shock in Italy
Responses to Spending (delayed)
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Figure 5: Expansionary Basic Revenue Fiscal Policy Shock in UK
Responses to Revenue
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Figure 6: Expansionary Basic Revenue Fiscal Policy Shock in Italy
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Figure 7: Expansionary Delayed Revenue Fiscal Policy Shock in UK
Responses to Revenue (delayed)
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Figure 8: Expansionary Delayed Revenue Fiscal Policy Shock in Italy
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Figure 9: Contractionary Basic Spending Fiscal Policy Shock in Italy
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Figure 10: Contractionary Delayed Spending Fiscal Policy Shock in UK
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Figure 11: Contractionary Delayed Spending Fiscal Policy Shock in Italy
Responses to Spending (delayed)
GDP
0 5 10 15 20
-2
-10
0
10
Expenditure
0 5 10 15 20
-5
-3
-1
1
Wages
0 5 10 15 20
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Money Market Rate
0 5 10 15 20
-0.75
-0.50
-0.25
0
0.25
0.50
PPI
0 5 10 15 20
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Consumption
0 5 10 15 20
-10
-6
-2
2
6
Revenue
0 5 10 15 20
-0.5
-0.25
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
Reserves
0 5 10 15 20
-5
-3
-1
1
3
GDP deflator
0 5 10 15 20
-0.5
-0.25
0
0.25
0.5
12
Figure 12: Contractionary Revenue Fiscal Policy Shock in UK
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Figure 13: Contractionary Revenue Fiscal Policy Shock in Italy
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Figure 14: Contractionary Delayed Revenue Fiscal Policy Shock in UK
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Figure 15: Contractionary Delayed Revenue Fiscal Policy Shock in Italy
Responses to Revenue (delayed)
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Figure 16: Deficit Tax Cuts in UK
Responses to Deficit Tax Cut
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Figure 17: Deficit Tax Cuts in Italy
Responses to Deficit Tax Cut
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Figure 18: Deficit Finance Spending Increase in UK
Responses to Deficit Spending
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Appendix 4
1
Figure 1: Europe’s Private Consumption Impulse Response Relative to the
US after an Expansionary Fiscal Policy
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Figure 2: Europe’s Exchange Rate Impulse Response Relative to the US after
an Expansionary Fiscal Policy
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Figure 3: Europe’s GDP Impulse Response Relative to the US after an Ex-
pansionary Fiscal Policy
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Figure 4: Europe’s Government Budget Impulse Response Relative to the
US after an Expansionary Fiscal Policy
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Figure 5: Europe’s Government Spending Impulse Response Relative to the
US after an Expansionary Fiscal Policy
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Figure 6: Europe’s Inflation Impulse Response Relative to the US after an
Expansionary Fiscal Policy
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Figure 7: Europe’s Interest Rate Impulse Response Relative to the US after
an Expansionary Fiscal Policy
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Figure 8: Europe’s Private Investment Impulse Response Relative to the US
after an Expansionary Fiscal Policy
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Figure 9: Europe’s Private Consumption Impulse Response Relative to the
US after a Technology Shock
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Figure 10: Europe’s Exchange Rate Impulse Response Relative to the US
after a Technology Shock
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Figure 11: Europe’s GDP Impulse Response Relative to the US after a Tech-
nology Shock
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Figure 12: Europe’s Government Budget Impulse Response Relative to the
US after a Technology Shock
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Figure 13: Europe’s Government Spending Impulse Response Relative to the
US after a Technology Shock
8
Figure 14: Europe’s Inflation Impulse Response Relative to the US after a
Technology Shock
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Figure 15: Europe’s Interest Rate Impulse Response Relative to the US after
a Technology Shock
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Figure 16: Europe’s Private Investment Impulse Response Relative to the
US after a Technology Shock
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